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Using Critical Race Theory and legal history, this article searches the roots 
of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s rationale in Grutter v. Bollinger.  It critically 
views Grutter as an “anti-affirmative” action case, contrary to popular belief.  
And it uses Professor Derrick Bell’s “interest-convergence” principle to explain 
the law’s regulation of miscegenation, interracial love and marriage, and why the 
law gave black women limited property ownership rights, in the antebellum South.
 African Americans have a peculiar relationship with the legal history of 
America’s private property ownership system.  Most of them descend from 
America’s enslavement of blacks, in which they were legally classified as “private 
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property.”  For enslaved blacks, being “property” meant that you were owned by, 
controlled by, could be abused by, and bought and sold by your owner.  (As an 
enslaved black, you were also generally denied property ownership rights.)  Your 
freedom, your labor, and even your body were attributes that your master legally 
controlled.  For enslaved black women, this meant that white men owned and 
controlled your sexuality, often using you to bear their children.  White masters 
owned their mixed-race children they fathered with their enslaved black women!   
This article analyzes how the American legal system regulated 
miscegenation, from the perspective of the black woman’s property rights.  It 
describes and analyzes the black woman’s property rights against the white man’s 
American Dream, the “property-enslavement-sexual” paradigm: cheap land, 
cheap labor, and cheap sex.  It describes and analyzes the law’s regulation of 
white men who attempted to bestow upon their black women and children inter 
vivos and causa mortis legacies.  How antebellum southern legislatures and courts 
managed the property rights of black women illustrates the relationship between 
sex, race, status, and wealth acquisition.  This article also analyzes the little known 
anomaly of the law’s treatment of “free” black women, who successfully 
negotiated past enslavement, and who themselves owned plantations, large homes, 
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and enslaved blacks:  the “black mistress.”  
This article concludes that the roots of Grutter are in the Nineteenth Century 
antebellum South’s legal treatment of blacks as white property.  And that Justice 
O’Connor’s rationale in Grutter treats aspiring African-American students 
(mainly women), applying to America’s elite public universities and professional 
schools, as intellectually-inferior “diversity commodity”: there merely to serve the 
white majority’s (mainly men) needs.  In summary, both Grutter and its 
Nineteenth-Century roots, regulate the sexual-racial economies of property,  treat 
blackness as white property, reflect Professor Bell’s “interest-convergence” 
principle, and serve to reinforce a greater social and economic order:  the 
continued domination, supremacy, and privilege of wealthy white men.     
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The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.  
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and 
political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or 
subconscious, even the prejudices of judges share with their 
fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the 
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be 
governed.
– Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes3
Translated from judicial activity in racial cases both before and 
after Brown, this principle of ‘interest convergence’ provides: 
3OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).  See JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, THE 
SLAVE COMMUNITY, PLANTATION LIFE IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1979) [hereinafter 
BLASSINGAME], Preface to the Second Edition, at vii, restating Holmes’ analysis in terms of 
history of American slavery: “Intriguing, complex, opaque: these are descriptive terms easily 
applied to American slavery.  The more the student of the peculiar institution reads, the more 
conviction grows that antebellum Southerners persisted in deviating from the beliefs and 
behavioral patterns historians have ascribed to them.”
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The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be 
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of 
whites.
– Professor Derrick Bell4
I.  INTRODUCTION
A. GRUTTER ON SEX, RACE, STATUS, AND WEALTH
This is an article about sex5, race6, status7, and wealth8 in American society.9
4Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1979-1980) [hereinafter BELL].  
5
“Sex” is defined as “[e]ither of the two divisions of organic beings distinguished as male 
and female respectively; the males or the females (of a species, etc. of the human race) viewed 
collectively.”  THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, VOL. XV, 107 (2nd ed. 1989) [hereinafter 
OXFORD DICTIONARY].  This article defines “sex” as the broad division of gender, male and 
female, as well as the physical and emotional relationship between people, regardless of gender.  
The author uses sex in the content of the American antebellum South, and does not deny or 
choose to ignore trans-gender issues.  
6
“Race” is defined as “[o]ne of the great divisions of mankind, having certain physical 
peculiarities in common.  The term is often used imprecisely; even among anthropologists there 
is no generally accepted classification or terminology.”  OXFORD DICTIONARY, VOL. XIII, supra
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note 5, at 69.  This article defines “race,” following the American antebellum southern tradition, 
as “black,” generally enslaved people of African descent, and “white,” generally free people of 
European descent.  The author recognizes this use reflects the values of a political economy that 
has benefitted and continues to benefit from such racial polarization.  
7
“Status” is defined as “Law.  The legal standing or position of a person as determined by 
his membership of some class of persons legally enjoying certain rights or subject to certain 
limitations; condition in respect, e.g. of liberty or servitude, marriage or celibacy, infancy or 
majority.” OXFORD DICTIONARY, VOL. XVI, supra note 5, at 573.  This article defines “status,” 
in the context of the American antebellum South, to emphasize the social value that white society 
placed on groups, based upon the political economy of sex and race.  In particular, how powerful 
white men perceived another group’s utility to them.
The author believes that status is an important factor when analyzing sex and race.  While 
the African-American community is not economically monolithic, as discussed infra, there are 
many shared “black experiences” that derive from white stereotypes of African Americans.  For 
example, a successful African-American female brain surgeon certainly enjoys greater financial 
and societal benefits than that of an impoverished, inner-city black welfare mother who is a high 
school dropout.  Yet they both share in the experience of being victims of police “racial 
profiling,” based upon the police’s perception of them as criminal element.  See generally
Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality:  Or Why the ‘War on 
Drugs’ Was a ‘War on Blacks,’ 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 381 (2002). 
Similarly, in the antebellum South, although all blacks faced racially-based 
discrimination, their status were not the same.  See generally BLASSINGAME, supra note 3, at 249 
(“The behavior of the black slave was intimately bound up with the nature of the antebellum 
plantation, the behavior of masters, the white man’s perceptions and misperceptions, and a 
multitude of factors which influenced personal relations.”)  For example, the vast majority of 
blacks were enslaved, yet there were a minority, approximately ten percent, who were legally 
“free.”  See generally IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS, THE FREE NEGRO IN THE 
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More specifically, it is about how sex, race, and status affect the acquisition, 
development, and retention of wealth.10  It exhibits how an analysis of legal 
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1974) [hereinafter BERLIN].  
8
“Wealth” is defined as “Economics.  A collective term for those things the abundant 
possession of which (by a person or a community) constitutes riches, or ‘wealth’ in the popular 
sense.”  OXFORD DICTIONARY, VOL. XX, supra note 5, at 42.  This article uses “wealth” as 
synonymous with the full rights of U.S. citizenship and capital accumulation, especially all rights 
of private property ownership, and wealth creation and transference, including that of intellectual 
or intangible property and government “entitlements.”  The author recognizes that “wealth” is 
synonymous with “greed,” the root of all evil, including the root of the American enslavement 
system.        
9This article adopts Professor Adrienne Davis’s terms “enslavement” and “enslaved,” 
rather than “slavery” and “slave” to describe the political-economic-sexual economy in which 
blacks were legally and often physically held in bondage.   Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law 
of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221, 223 at n. 4 (1999) 
[hereinafter DAVIS] (“I do so in order to highlight the fact that people are not born into servitude.  
Others force such conditions onto them, with the assistance of state-sanctioned, and often state-
sponsored, violence and coercion.  Enslavement is not a one-time determination of status; rather, 
it must be enforced and maintained on an ongoing basis.”)
10See generally Daniel J. Sharfstein, The Secret History of Race in the United States, 112 
YALE L.J. 1473 (2003) (presenting society’s attempts to divide the world strictly into black and 
white, and to erase racially-mixed people from legal classification).
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principles regulating miscegenation, specifically pertaining to sexual relations11
11See PETER KOLCHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, 1619-1877, 122-24 (1993) [hereinafter 
KOLCHIN] (“The close contact that existed between masters and slaves worked special hardship 
on slave women, who were vulnerable to sexual as well as labor exploitation....  South Carolina 
ideologue William Harper turned it into a virtue, insisting that it helped account for the absence 
of Southern prostitution and the purity of white women.  Patrician diarist Mary Boykins Chesnut, 
by contrast, countered that in fact ‘we live surrounded by prostitutes....  Like the patriarchs of old 
our men all live in one house with their wives and concubines, and the mulattoes one sees in 
every family exactly resemble the white children.’  Chesnut’s resentment was directed at the 
wrongs she saw committed against white (sic) women...but to the equally bitter ex-slave 
autobiographer Harriet Jacobs, the victims were black (sic) women forced to endure the shameful 
indignities ‘inflicted by fiends who bear the shape of men.’ (sic)  As Chesnut and Jacobs 
recognized, and Harper implicitly conceded, no slave woman was safe from unwanted sexual 
advances.
Of course, not all advances were entirely unwanted.  There were slave women who 
maintained long-term relationships with white men that came close to common-law marriages. 
[This author disagrees with this source, that longevity in an abusive relationship equates to 
consent, especially when the victim is already legal property of the other party in the 
“relationship.”]....
Far more often, however, slaves who had sex with whites did so against their will, 
whether the victims of outright rape or of the powerlessness that made resistance to advances 
futile and the use of force in such advances unnecessary....  Sex between white men and black 
women was a routine feature of life on many, perhaps most, slaveholdings, as masters, their 
teenage sons, and on large holdings their overseers took advantage of the situation to engage in 
the kind of casual, emotionless sex on demand unavailable from white women.  What was 
routine and causal to white men caused anguish to black women, anguish graphically described 
by Harriet Jacobs in her searing autobiography, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, ‘I cannot tell 
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between wealthy white men 12 and black13 women 14 in the antebellum South,15
how much I suffered in the presence of these wrongs,’ she wrote, ‘nor how I am still pained by 
the retrospect.’” (Footnotes omitted.))    
12Who were these “wealthy white males” in the antebellum South, and why are they 
significant to understanding sexual-racial economies?   In the antebellum South, “wealth” was 
viewed by the number of enslaved blacks one owned.  See KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR 
INSTITUTION:  SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 30-1 (1956) [hereinafter STAMPP] (“The 
planter aristocracy was limited to some ten thousand families who lived off the labor of gangs 
(sic) of more than fifty slaves.  The extreme wealthy families who owned more than a hundred 
slaves numbered less than three thousand, a tint fraction of the southern population.”).  It is 
generally accepted that owning fifty or more slaves constituted a “large” holding.  ROBERT 
WILLIAM FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS:  THE ECONOMICS OF 
AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY 200 (1974) [hereinafter FOGEL & ENGERMAN].  See generally
WILLIAM KAUFFMAN SCARBOROUGH, MASTERS OF THE BIG HOUSE:  ELITE SLAVEHOLDERS OF 
THE MID-NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH (2003) [hereinafter SCARBOROUGH] (presenting a 
comprehensive analysis of the demographics, backgrounds, and thinking of this elite super-
class). 
While black enslavement was concentrated on several large plantations, it was, at the 
same time, widespread and intimate:  the majority of the four million enslaved blacks, counted in 
the 1860 U.S. Federal Census, were owned by “resident” masters, in small holdings.  KOLCHIN, 
supra note 11, at 93, 101.  
The planter aristocracy added to wealth, with political power.  KOLCHIN, infra, 183-84 
(“More and more, slaveholders–and the defense of slaveholders’ interests–dominated Southern 
politics....  Reinforcing the hegemonic hold of slaveholding interests over Southern politics was 
the simple numerical preponderance of slaveholders in Southern government....  A majority of
legislators in every slave state except Missouri, Arkansas, and Delaware were slave owners in 
1860; typically, about three-quarters of deep-South legislators and two-thirds of upper-South 
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legislators owned slaves.  At the gubernatorial level, slaveholding was virtually universal.... [t]he 
slaveholding character of most Southern politicians greatly facilitated the identification of 
Southern interests with slaveholding interests, both in their own minds and in the minds of 
others.  Southern politics increasingly revolved around the defense of slavery, which was cast as 
defense of the South itself.”) 
One might believe that white men, especially wealthy and powerful white men, rarely 
chose black women, especially enslaved black women, as their sexual partners.  Yet our history 
is filled with miscegenational relationships, involving rich and powerful white men and black, 
sometimes enslaved, women.  Some noteworthy ones include that of President Thomas 
Jefferson’s sexual relationship with Sally Hemming (see WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER 
BLACK 546 (1968), Chapter 6, detailing Jefferson’s long-term sexual relationship with Sally 
Hemming, one of his enslaved black women).  They also include Vice President Richard M. 
Johnson (under President Martin Van Buren) who had an open, long-term relationship with a 
black woman, and provided for their mulatto children.  And most recent, it is now known that 
Senator Strom Thurmond had a sexual encounter with Carrie Butler, that produced their 
daughter, Essie Mae Washington-Williams (see Michael Janofsky, Thurmond Kin Acknowledge 
Black Daughter, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2003, at http://www.nytimes.com (last visited, Dec. 16, 
2003)).  See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES, SEX, MARRIAGE, 
IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 41-59 (2003) [hereinafter KENNEDY].
13
“Black(s)” is defined as “[h]aving an extremely dark skin; strictly applied to negroes 
and negritos, and other dark-skinned races; often loosely, to non-Europeans races, little darker 
that many Europeans....  Of or pertaining to the negro race.”  OXFORD DICTIONARY, VOL. II, 
supra note 5, at 238.  For purposes of this article, the term “black(s)” refers to people of African 
heritage, who, in the American enslavement system, were generally enslaved.  The term “black” 
is synonymous with the terms “Negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “mulatto,” as those terms were 
used in the 1830, 1840, 1850, and 1860 United States Census.  “Black” is a term unoffensive to 
most contemporary African Americans, especially compared to terms often used by some whites 
Blackness as Property
Page 16 of 302
in the antebellum period (and afterwards) including “Negro” and “nigger.”  For an intriguing and 
brilliant analysis of the history and legacy of a racially-charged word, see RANDALL KENNEDY,  
NIGGER, THE STRANGE CAREER OF A TROUBLESOME WORD (2002). 
Unlike Professor Kimberle Crenshaw, this author has chosen not to capitalize the word 
“black,” seeking to highlight skin color and to contrast “white,” which is generally not 
capitalized.  In doing so, the author does not disagree with Professor Crenshaw’s view that 
“Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other ‘minorities’ constitute a specific cultural group and, as 
such, require denotation as a proper noun.”  See Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and 
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
1331, 1332 n.2 (1987-1988).    The term “black(s)” in this article does not refer to skin color, as 
by operation of law, any “drop of black blood” (any black ancestry) resulted in a person being 
classified as “black,” or “Negro,” meaning not white.   See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ISIDORE 
STARR, THE NEGRO IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 3-13 (1967).  The enslavement economy used 
racial classification to promote enslavement over freedom.  See generally COLOR AND RACE 
(John Hope Franklin ed., 1968); Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE 
L.J. 1487 (1999-2000).  
In Louisiana, racial classifications were taken to another level.  Free blacks were often 
referred to as “persons of color” or “gens de couleur.”    There were also many levels of racially-
based classification based on the mixture of black and white “blood” (although we know that 
blood only has one red color).  This article is not concerned with the debate over the effect that 
skin color or ethnicity may have had on the status or social acceptability by whites of certain free 
blacks who might have looked and acted “European,” although the author does not deny that skin 
color may be a “status” issue.  A black’s skin color alone did not determine status in the 
antebellum South, as there were clearly dark-complexioned blacks who were free and owned 
enslaved blacks.  In addition, there were clearly light- or white-complexioned blacks (and even 
reportedly white people) who were enslaved and treated as such.  See VIRGINIA R. DOMINGUEZ, 
WHITE BY DEFINITION: SOCIAL CLASSIFICATION IN CREOLE LOUISIANA (1986).  
Racial classification, that is “black” and “white” (and formerly “colored”), remains a 
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closely guarded legal phenomenon in contemporary America.  See recent debate over 
California’s Proposition 54, a failed and heated attempt to change the California constitution to 
delete racial classifications from official records.  See generally Tanya Kateri Hernandez, 
“Multiracial” Discourse: Racial Classification in an Era of Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 MD. 
L. REV. 97 (1998) (exploring the contemporary legal ramifications of the multiracial category 
movement, proposed by “monoracial” black and white parents of biracial children).  (Racial 
classification is legally more significant than gender classification, as seen in a Louisiana statute, 
by which a person, who “changes” his or her sex, can legally have the “sex” designation (e.g., 
from “male” to “female”) changed on his/her birth certificate.  See 40 La. Rev. Stat. § 62, 
“Issuance of New Birth Certificate after Anatomical Change of Sex by Surgery.”  There is no 
corresponding provision for a person to change their race on their birth certificate. 
14This article will focus primarily on the adult relationships between wealthy white 
masters and “adult” enslaved or free black women, both of legal age of consent.  (There is doubt 
whether black women ever “consent” to these relationships.  First, the law gave such 
overwhelming power and authority that white masters made their sexual advances difficult to 
resist.  Second, the law provided no remedy for the rape of an enslaved black woman. And, third, 
the law failed to provide an enslaved black the legal capacity to consent, negativing their 
humanity and will.)  Some historians, such as Eugene Genovese, have concluded that these illicit 
relationships began with rape and may have ended with love.  EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, 
JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 415 (1974) [hereinafter GENOVESE, ROLL]. 
(“Many white men who began by taking a slave girl in an act of sexual exploitation ended loving 
her and the children she bore.”) Tragically, many of these relationships began with adult white 
men raping underage enslaved black girls.  See Lisa Haberman, The Seduction of Power: An 
Analogy of Incest and Antebellum Slavery, 13 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 307, at 313 -19 (2002) 
(noting the similar relationship in the law’s treatment of enslaved blacks and that of wives and 
children, which in each case, many times led to sexual exploitation).   
There is consensus that some enslaved black women were purchased specifically to be 
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white men’s sex toys, although perhaps not a widespread reason for all purchases of black 
women.  See ULRICH B. PHILLIPS, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY:  A SURVEY OF THE SUPPLY, 
EMPLOYMENT AND CONTROL OF NEGRO LABOR AS DETERMINED BY THE PLANTATION REGIME 
193-4 (2nd ed. 1969) [hereinafter PHILLIPS] (“The slaves whom the dealer preferred to buy for 
distant sale....  Demonstrable talents in artisanry (sic) would of course enhance a man’s value; 
and unusual good looks on the part of a young woman might stimulate the bidding of men 
interested in concubinage.  Episodes of the latter sort were occasionally reported....  Concubinage 
itself was fairly frequent, particularly in southern Louisiana; but no frequency of purchases for it 
as a predominant purpose can be demonstrated from authentic records.”)
A romantic view of these miscegenational relationships can be found in the account of a 
white Tennessee schoolteacher.  Showing his deep love for his black wife and their children, in a 
petition to the American Colonization Society, he asked for permission to migrate to Liberia: 
“My wife is a Quadroon of New Orleans... we have been married for five years and have two 
children, who being only 1/8 African, are blue-eyed, and flaxen hair; and nearly as ‘pale faced’ 
as myself.  Still, they are coloured and that is a word of tremendous import in North America!...  
I will go anywhere... to avoid so hateful an alternative.” BERLIN, supra note 7, at 267.   
Other white men-black women relationships existed, some legitimate and some 
“illegitimate.”  There was the wealthy white master’s relationship with his mulatto daughter, 
who is herein referred to as the “black princess,” the offspring of a white master and a black 
woman, free or enslaved.  By law, the black princess was owned by her white father, as she 
maintained the legal status of her enslaved mother.  For example, the first recorded Virginia 
“slave code” statute, in 1662, firmly dealt with the legal status of mixed race offspring: 
“Whereas some doubts have arisen whether children got (sic) by an Englishman upon a negro 
woman should be slave or free, Be it therefore enacted... that all children borne in this country 
shall be held bond (sic) or free only according to the condition of the mother.” JOHN H. 
RUSSELL, THE FREE NEGRO IN VIRGINIA, 1619-1865, 19 n. 8 (Dover Publications, Inc. 1969) 
(1913) [hereinafter RUSSELL] (citing Hening, vol. ii, p. 170).  See also BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1121 (6th ed. 1990), under the term “partus sequitur ventrem.” (“The offspring of a 
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provides great insight into the very nature of the regulation of wealth transference 
and property rights, including a better understanding of contemporary 
constitutional issues involving race and gender.  This article’s focus on the 
relationship between miscegenation and wealth transference represents an unusual 
and exciting interdisciplinary approach to the contemporary debate on society’s 
obligations to African Americans.  Legal scholarship has peeked at how Critical 
Race Theory can illuminate the truth in the development of the American legal 
system.16  This article’s approach serves to open the door to an increased use of 
slave belongs to the mother, or follows the condition of the mother.”).  The white father and 
master had to both acknowledge and emancipate his black princess to give her “free” status, 
along with inheritance rights.  In addition to relations with the black mistress, wealthy white 
masters had relationships with older black women, free or enslaved; some of whom reared him 
and breast fed him, as a surrogate mother.  
15See STAMPP, supra note 12, at 28 (referring to the 1830-1860 time period as the “ante-
bellum” enslavement period).
16See generally DOROTHY A. BROWN, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: CASES, MATERIAL AND 
PROBLEMS (2003) (utilizing Critical Race Theory in developing a black letter law case book). See 
also DAVIS, supra note 9 (analyzing the relationship of race, sex, and inheritance law, and 
describing the legal obstacles to black devisees in the antebellum South); Anthony R. Chase, 
Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to the Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1 
(1995) [hereinafter CHASE] (taking a Critical Race Theory approach to analyzing the 
development of contract law); Mary Frances Berry, Judging Morality: Sexual Behavior and 
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Critical Race Theory to solve contemporary legal problems. 
This article seeks to explain the majority opinion in the recent Supreme 
Court’s “anti-affirmative action”17 decision in Grutter v. Bollinger.18   It seeks to 
Legal Consequences in the Late Nineteenth-Century South, 78 J. AM. HIST. 835 (1991) 
(analyzing legal attitudes towards concubinage and inheritance); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE 
AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY 1810-1860: CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST 45-50 
(1981) [hereinafter TUSHNET] (describing how commercial law was influenced by enslavement, 
such as the fellow-servant rule); and Frederick Wertheim, Slavery and the Fellow-Servant Rule: 
An Antebellum Dilemma, 61 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1112 (1986) (describing enslavement’s effect on the 
fellow-servant rule).  One Critical-Race-Theorist defined it as “the work of progressive legal 
scholars of color who are attempting to develop a jurisprudence that accounts for the role of 
racism in American law and that works towards the elimination of racism as part of a larger goal 
of eliminating all forms of oppression.”  Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False 
Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1763, 1763 n.3 (1990).  See generally CRITICAL 
RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberle Crenshaw et al., 
eds., 1995).
This article seeks to marry Critical Race Theory with Feminist sensitivities to promote 
the observation that anticipated this article’s position, made by DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE 
BLACK BODY, RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 23 (1997), wherein she 
states: “The social order by powerful white men was founded on two inseparable ingredients: the 
dehumanization of Africans on the basis of race, and the control of women’s sexuality and 
reproduction.  The American legal system is rooted in this monstrous combination of racial and 
gender domination.” 
17Grutter is an “anti-affirmative action” decision because, even though hailed as a victory 
for racial and ethnic-based “affirmative action” at state universities and professional schools, the 
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do so by analyzing the legal history of miscegenation and of black women’s 
property rights in the antebellum South.  It is within that analysis that this article 
expects to find the roots of the majority’s rationale in Grutter.  
Tying the Grutter rationale to laws regulating miscegenation and black 
women’s property rights in the antebellum South, needs some introductory 
explanation.  From a critical perspective, Grutter is a case about property, wealth 
transference, and miscegenation, when seen through the rationale of Justice 
O’Connor’s swing-vote opinion.19  First, Grutter is a case about privilege and 
Supreme Court’s justification was not to act affirmatively to benefit African-American and other 
racially and ethnicly “disadvantaged” students, but, rather, it was to enhance the educational 
experience of the affluent majority white student population.  See infra, note 19.  Compare a 
positive interpretation of Grutter, P ATRICIA GURIN, JEFFREY S. LEHMAN, AND EARL LEWIS, 
DEFENDING DIVERSITY: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN (2004).  The 
author is particularly grateful to Cornell University President (formerly Dean, University of 
Michigan Law School) Jeffrey S. Lehman for sending an advance chapter, entitled, “The 
Evolving Language of Diversity and Integration in Discussions of Affirmative Action from 
Bakke to Grutter.”
18123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
19Justice O’Connor’s fifth vote is generally regarded as the decisive tiebreaker in that 
case.  See Evan Thomas, Stuart Taylor Jr., Debra Rosenberg & Eleanor Clift, Center Court: She 
helped America seek a middle ground on the thorny subject of race.  Sandra Day O’Connor’s 
brand of justice, NEWSWEEK, July 7, 2003, available at 2003 WL 8639381.   First, Justice 
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wealth transference.  Wealth is the capital accumulation of “privilege” and 
“property”20 interests.   It has been widely recognized that access to prestigious 
O’Connor reiterates Justice Powell’s view in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 
(1978), establishing “strict scrutiny” of racial or ethnic-based state actions: “In Justice Powell’s 
view, when governmental decisions ‘touch upon an individual’s race or ethnic background, he is 
entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely 
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.’  Id. at 299, 98 S. Ct. 2733. Under this 
existing standard, only one of the interests asserted by the university survived Justice Powell’s 
scrutiny.”  Second, Justice O’Connor agrees with Justice Powell’s rejection as a compelling 
argument that African-Americans deserved to have an equal opportunity to attend professional 
(medical) degree granting schools.  She states that Justice Powell first rejected an interest in 
“‘reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medicine and in the 
medical profession’” as an unlawful interest in racial balancing. Id. at 306-07, 98 S. Ct. 2733.  
Second, Justice Powell rejected an interest in remedying societal discrimination because such 
measures would risk placing unnecessary burdens on innocent third parties “who bear no 
responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions programs are thought 
to have suffered.” Id. at 310, 98 S. Ct. 2733.  And third, Justice Powell rejected an interest in 
“increasing the number of physicians who will practice in communities currently underserved,” 
concluding that even if such an interest could be compelling in some circumstances, the program 
under review was not “geared to promote that goal.” Id. at 306, 310, 98 S. Ct. 2733.  Justice 
Powell approved the university’s use of race to further only one interest: “the attainment of a 
diverse student body.”  Id. at 311, 98 S. Ct. 2733.      
20
“Property” has historically been seen as a legal interest in a thing, and almost 
synonymous with the thing, such as land.  That legal interest became “reified” or abstracted, as 
to be no longer reflective of a tangible object.  See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of 
the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV.
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universities, like Yale, Stanford, and the University of Michigan, is one of the 
greatest sources of wealth creation in contemporary society, especially their 
professional school programs.21
Second, Grutter is about “property,” in that African Americans who apply to 
elite predominately white universities and professional schools are judicially 
325 (1980) (analyzing the “dephysicalization” of property and the resultant broadening of 
property law to include valuable interests not traditionally treated or considered as property.) 
Compare William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial 
Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1974) (showing how the 
racial sexual economy impacts legal development).  Query: Did this “dephysicalization” or 
“reification” occur in response to the classification of enslaved blacks as “property?”  One 
answer can be found in the view of JUDGE A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF 
COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 15 (1978) 
[hereinafter HIGGINBOTHAM] (explaining “how the American legal process was able to set its 
conscience aside and, by pragmatic toadying (sic) to economic ‘needs,’ rationalize a regression 
of human rights for blacks.”)
Today, “property” is legally enforceable interests over wealth including intangibles such 
as intellectual property (copyrights and patents), investment vehicles (stocks and bonds), 
education (law and medical degrees and licenses), and arguably governmental benefits (social 
security and welfare).  See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).   
Hence, the contemporary issue of African-American access to quality higher education, 
“affirmative action” is a property law issue. 
21See Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383 
(1993).
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reduced to “white property,” or “diversity commodity.”22  In Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion, the only legal justification for African Americans attending America’s 
elite public (and arguably) private universities and professional schools, is to 
provide “a diverse student body” to enhance the learning environment of the 
affluent white majority.23  This view reduces African Americans to white property 
22The author coins this phase to refer to African-American students on white college 
campuses, who, in the eyes of the majority of the Supreme Court in Grutter, are not entitled as 
tax-paying citizens to seek a quality education at their state’s “flagship” universities and 
professional schools.  The Grutter Court’s only legal justification for minority students’ presence 
on white campuses is that they merely enhance the experience of the white student majority.  
(Query: Should the white student majority pay the African-American students’ tuition, as the 
white students are the prime beneficiaries of the experience?)
23123 S.Ct. at 2340 (Justice O’Connor): 
These benefits (of diversity; author’s words of explanation, not Justice 
O’Connor’s direct words) are not theoretical but real, as major American 
businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today’s increasingly global 
marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, 
cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.... What is more, high-ranking retired officers and 
civilian leaders of the United States military assert that, ‘a highly qualified, 
racially diverse officer corps... is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its 
principle mission to provide national security.’...  The primary sources for the 
Nation’s officer corps are the service academies and the Reserve Officers 
Training Corps (ROTC), the latter comprising students already admitted to 
Blackness as Property
Page 25 of 302
in three ways:   The Grutter majority fails to recognize African -American self-
determination as a consideration, negating their free will.  The Grutter majority 
appears to accept as its premise the “African-American inferiority stereotype.”24
participating colleges and universities.... At present, ‘the military cannot achieve 
an officer corps that is both highly qualified and racially diverse unless the 
service academies and the ROTC used limited race-conscious recruiting and 
admissions policies.’...  To fulfill its mission, the military ‘must be selective in 
admissions for training and education for the officer corps, and it must train and 
educate a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps in a racially diverse 
setting.’...  We agree that ‘it requires only a small step from this analysis to 
conclude that our country’s other most selective institutions must remain both 
diverse and selective.’   (References omitted.)
24That stereotype of “inferiority” is based mainly upon performance on “standardized” 
examinations, such as the LSAT test for law school applicants.  It is irrefutable that Justice 
O’Connor’s Grutter opinion stigmatizes all racial minorities who apply to, and attend, 
predominately white, elite public (and arguably private) institutions as less qualified than many, 
if not most, of their white counterparts.  Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2344 (O’Connor, as part of her 
discussion of the “termination” point of affirmative action): “What is more, the Law School 
actually gives substantial weight to diversity factors besides race.  The Law School frequently 
accepts nonminority (sic) applicants with grades and test scores lower than underrepresented 
(sic) minority applicants (and other nonminority (sic) applicants who were rejected.”  And again, 
at 2346-7, Justice O’Connor refers to the lower scores of minority students: “It has been 25 years 
since Justice Powell first approved the use of race to further an interest in student body diversity 
in the context of higher education.  Since that time, the number of minority applicants with high 
grades and test scores have indeed increased.”  (She also referenced lower minority grades at 
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That is, that African-American applicants need “affirmative action,” because they 
are inherently unqualified to compete with white students at elite state universities 
and professional schools.  And the Grutter majority empowers white America to 
judge whether African-American applicants are worthy recipients of white 
generosity.
And, third, the Grutter case is about miscegenation.  It is specifically 
concerned with a limited number of African-Americans, primarily women, seeking  
access into predominantly white, elite public universities and professional 
schools.25  As white men make up the largest single gender group on elite public 
2344, “Justice Kennedy speculates that ‘race is likely outcome determinative for many members 
of minority groups’ who do not fall within the upper range of LSAT scores and grades.”)
At the same time, Justice O’Connor was aware that there were less stigmatizing 
alternatives to increase the number of minority at the University of Michigan Law School, but 
chose to ignore them: “The District Court took the Law School to task for failing to consider 
race-neutral alternatives such as ‘using a lottery system’ or ‘decreasing the emphasis for all 
applicants on undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores’....  So too with the suggestion that the Law 
School imply lower admissions standards for all students, a drastic remedy that would require the 
Law School to become a much different institution and sacrifice a vital component of its 
educational mission.”  Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2345 (O’Connor).      
25See The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, at 
www.jbhe.com/latest/112703_blacks_law_schools.html (last visited December 16, 2003) 
[hereinafter JOURNAL] (reporting that “black women are now 60 percent of all African-
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university campuses, when we discuss integrating those campuses with primarily 
black women, we must consider the issue of miscegenation.  (Of course, there are 
other racial-gender relationships, including white men and black men, white 
women and black men, and white women and black women, that exist on elite 
university campuses.) 
The thesis of this article, then, is that Justice O’Connor’s rationale in Grutter
has its roots in southern antebellum laws regulating and negotiating the sexual-
racial economies of property acquisition and transfers from white men to black 
women, including testamentary transfers and intestate succession, and, consistent 
with Professor Derrick Bell’s “interest-convergence” principle, serves to reinforce 
a greater social and economic order (as the law did in the antebellum South): the
domination, supremacy, and privilege of wealthy white men.
An overview of the article’s layout is appropriate here.  Part I establishes the 
Americans law school enrollments....  At both the University of California at Berkeley and the 
University of Virginia, black women are more than 70 percent of all black students.”  See also
The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, at 
www.jbhe.com/latest/120403_grads_MedicalSchool.html (last visited December 16, 2003) 
(reporting that “Beginning in 1989, and for every year since then, black women have been the 
majority of all blacks completing medical school.  In 2001 they made up 60.5 percent of all 
blacks who graduated from medical school....  Black women are 61 percent of all black students 
at Johns Hopkins University, believed to be the best medical school in the nation.”)    
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critical value of a case study of the law of miscegenation and black women’s 
property rights, relative to contemporary constitutional law race and gender issues 
and its validity in evaluating Professor Derrick Bell’s “interest-convergence” 
principle.  Part II presents and analyzes the legal principles that the white masters 
developed to control the world they made, one that effectively married America’s 
antebellum private property ownership, enslavement, and sexual paradigms; their 
“American Dream.”  Part III describes and analyzes how, in the antebellum 
American South, legislatures regulated miscegenation, and how sex, race, and 
status affect the doctrinal mechanisms that governed private property transactions 
including the acquisition, control, and transfer of property.   Part IV describes and 
analyzes how and why antebellum Southern courts, particularly in the more 
permissive legislative regime of Louisiana, restricted white men’s ability to 
transfer, by will, wealth to their enslaved black female sexual partners.  Part V 
describes and analyzes the paradox in the existence and success of the “black 
mistress,” black women who the law allowed certain property law privileges, 
including the right to own land and enslaved blacks in the antebellum South, and 
how their legal experience challenges Professor Bell’s “interest-convergence” 
principle.  Part VI provides a postscript to the black mistress, describing her role in 
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the post-bellum civil rights movement.  And Part VII describes and evaluates the 
concept of “blackness as white property” in contemporary society.  
This article concludes that the legal treatments of miscegenation and of 
black women’s property rights, in the antebellum South, are the roots to Justice 
O’Connor’s rationale in Grutter, and that both reflect and support  Professor Bell’s 
“interest-convergence” principle.  That is, that the law regulating and negotiating 
the sexual-racial economies of property acquisition and transfers, including 
testamentary transfers and intestate succession between white men and black 
women, served to reinforce a greater social and economic order in the antebellum 
South: the domination, supremacy, and privilege of wealthy white men.
B. BELL’S “INTEREST-CONVERGENCE” PRINCIPLE TESTED BY 
THE LEGAL HISTORY OF MISCEGENATION 
This article utilizes Professor Derrick Bell’s “interest-convergence” 
principle as a vital tool.  Relative to Critical Race Theory, Professor Bell has 
observed: “Translated from judicial activity in racial cases both before and after 
Brown, this principle of ‘interest convergence’ provides: The interest of blacks in 
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achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the 
interests of whites.”26   This article tests the application of Bell’s “interest 
convergence” principle to the development of the antebellum South’s law of 
miscegenation and the black women’s property rights, or simply white to black 
wealth transference.    
This article conducts an interdisciplinary analysis of sex, race, status, and 
private property by examining the law’s role in black women’s property ownership 
in the antebellum South.  (It also exposes and explodes certain myths and 
stereotypes about enslavement and the status of black women within the 
enslavement.)  This article examines nineteenth-century statutes and cases 
involving black women’s27 property and inheritance rights, including those of 
26BELL, supra note 4.
27This article expressly singles out African-American women in its treatment of the 
subject for various reasons.   First, as discussed later, black women made up a significant 
percentage of the free population. BERLIN, supra note 7, at 151 (“Of all slaves, the black 
concubines and children of slaveholders were most assured of emancipation.”) Id. at 177 (“In 
contrast to the white and slave populations, there were many more Negro women than men in the 
South.  The great preponderance of free Negro women was confined almost entirely to the cities.  
There the combined effects of manumission and migratory patterns played havoc with the sexual 
balance.  Urban emancipators tended to bestow favors on women, partly because slave women 
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free28 black women who owned property, including land and their ownership of 
enslaved blacks.29  In this article, these rare, privileged, and affluent class of free 
outnumbered slave men in the cities and partly because close intermingling encouraged sexual 
liaisons which sometimes led to manumission....  [T]he greater mobility of free Negro men 
allowed a disproportionate number of them to leave the South.”)  Second, some black women 
held significant tracts of land and large numbers of slaves.  Third, miscegenation, particularly 
black women’s relationships with white men, is an essential element for understanding this piece 
of legal history. 
The author’s focus on the relationship between white men and black women is not meant 
to lessen the importance of other miscegenational relationships in the antebellum South, or to be 
blind to their existence.  For example, there were also free black men who played a significant 
role in American history.  Consistent with Professor Bell’s “interest-convergence” principle, 
black men were manumitted mainly due to military service and other heroic deeds that served the 
interests of wealthy white males.  See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 428 (“Among the more 
romantic liberations was that of Pierre Chastang of Mobile who, in recognition of public service 
in the war of 1812 and the yellow fever epidemic of 1819 was bought and freed by popular 
subscription....” (Footnote omitted.))  Needless to say, there were sexual relationships between 
free black men and white women, particularly in the urban areas.  See, e.g., JOHN W. 
BLASSINGAME, BLACK NEW ORLEANS 1860-1880 (1973) [hereinafter BLASSINGAME, BLACK] 
(especially Chapter 7 on sexual relations between blacks and whites).  
28These blacks, living in the southern enslavement states, were legally “free,” not legally 
enslaved and were not someone’s property.  See generally BERLIN, supra note 7.  
29See LOREN SCHWENINGER, BLACK PROPERTY OWNERSHIP IN THE SOUTH, 1790-1915, 
86-87 (1990) [hereinafter SCHWENINGER]: 
Blackness as Property
Page 32 of 302
[F]ree women of color... as a group... controlled a substantial proportion of the 
total black wealth.  In 1850, they owned $2,033,500 worth of real estate or 27 
percent of the total $7,668,100; in 1860, they owned $2,782,700 of the 
$12,841,600 in real property, or 22 percent.  As with men there was a sharp 
contrast between the Lower South, where, according to the census, 561 free 
women of color owned a total of $1,671,400 in 1850, or $2,979 per realty holder, 
and the Upper South, where 695 black women controlled only $362,100, or an 
average of only $521 each.  In 1860, 694 women in the Lower South owned 
$1,870,200, or $2,695 per owner, while in the Upper South 1,223 owned 
$912,500, or $746 apiece.  Some of these women–especially in Louisiana and 
Virginia where half of them lived–were widows of prosperous free men of color 
or former mistresses of wealthy whites, but in the Upper South most were simply 
industrious women who had spent many years accumulating small amounts of 
property.  On both sections a few Negro women had made the journey from 
slavery to freedom to landownership in a single lifetime....  Yet, despite these 
difficulties, free black women accumulated significant amounts of property.  In 
addition, they owned more real estate, on average, than Negro men: in 1850, their 
average realty holding stood at $1,619 compared with $1,144 for men; a decade 
later the gap had narrowed but women still possessed larger average (sic) estates 
than their male counterparts.  By then, one out of five Negro real estate owners in 
the South was female.   
For empirical evidence that southern blacks did, in fact, own enslaved blacks, see FREE 
NEGRO OWNERS OF SLAVES IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1830 TOGETHER WITH ABSENTEE 
OWNERSHIP OF SLAVES IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1830 (Carter G. Woodson, compiler and editor,
1924) [hereinafter WOODSON], and Carter G. Woodson, Free Negro Owners of Slaves in the 
United States in 1830, 9 J. NEGRO HIST. 41-85 (1924) (both compiling and analyzing the United 
States 1830 Population Census to list by states the names of free black heads of families and the 
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black women is referred to as the “black mistress.”30  This article seeks to explain 
number of slaves they owned). Compare LUTHER PORTER JACKSON, FREE NEGRO LABOR AND 
PROPERTY HOLDING IN VIRGINIA, 1830-1860, 201, 202 n.5 (Atheneum 1968) (1942) [hereinafter
JACKSON] (noting “a few serious errors” in Woodson’s work, such as “Many of the largest 
slaveholders listed in the Virginia section... were not Negroes but white persons....  The number 
of slaves credited to each individual in this compilation varies from 18 to 71.  Free Negroes in 
Virginia never owned slaves on so large a scale.”)  See also PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 433-36 
(“...a negro planter in St. Paul’s Parish, South Carolina, was reported before the close of the 
eighteenth century to have two hundred slaves as well as a white wife and son-in-law, and the 
returns of the first federal census appear to corroborate it....  In Louisiana colored planters on a 
considerable scale became fairly common....  In rural Virginia and Maryland also there were free 
colored slaveholders in considerable numbers.”)
Not all free blacks, of course, owned enslaved blacks.  Most of them, like the majority of 
antebellum southern whites, were poor and owned no property of any kind.  The majority of free 
blacks who did own enslaved blacks owned only a few, leading to the observation “that by far 
the larger portion of free Negro owners of slaves were the possessors of this human chattel for 
benevolent reasons. There are numerous examples of free Negroes having purchased relatives or 
friends to ease their lot.”  JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE FREE NEGRO IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1790-
1860, 160 (W. W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1971) (1943) [hereinafter FRANKLIN]. 
30The author expressly uses the term “black mistress” to describe black women who 
owned land and enslaved blacks, even though in antebellum society, the term “mistress” denoted 
white women who ran plantation households.  See DAVIS, supra note 9, 220 n.17 (describing her 
views on various words labeling black women).  As will be discussed later, this article takes
issue with Professor Davis’s observation that the role of running a plantation was “specifically 
denied to black women.” Id. at n.17.  Within the term “black mistress,” the author intends to 
include the “black princess,” the female offspring of white slaveholding masters and black 
women, free or enslaved.  See FREDERICK LAW OLMSTED, THE COTTON KINGDOM: A 
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TRAVELLER’S OBSERVATIONS ON COTTON AND SLAVERY IN THE AMERICAN SLAVE STATES 235-
36 (Arthur M. Schlesinger ed., 1953) (“There is one, among the multitudinous classifications of 
society in New Orleans, which is a very peculiar... result....  I refer to a class composed of 
illegitimate offsprings of white men and coloured women (mulattoes or quadroons), who, from 
habits of early life, the advantages of education and the use of wealth, are too much superior to 
the negroes, in general to associate with them, and are not allowed by law, or popular prejudice, 
to marry white people.   The girls are frequently sent to Paris to be educated, and are very 
accomplished.  They are generally pretty, often handsome.  I have rarely, if ever, met more 
beautiful women than one or two whom I saw by chance, in the streets.”)     
This author is greatly in debt to Professor Davis for setting the bar of legal scholarship on 
the subject of sex, race, and testamentary transfer at such a high level so as to challenge to 
greatness anyone with the fortitude to enter into the arena.  Professor Davis “chose to focus on 
(black) women who suffered under the disabilities of slavery to reveal the contradictions and 
evolution of private law doctrine as it struggled to manage the racial economics of sex.” DAVIS, 
supra note 9, at 228. (Emphasis added.)  Professor Davis’s work focused on relationships 
between white men and enslaved black women, admittedly leaving out white men’s relationships 
with free black women (id. at 228).  This article covers white men’s relationships with enslaved 
and with free black women.  The author is especially interested in focusing on the relationships 
between free women of color and wealthy white men is that those relationships support the 
author’s sub-thesis that some black women were not helpless or defenseless, and were, in fact, 
mistresses of their own faith and drivers of their own destiny.
 The term “black mistress” plays on our historically flawed, fictionalized picture of the 
drama of the master-enslaved relationship. As this study will show, there were a few free blacks, 
who like their white “aristocratic,” wealthy counterparts, were in the “planter” class.  For these 
“black mistresses,” there was the greatest status difference with the enslaved population.  Black 
mistresses were also the greatest challenge to enslavement’s white supremacy premise.  Black 
mistresses, then, were free black women who owned land and twenty or more enslaved blacks. 
See ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD: BLACK AND WHITE 
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the legal paradox of the black mistress’s property rights.
In the antebellum American South, legislatures and courts had to decide how 
sex, race, and status affected the doctrinal mechanisms that governed interracial 
private property transactions, including the acquisition, control, and transfer of 
property.  How these legislatures and courts handled black women’s property 
rights illuminates principles of sex, race, status, and property (wealth inheritance) 
law that may help us understand contemporary gender and race issues relative to 
wealth transference.  In addition to key cases, this article effectively utilizes 
primary legal research sources, including the United States Census schedules, the 
private property transactions recorded in courthouses such as conveyances, 
mortgages, donation records, and probate records to provide a rich, yet little 
known, glimpse into this peculiar anomaly of American society.
This article serves to answer three probing questions about the relationship 
between sex, race, status, and private property law:  First, why did the law allow 
some blacks to be freed and to remain free, despite the general legal proposition of 
enslavement law that all blacks be enslaved?  Second, why did the law allow free 
WOMEN IN THE OLD SOUTH 86 (1988) [hereinafter FOX-GENOVESE] (defining “planters” as a 
person owning more than twenty); compare KOLCHIN, supra note 11, at xiii (1993) (defining 
“planters,” as a person owning twelve or more enslaved blacks). 
Blackness as Property
Page 36 of 302
blacks to own private property, despite the general legal proposition that enslaved 
blacks were not allowed to own property?  And third, why have American-African 
women been stereotyped as un-industrious, helpless victims of white domination, 
despite a history of self-determination and achievement?  These questions and their 
answers will be approached from a study of the legal history of the antebellum, 
southern, black woman’s private property ownership and the law of miscegenation.  
How, then, does Professor Bell’s “interest-convergence” principle facilitate 
our understanding of how and why the law generally failed to provide white men 
the right to marry black women, and to alienate, inter vivos and causa mortis, their 
private property, to their black women and their children?  It would appear, 
according to Professor Bell’s principle, that whoever provided the greatest 
“service” to wealthy white men received the greatest legal benefits, including 
property rights.  An analysis of this question requires us to evaluate both the law of 
miscegenation, particularly as it relates to white men’s ability to dispose of 
legacies to black women, and the legal history of free black women, who owned 
property in the antebellum South. 
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C. WEALTH AND RACIAL/SEXUAL STEREOTYPES
Private property ownership is perhaps the hallmark of American society.31
Its relationship to sex and race provides a compelling opportunity to evaluate 
private property ownership’s role in the development of our legal system.  The first 
American revolution was arguably tied to the struggle for control of property, 
particularly land.32  The second American struggle for freedom that culminated 
with the Civil War, was tied to another form of private property ownership, that of 
enslaved black human beings.33   In the enslavement political economy,34 private 
31See Francis S. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV.
691 (1937-1938) (documenting primary of property law in the legal order, and concluding that 
the doctrinal concern for vested property rights was “the basic doctrine of American 
constitutional law.”) 
32See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973) [hereinafter 
FRIEDMAN], especially Chapter IV, “The Law of Person Status: Wives, Paupers, and the Slaves” 
and Chapter V, “The American Law of Property.”
33See generally DAVID M. POTTER, LINCOLN AND HIS PARTY IN THE SECESSION CRISIS
(Yale Univ. Press, 6th ed 1971) (1942) (analyzing and documenting the attitudes of the 
Republicans to the threat of secession and the actions of President Lincoln between his election 
as President and the fall of Fort Sumter). 
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ownership of enslaved blacks represented a very substantial investment in capital.35
34The term “enslavement political economy” or “enslavement economy” reflects the 
plantation society of EUGENE D. GENOVESE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SLAVERY: STUDIES IN 
THE ECONOMY AND SOCIETY OF THE SLAVE SOUTH 15-16 (1965) (“The essential element in this 
distinct civilization was the slaveholders’ domination, made possible by their command of labor.  
Slavery provided the basis for a special Southern economy and social life, special problems and 
tensions, and special laws of development.”)  
35See FOGEL & ENGERMAN, supra note 14, at 4 (“Slavery was not a system irrationally 
kept in existence by plantation owners who failed to perceive or were indifferent to their best 
economic interests.  The purchase of a slave was generally a highly profitable investment which 
yielded rates of return that compared favorably with the most outstanding investment 
opportunities in manufacturing.”)  See also ULRICH B. PHILLIPS, LIFE AND LABOR IN THE OLD 
SOUTH 185, 185 n. 4 (Little, Brown and Company 1963) (1929) [hereinafter PHILLIPS, LIFE] 
(“The universal disposition is to purchase.  It is the first use for savings, and the negro purchased 
is the last possession to be parted with,” quoting a writer of a well-read southern agricultural 
journal, James B. D. DeBow, on the primacy of investing in slave property.   DeBow’s Review, 
XXX, 74 (January, 1861)).  “An expert accountant has well defined the property of a master in 
his slave as an annuity extending throughout the slave’s working life and amounting to the 
annual surplus which the labor of the slave produced over and above the cost of his 
maintenance.”  PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 359, 359 n.1, citing Arthur H. Gibson, Human 
Economics (1909), at 202 (sic). 
Enslaved black labor was often viewed as a commodity, like chattel.  See, e.g., PHILLIPS, 
LIFE , infra at 176-177 (presenting a price-curve chart for prime field hands, plotted from four 
nineteenth-century enslavement markets, including New Orleans, Charleston, Virginia, and 
Georgia, showing the average price being $1,300 over a thirty-year time-span, with a high of 
$1,800 in 1860). 
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Therefore, one peculiar aspect of the development of American property law is its 
relationship to the institution of enslavement.36  The third and current American 
revolution will arguably focus on economic disparities and wealth redistribution.37
“Whiteness” has come to represent a positive property right in America’s 
political and economic wealth.38  The opposite could be said about “blackness:”  a 
negative property right in America’s legacy, starting with a history of blacks as 
36See generally DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (2000) [hereinafter 
“BELL, RACE”].
37See Kevin Hopkins, Forgive U.S. Our Debts: Righting the Wrongs of Slavery, 89 GEO. 
L. J. 2531 (2001); Charles J. Ogletree, Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Lecture of Constitutional Law: 
The Current Reparations Debate, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1051 (2003).  (The National Coalition 
of Blacks for Reparations in America (“N’COBRA”) is an umbrella organization of more than a 
dozen groups seeking to advance the campaign for reparations.)  See generally SHOULD AMERICA 
PAY?  SLAVERY AND THE RAGING DEBATE ON REPARATIONS (Raymond A. Winbush, ed.) (2003).
38See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1716 (1993) 
(examining how whiteness, initially constructed as a form of racial identity, evolved into a form 
of property, historically and presently acknowledged and protected in American law, noting that 
race or racism alone did not operate to oppress blacks; instead “the interaction between concepts 
of race and property, played a critical role in establishing and maintaining racial and economic 
subordination.”)  It is, as a result of her inspiring work and thought-provoking analysis, that this 
article adds “sexual oppression” to the analytical picture and parodies the title of her note-worthy 
thesis.  (Imitation is the highest form of compliment!)
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whites’ enslaved property, to second-class citizenship status following the Civil 
War, and still facing a wealth and education gap compared to white Americans.39
African Americans today are still seeking full legal equality under property 
law,40 following a recent history that includes racially-restrictive covenants.41  It 
39African-American legal history is one of a continuing struggle for full and equal rights 
as U.S. citizens, without the shackles of racial and gender discrimination.  See generally BELL, 
RACE, supra note 36.  The Reconstruction Congress recognized the need to bestow full U.S. 
citizenship benefits on African Americans, including the right to property, the right to contract, 
the right to the benefits of one’s labor, and attempted to do so through the 13th, 14th, and 15th 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIII, XIV, and XV.
40See generally BELL, RACE, supra note 36, especially Chapter 8, “Property Barriers and 
Fair Housing Laws” (outlining and analyzing the legal history of housing discrimination).
41See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), as cited in BELL, RACE, supra note 36, at 
372 (wherein the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a restrictive covenant in a deed  
stating, “it being intended hereby to restrict the use of said property for said period of time 
against the occupancy as owners or tenants of any portion of said property for resident or other 
purpose by people of the Negro or Mongolian Race.”)  See also, the Federal Fair Housing Act, 
enacted as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-31, as cited in BELL, 
RACE, supra note 36, at 398 (1994) (making it unlawful to refuse to sell or rent or otherwise 
make unavailable a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, 
familial status, or handicap).  
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has been shown that the basis for today’s racial wealth gap42 is rooted in America’s 
enslavement of African Americans, followed by continuing racial discrimination 
and victimization.43  It appears that we are still living the legacy of our racially-
oppressive past.  
To better understand the law’s relationship to wealth creation and the 
42See Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Wealth Ownership, 1983-1998, Apr. 2000, at 
http://www.levy.org/docs/wrkpap/papers/300.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2004) (showing that in 
1998, the median net worth of African Americans was $10,000, compared to $81,700 of white 
Americans, and, when housing is excluded, $1,200 for African Americans, compared to $37,600 
for white Americans.)  See generally THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING 
AFRICAN AMERICAN, HOW WEALTH PERPETUATES INEQUALITY (2004).
43See A. Leon Higginbotham Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The ‘Law Only as an Enemy’: The 
Legitimatization of Racial Powerlessness through the Colonial and Antebellum Criminal Laws of 
Virginia, 70 N.C.L. Rev. 975 (1992) [hereinafter HIGGINBOTHAM & JACOBS] (recognizing “a 
nexus between the brutal centuries of colonial slavery and racial polarization and anxieties today.  
The poisonous legacy of legalized oppression based upon the matter of color can never be 
adequately purged from our society if we act as if slave laws never existed.”)  See also CLAUD 
ANDERSON, BLACK LABOR, WHITE WEALTH: THE SEARCH FOR POWER AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE
(1994); Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, Joint Center Data Bank, available at 
http://www.jointcenter.org./DB (for statistical data showing the nature of the racial wealth gap).  
See generally RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS (2000);
GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY (2002); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Essay: 
Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in America, 38 HARV. C.R.- C.L.L. 
REV. 279 (2003).
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challenges to full wealth equity that African Americans face, it is appropriate to 
introduce the “racial ladder” analogy.44  At the bottom level of the ladder was 
enslavement, where enslaved black women, as will be later described, had no 
property rights and, indeed, were themselves property, subject to many types of 
personal abuse, including sexual.  At the top rung of the ladder was freedom, 
where wealthy white men or “masters” enjoyed all legal private property law 
benefits.  Freedom’s legal citizenship benefits included the right to purchase, sell, 
own, alienate, abandon, manumit (in the case of enslaved property), lease (as lessor 
or lessee), gift (both inter vivos and causa mortis), contract (sale and concurrent 
ownership including marriage), inherit (both by will and through the intestate 
laws), create non-possessory interests (e.g., easements), collateralize (to secure 
financing), and the like.   A legal history of enslaved blacks’ struggles to obtain the 
full civil benefits of freedom is an important lesson in America’s history and 
valuable in understanding contemporary constitutional rights issues.  It also helps 
legal scholars better understand the development and the nature of property rights.     
Relative to property rights, there is a ten step or “rung” process from 
44The author refers to the various levels of American citizenship as the “racial ladder,” 
because it helps the reader visualize the different levels or “rungs” of citizenship, from “alien” 
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enslavement to freedom that enslaved black women had to negotiate.  Step One 
was manumission.  This was the legal process through which an enslaved black 
obtained “free” legal status.45  Step Two was the right to contract, especially for 
one’s labor.46  Step Three was the right to receive gifts, inter vivos, and by 
inheritance.  Step Four was the right of succession, to inherit through operation of  
intestate succession law, as well as the right to be recognized as a legitimate heir.  
Step Five was the right to acquire land as property in one’s own name.47  Step Six 
(or enslaved) status to full citizenship status (or free).   
45See generally JUDITH KELLEHER SCHAFER, BECOMING FREE, REMAINING FREE, 
MANUMISSION AND ENSLAVEMENT IN NEW ORLEANS, 1846-1862 ( 2003) [hereinafter SCHAFER, 
FREE].  Manumission often resulted from the magnanimous (although usually self-serving) act of 
a white master.  But it also resulted from the hard-fought efforts of enslaved blacks through the 
use of “freedom suits.”  See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. and F. Michael Higginbotham,
“Yearning to Breathe Free”: Legal Barriers Against and Options in Favor of Liberty in 
Antebellum Virginia, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1213 (1993). 
46See generally CHASE, supra note 16 (taking a Critical Race Theory approach to 
analyzing the development of contract law).
47Recognizing that enslavement had deprived enslaved blacks and sometimes free blacks 
of property rights enjoyed by U.S. citizens, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Section One, expressly 
provided for the right to contract for property and other property rights:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign 
power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of 
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was the right to acquire other types of property, including enslaved blacks.  Step 
Seven was the right to mortgage property and borrow money.  Step Eight was the 
right to gift property, inter vivos and causa mortis.  Step Nine was the right to 
participate in open commerce.  And Step Ten was the right to marry, especially 
across racial lines.48  An analysis of these ten steps will provide a greater 
appreciation of the forthcoming study of the regulation of miscegenation and of 
the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without 
regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, 
except as punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the 
United States to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give 
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and 
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings 
for the security of persons and property as enjoyed by white citizens, and 
shall be subject to like punishment, pains and penalties and to none other, 
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to the contrary 
notwithstanding.”  
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866).
48There are many legal benefits that derive from a legally-recognized marriage that were 
denied black women who had relationships with white men.  See William Reppy, Property and 
Support Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants: A Proposal for Creating a New Legal Status, 44 LA. 
L. REV. 1677, 1678 (1984) [hereinafter REPPY] (analyzing some benefits of marriage, including 
enforcement of property rights contracts, that achieve income tax, gift tax, or estate tax benefits).
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black women’s property rights.     
African Americans share a history that is intrinsically tied to the 
development of American property law.49  In the early colonial days, blacks were 
often treated as indentured servants, who had some property rights and, most 
importantly, ended their indenture with the completion of a term of years of 
service.50  Yet there is evidence that early in our nation’s history, blacks were 
49See generally WINTHROP D. JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN, HISTORICAL ORIGINS 
OF RACISM IN THE UNITED STATES (1974) [hereinafter JORDAN]; Donald Aquinas Lancaster, Jr., 
The Alchemy and Legacy of the United States of America’s Sanction of Slavery and Segregation: 
A Property Law and Equitable Remedy Analysis of African American Reparations, 43 HOW. L.J. 
171 (2000).
50There is evidence that blacks were not legally “slaves” in colonial America, as they had 
the same status as white indentured servants.  “In the records of the county courts (of Virginia) 
for 1632 to 1661 negroes were designated as “servants,” “negro servants,” or simply as 
“negroes,” but never in the records which we examined were they termed “slaves.” RUSSELL, 
supra note 14, at 24 (citing for examples or illustrations M.S. Court Records of Accomac 
County, 1632-1640, pp. 55, 152 et seq.; Lower Norfolk County, 1637-1646, 1646-1651; also 
citing the opinion of Thomas Jefferson, “...they lived on a footing with the whites, who, as well 
as themselves, were under the absolute direction of the president.”  Jefferson Report, 119n.)   
RUSSELL, supra note 14, at 23-24.
Thus for the first two generations the negroes were few, they were 
employed alongside the white servants, and in many cases were members 
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legally classified and treated as “property,” under their master’s control.51
of their masters’ households... and even their legal status was during the 
early decades indefinite....  The first comers were slaves in the hands of 
their maritime sellers; but they were not fully slaves in the hands of their 
Virginia buyers, for they were neither law nor custom then establishing the 
institution of slavery in the colony....  In the country court records prior to 
1661 the negroes are called negro servants or merely negroes–never, it 
appears, definitely slaves....  Some of the blacks were in fact liberated by 
the courts as having served out the terms fixed by their indentures or by 
the custom of the country. 
PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 75.        
51See generally THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619-1860, 62 
(1996) [hereinafter MORRIS], especially Part II, “Slaves as Property,” (pointing out that, despite 
moral objections, enslaved blacks themselves were held as “property,” not just their labor).  See 
also STAMPP, supra note 15, at 201 (“(Regarding the dehumanizing effects of reducing people to 
property) The laws, after all, were not abstractions; they were written by practical men who 
expected them to be applied to real situations.  Accordingly, slaves were (sic) bartered, deeded, 
devised, pledged, seized, and auctioned.  They were awarded as prizes in lotteries and raffles; 
they were wagered at gaming tables and horse races.  They were, in short, property in fact as 
well as in law.”  (Emphasis added.))
Unfortunately, American enslavement predates the American Revolution and the 
Constitutional Conventions.  See generally HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 20, and EDMUND S. 
MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 
(1975) (describing often-heated debates over the role of enslavement in a free United States 
society).  See also WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW, 1760-1830, 
50-51 (1975) [hereinafter NELSON] ([Even in the Prerevolutionary (1760-1775), “Northern free 
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For the enslaved, it must have been devastating to be someone’s private 
property.52  It meant that you were owned by, controlled by, could be abused by, 
state” of Massachusetts] “The law also regarded many laborers as a form of property.  Many 
cases confirm the widely known fact that slaves were regarded as “Property.”...  What is less 
known is that indentured servants, apprentices, and even children were similarly regarded....”)
In addition, once established, special effort was made to maintain the enslavement 
economy.  For example, a Louisiana statute provided for a master’s absolute control over his or 
her enslaved blacks: “The condition of a slave being merely a passive one, his subordination to 
his master and to all who represent him, is not susceptible of any modification or restriction....  
[H]e owes to his master, and to all his family, a respect without bounds, and an absolute 
obedience, and he is consequently to execute all the orders which he receives from him, his said 
master, or from them.”  CODE NOIR or BLACK CODE of Louisiana, Acts Passed at the First 
Session of the First Legislature of the Territory of New Orleans, § 18 (1806) (repealed 1868) 
[hereinafter BLACK CODE].  See generally Bill Quigley & Maha Zaki, The Significance of Race: 
Legislative Racial Discrimination in Louisiana, 24 S.U. L. REV. 145 (1997) [hereinafter 
QUIGLEY]. 
52See BLASSINGAME, supra note 3, at 297 (describing the psychological effect on black 
families separated by sale):
Added to the slave’s fear of the lash was the dread of being separated from loved ones.  
To be sold away from his relatives or stand by and see a mother, a sister, a brother, a 
wife, or a child torn away from him was easily the most traumatic event of his life.  
Strong men pleaded, with tears in their eyes, for their master to spare their loved ones.  
Mothers screamed and clung grimly to their children only to be kicked away by the slave 
trader....  Angry, despondent, and overcome by grief, the slaves frequently never 
recovered from the shock of separation.  Many became remorse and indifferent to their 
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and be bought, sold53 and devised by your owner.54  As private property, being an 
enslaved black, meant absolute loyalty to your master; your enslaved family came 
work.  Others went insane, talked to themselves, and had hallucinations about their loved 
ones....  William Wells Brown described one slave woman who was so despondent over 
being forced to leave her husband that she drowned herself.       
53PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 373 (describing the market for enslaved blacks and showing 
the incredible prices paid for them):
At the middle of the (eighteen) forties, with a rising cotton market, there began a strong 
and sustained advance, persistent throughout the fifties and carrying slave prices to 
unexampled heights.  By 1856, the phenomenon was receiving comment in the 
newspapers far and wide.  In the early months of that year the Republican of St. Louis 
reported field hand sales in Pike County, Missouri, at $1,250 to $1,550; the Herald of 
Lake Providence, Louisiana, recorded the auction of General L.C. Polk’s slaves at which 
‘negro men ranged from $1,500 to $1,635, women and girls from $1,250 to $1,550, 
children in proportion–all cash’ (sic)....  (Emphasis added.)
54See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 Howe) 393, 449-52 (1857) (wherein the United 
States Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the enslaved Dred Scott’s long residence with his 
owner in a “free” territory did not automatically emancipate him.  Chief Justice Taney’s opinion 
for the Court in Dred Scott stated that “the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly 
affirmed in the Constitution” and that the Fifth Amendment Due Process and Just Compensation 
clauses prevented Congress from outlawing enslavement as that would deprive enslavers of their 
property.”)  Id. at 449-52.
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second, if at all.55   Being an enslaved black woman meant that you were your 
master’s sexual property as well.56  It also meant that your children, including 
55FOGEL & ENGERMAN, supra note 12, at 128, 130 (“[W]hile the existence of slave 
marriages was explicitly denied under the legal codes of the states, they were not only 
recognized but actively promoted under plantation codes....  Of course, not all planters, and not 
all of their overseers, were men who lived by the moral codes of their day.  That many of these 
men sought sex outside of the confines of their wives’ bed is beyond question.  To satisfy their 
desires they took on mistresses and concubines, seduced girls of tender ages, and patronized 
prostitutes.”)
56See KOLCHIN, supra note 11, at 124 (In the words of one former enslaved woman, 
Harriet Jacobs, in her searing autobiography, INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF A SLAVE GIRL, told of the 
abuse a black enslaved women received from her white male masters:  “I cannot tell how much I 
suffered in the presence of these wrongs or how I am still pained by the retrospect.”)  Former 
slave, prolific writer, and public orator, Frederick Douglass declared that the “slave woman is at 
the mercy of the fathers, sons or brothers of her master.”  FREDERICK DOUGLASS, MY BONDAGE 
AND MY FREEDOM 60 (1855).  See also, PHILLIPS, LIFE, supra note 35, at 162 (“A slave could 
own no property unless by sanction of his master, nor make a contract without his master’s 
approval.  His mating was mere concubinage in law, though in case of subsequent emancipation 
it would become a binding marriage.  The rape of a female slave was not a crime, but a mere 
trespass upon the master’s property!”)  See generally BLASSINGAME, supra note 3, at 172-73 
(analyzing the negative impact miscegenation had on the black family: “Generally, however, the 
women had no choice but to submit to the sexual advances of white men.  Henry Bibb (author of 
a slave autobiography, Adventures) wrote that ‘a poor slave’s wife can never be... true to her 
husband contrary to the will of her master.  She can neither be pure or virtuous, contrary to the 
will of her master.  She dare not refuse to be reduced to a state of adultery at the will of her 
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those fathered by your white master, were enslaved.57    In addition, enslaved 
blacks were legally prohibited from owning property,58 including the “property” of 
master....’”  (Emphasis added and footnote omitted.)  The punishment for not submitting to the 
master’s sexual demands ranged from infliction of physical harm to separation through sale of 
either the husband or wife.  Id. at 173-74.)  
57There is some controversy over the extent to which white men fathered children with 
their enslaved black women, although all agree that the “practice” was extensive.  In order to get 
a fuller picture of when white men fathered children with black women, one must look to three 
circumstances.  The first and the most horrible was when a wealthy white master forcibly raped 
his unwilling, and all too often underage, enslaved black woman.  The second was when a 
wealthy white master participated in “consensual” sexual intercourse with an enslaved woman.  
And the third was when a wealthy white man participated in consensual sexual intercourse with a 
free black woman.  See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 178-79 (noting that according to the 1860 U.S. 
Census, 10.4% of the enslaved population was of mixed racial ancestry, while 40.8% of the free 
black population was.  With 4 million enslaved blacks and about 400,000 free blacks, this meant 
that there were about 600,000 blacks of mixed ancestry (enslaved and free), or about 15% were 
racially mixed.  Statistical data and analysis concerning skin color as evidence of racial 
parentage are tainted by three questionable factors: First, no criterion for “mulatto” was given to 
the census takers, hence one must speculate on the accuracy and consistent use of that term.  
Second, one cannot assume that the offspring of a white man and a black woman would always 
produce a child whose skin is lighter than its black mother.  And third, one cannot rule out that 
some “mulatto” children were the offspring of white women and black men, or of enslaved or 
free mulatto men or women with enslaved or free black men or women.)      
58See PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 512 (“The law, for example, conceded no property 
rights to the slaves, and some statutes specifically forbade their possession of horses....”) See 
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their labor.59  Added to the legal prohibitions they faced, enslaved blacks also 
suffered from the emotional, psychological, physiological, economic, sociological, 
and spiritual impacts of being someone’s property.60  African Americans are still 
generally ROBERT B. SHAW, A LEGAL HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 157 (1991) 
[hereinafter SHAW] (summarizing the legal status of enslaved blacks: “For all practical purposes, 
the legal status of a slave could be described very succinctly.  He was the absolute property of 
his owner, possessing almost no rights of his own.  To be more specific, he had no right to 
choose his own employment, to own property, to make contracts with any person, to select his 
place of residence, to marry or to enjoy genuine family life, to become educated, to inherit 
property or to utilize the system of justice in any way.”) See also, QUIGLEY, supra note 51, at 
159 (“A slave is one who is in the power of a master to whom he belongs.  The master may sell 
him, dispose of his person, his industry, and his labor; he can do nothing, possess nothing, nor 
acquire anything but what must belong to his master.” (citing the 1825 Louisiana Civil Code, 
Art. 35, p.6., Id. n.104.)) “Slaves were not allowed to own anything other than what the master 
allowed, and anything that the slave had belonged to the master.  Slaves could not will anything 
to anyone....  Slaves could not donate or inherit or bequeath, but they could be donated, inherited 
or bequeathed to others.”  Id. at 176 (Footnotes omitted.)  
59The “property” right to the fruits of one’s labor was generally denied to enslaved 
blacks, contrary to the “labor theory” of property of the famous philosopher John Locke (1632-
1704).  See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT, Book II, Ch. V (c. 1690), a slightly 
modernized version states: “Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, 
yet every man has a property in his own person.  This nobody has any right to but himself.  The 
labor of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are property his.” as cited in JESSE 
DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 15-16 (1998) [hereinafter DUKEMINIER].   
60See generally BLASSINGAME, supra note 3 (presenting a picture of the human face of 
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haunted by the legal vestiges of having been whites’ legal property through much 
of American legal history.61  Hence, African Americans have a strange relationship 
with the legal history of private property.
Therefore, this article does additional duty.  It also presents and discredits a 
major “gender-race” enslavement myth that continues to cloud the contemporary 
American mind, as stereotypes of sex, race, and property paradigms.  That 
enslavement myth is that of the “helpless, defenseless black woman.”  The myth 
proposes that throughout enslavement and after, black women were helpless and 
defenseless victims of the whims of their white masters.  This article hopes to shed 
enslavement from the enslaved black’s perspective, successfully utilizing slave autobiographies, 
slave narratives, and interviews of previously enslaved blacks, in the 1930's Writers Project of 
the United States Work Progress Administration).   
61See, e.g., OWEN FISS, A WAY OUT: AMERICA’S GHETTO’S AND THE LEGACY OF RACISM
113 (Joshua Cohen et al., eds., 2003) [hereinafter FISS] (noting the vestiges of enslavement, Jim 
Crow segregation, and welfare policies have created poor black ghettos that cry out for “a bold 
program of reconstruction.”); MICHAEL K. BROWN, DAVID WELLMAN, MARTIN CARNOY, 
ELLIOTT CURRIED, TROY DUSTER, DAVID B. OPPENHEIMER, & MARJORIE M. SHULTZ, 
WHITEWASHING RACE: THE  MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY (2003) [hereinafter BROWN]
(showing how “durable racial inequality” persists today as the cumulative effects of inequality 
on blacks and the long-term positive effects of institutional discrimination on whites: e.g., the 
ratio of black to white income is 62 percent, but the ratio black to white median net worth is just 
8 percent); AMERICANS FROM AFRICA:  SLAVERY AND ITS AFTERMATH (Peter I. Rose ed., 1970).   
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some new light on the myth and hopes to show that in reality, many black women 
were often masters of their own destinies and were capable business leaders, while 
many others were innocent and irresponsible victims of legally-sanctioned white 
physical and sexual oppression.
D.  WHY THIS CASE STUDY IS RELEVANT
Perhaps the uninitiated critic would find this study of the regulation of 
miscegenation and of antebellum black women’s property ownership too marginal 
to have any material effect, at least as it relates to our understanding of American 
property law principles,62 as well as its constitutional issues.   Additionally, one 
might doubt that black women owned property in the antebellum South.63  Yet this 
62The author recalls the Yale History Department’s skeptical reaction to his Scholars of 
the House proposal to study blacks who owned slaves: “Great project, Crusto, but you cannot 
research something that did not exist.”      
63The plight of enslaved and free black women must be viewed from the unfortunately 
low legal and social status that women in general (including married white women) held in 
Nineteenth Century American society.  See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 179-201, 
Chapter 6, “The Law of Personal Status: Wives, Paupers, and Slaves.”  For example, on the issue 
of rape of enslaved black women, sadly, even in modern times, it was not criminal for a husband 
Blackness as Property
Page 54 of 302
article will prove the skeptics wrong on both fronts.  And it tutors legal scholars on 
important sexual and racial aspects of our private property system that underpin 
contemporary policy debates.
One may anticipate criticism to this article along several lines of argument.  
First, what role does legal history have for contemporary legal problems?  Second, 
why look at private property transactions and private case law, including sales, 
inter vivos transfers, and testamentary transfers, when public law in the form of 
state statutes are of primary importance?  Third, why be concerned with a very 
limited universe of cases (e.g., white men and black women) of a very limited 
subset of an already marginal population (e.g., free black women owners of 
property, in an enslavement society where most blacks were enslaved)?  Here are 
some answers for the critics.
First, legal history has proven to be a great source of wisdom in analyzing 
and solving contemporary legal issues.64   The famous civil rights jurist, Judge 
to rape his wife.  See, e.g., State v. Haines , 51 La. Ann. 731 (La. 1899) (Louisiana law prohibited 
a wife from charging her husband with rape “on account of her matrimonial consent which she 
has given, and which she cannot retract.”)     
64Contemporary debate on sex and race in the law have often benefitted from a historical 
analysis.  See, e.g., C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 13 (3rd ed. 1974) 
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John Minor Wisdom, mastered the technique of using legal history to tackle 
contemporary racial (and other) problems, as represented in his majority opinion in 
the landmark voting rights case, United States v. Louisiana.65 Although this case 
was not directly a traditional “property” right case, Judge Wisdom’s opinion serves 
two purposes.  First, in his use of legal history (and arguably Critical Race 
[hereinafter WOODWARD, STRANGE] (noting that the roots of Jim Crow segregation can be found 
in the treatment of free blacks in enslavement states, such as “[d]enied full rights and privileges 
of citizens, derived of equality in the courts, and restricted in their freedom of assembly and 
freedom of movement....”)
65225 F. Supp. 353, 1963 U. S. Dist., LEXIS 10307 (E.D. La. 1963).  In United States v. 
Louisiana, the majority (2-1) held that the Louisiana State Constitution’s  “interpretation test” 
(requiring that an applicant for voter registration “be able to understand and give a reasonable 
interpretation of any section of [the Louisiana or Unites States] Constitution[s] when read to him 
by the registrar” (LA. CONST. of 1921, art VIII, §1(d) (amended 1960) (emphasis added)) was a 
“sophisticated scheme to disfranchise Negroes,” and was “unconstitutional as written and as 
administered.” Id. at 356.   See Barry Sullivan, The Honest Muse: Judge Wisdom and the Uses of 
History, 60 TUL. L. REV. 314, 324 (1985) (“Historical research provides the stone and mortar 
from which Judge Wisdom’s opinions were crafted.  History provides the ‘facts’ upon which the 
judgement of unconstitutionality is premised.”)  See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES
(1981); HARVEY C. COUCH, A HISTORY OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, 1891-1981 (1984); and FRANK T. 
READ AND LUCY S. MCGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE  JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP 
SOUTH (1978) (describing Judge Wisdom’s distinctive judicial style, especially in landmark 
desegregation decisions of the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals).      
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Theory), Judge Wisdom documents that “by 1860, free blacks66 in Louisiana 
66
“Free blacks” refer to people living in the American enslavement states who were of 
African ancestry and who were not enslaved, but were legally “free.”  Enslaved blacks became 
“free” through a legal act of “manumission.”  (There were other means of becoming “free” 
including migrating to a “free” state, for example, through use of the Underground Railroad.)  
Manumission was common throughout the history of American enslavement, often occurring at 
the death of the wealthy white master, by act of will, subject to full payments of mortgages for 
which enslaved blacks served as collateral.  See PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 426-29 (“John 
Randolph’s will set free nearly four hundred in 1833 (Virginia); Monroe Edward of Louisiana 
manumitted 160 by deed in 1840; and George W.P. Custis of Virginia liberated his two or three 
hundred at his death in 1857.”  (Footnotes omitted and emphasis added.))  See also, SCHAFER, 
FREE, supra note 45.  
Contrary to the norm, some enslaved blacks were able to obtain money, often with the 
permission of their master(s), and allowed or encouraged to “purchase” their freedom.  See, e.g.,
PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 427-28 (“John McDonogh... of New Orleans... made a unique bargain 
with his whole force of slaves... by which they were collectively to earn their freedom and their 
passage to Liberia by the overtime work of Saturday afternoons....  The plan was carried to 
completion on schedule...they left America in 1842, some eighty in number....  McDonogh 
wrote: ‘... I can say with truth and heartfelt satisfaction that a more virtuous people does not exist 
in any country.’” (Footnotes omitted.)) 
Of course, there were “free blacks” who lived in “free,” northern states, but they are not 
the focus of this study.  As to their legal status and condition, see, e.g., KOLCHIN, supra note 11, 
at 82 (“Northern blacks, although free, were objects of both legal discrimination and vicious 
hostility.  Excluded from most public schools, denied the right to vote (except in Maine, 
Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, and-if they could meet a property requirement-
New York), forbidden by (sporadically enforced) law from entering many states, jeered at and at 
times physically attacked by whites who refused to work with them or live near them, blacks 
Blackness as Property
Page 57 of 302
owned real property and slaves valued at $50 million.”67  And second, Judge 
Wisdom introduces the basis for the thesis of this article, in that the 
disenfranchising “interpretation test” was a part of Louisiana’s “historic policy and 
the white citizens’ firm determination to maintain white supremacy in state and 
local government by denying to Negroes the right to vote.”68  Following the 
“Wisdom model” of using legal history to address contemporary constitutional 
issues, in addition to Critical Race Theory, this article uses legal history to reflect 
quickly came to appreciate the difference between freedom and equality.”)    
67As a part of his legal history analysis of African-American disenfranchisement, Judge 
John Minor Wisdom wrote: 
Thus, from the Code Noir of 1724 until 1864, the organic law of the state 
ordained that only free white males could vote or hold office.  This was in a state 
where there were thousands of free men of color.  Many of these were well 
educated and owned slaves.  Except for suffrage, they possessed the civil and 
legal rights of white citizens. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 363.  Judge Wisdom, using census figures and other primary sources, noted, “In 1810 New 
Orleans had 8,001 white persons, 5,727 free persons of color, 10,824 slaves....  A battalion of 
gens de couleur fought at the Battle of New Orleans in 1815.  In 1860, Louisiana free blacks 
owned real property and slaves valued at $50,000,000.” Id. at 363-64, n.9.  (Emphasis added.)
68Id. at 363.
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on the Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter.  (Critics of the majority opinion of 
Grutter, on the basis of “historical amnesia,” would find support in another of 
Judge Wisdom’s famous civil rights decisions, that of the integration of the then-
racially segregated University of Mississippi at Oxford, by James Meredith, a 
black man, over thirty years prior to Grutter.69)
Second, the analysis of private law transactions and private case law, such as 
those involving disputes over inter vivos and causa mortis legacies, have proven to 
be an important “window on a more general economy of race, status, and sex 
operative in the antebellum period and postbellum South.”70   The legal history of 
the property rights, from both its public and private law aspects, is perhaps an 
accurate barometer of what was actually occurring in nineteenth century society.  
But statutory or public law alone often is a poor reflection of life.  Rather than 
69Meredith v. Fair, 306 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1962); see Mitchell F. Crusto, The Supreme 
Court’s “New” Federalism: An Anti-Rights Agenda?, 16 GA. ST. U .L. REV. 517 (2000); 
Mitchell F. Crusto, Federalism and Civil Rights:  The Meredith Case, 11 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 301 
(1989).  
70See DAVIS, supra note 9, at 225, 288 (pioneering analysis of the legal history of private 
law in wealth transfer: “The claim of this article is that the ideological messages and 
distributional consequences of private law are at least as important-if not more important-than 
the public law criminalization of a particular kind of relationship.”)
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present a clear picture of the norm, it often is an attempt to change the norm.  This 
may be especially true of sexual and racial norms.  For example, if white men and 
black women were not involved sexually, why would there be a need to pass a 
state statute prohibiting them from marrying?71
This article starts with the principles of private property, then presents the 
statutory norms of enslavement to show the context and the legal obstacles that 
enslaved black women faced in that economy system.  It then plots the doctrinal 
axes of private property ownership, enslavement, and sexual paradigms that 
governed life for the greater majority of southern black women, in order to chart 
the property-enslavement-sexual legal matrix.  This apparently harmless and 
71See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down, as unconstitutional, 
theretofore criminal bans on interracial marriage in Virginia and in fifteen other states and the 
District of Columbia).  Cf. (sic) The Virginia judge who had upheld the state’s anti-
miscegenation laws, in Loving, justified his decision based upon God’s will to separate the races: 
“Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay (sic) and red, and he placed them 
on separate continents....  The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the 
races to mix.”)  Id. at 3.  See MYRDAL GUNNAR, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM 
AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 606 (1944) (observing that anti-miscegenation laws had “the highest 
place in the white man’s rank order of social segregation and discrimination.”)  As this article 
will show, that may have been true as to the white man’s laws, but it did not reflect the white 
man’s sexual behavior.  See also Robert A. Destro, Law and the Politics of Marriage: Loving v. 
Virginia After Thirty Years Introduction, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1207 (1998). 
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pervasive matrix was the engine that created wealth, status, and entitlements, while 
at the same time it constructed barriers, obstacles, and disabilities.  It was and is 
the foundation of our present sexual-racial economy.  
Third, as to the small number of black mistresses, the uninitiated would like 
to believe that they were nonexistent.  The free black population was a significant 
feature of southern society.72  And free black women outnumbered free black 
men.73  The small number of black mistresses must be viewed in the context of the 
72See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 45-50 (observing “The spectacular increase in 
manumissions and runaways and the influx of West Indian people of color altered the size and 
character of the Southern free Negro caste.  The change can best be viewed in Maryland.  
Between 1755 and 1790 the free Negro population of Maryland grew 300 percent to about 8,000, 
and in the following ten years it more than doubled.   By 1810, almost one-quarter of Maryland’s 
Negroes were free, and they numbered nearly 34,000; this was the largest free Negro population 
of any state in the nation....  By 1810, the 108,000 free Negroes were the fastest-growing element 
in the Southern population.”) (“The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 brought a large number of free 
Negroes with American borders....  The free Negro population of the Gulf region was almost 
entirely the product of extramarital unions between white men and black women.”  Id. at 108-
09.)  Combining the enslaved and the free groups, the black population in most of the South 
outnumbered the white population.     
73See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 177 (“In contrast to the white and slave population, there 
were many more free Negro women than men in the South.  The great preponderance of free 
Negro women were confined almost entirely to the cities....  Urban emancipators tended to 
bestow favors on women, partly because slave women outnumbered slave men in the cities and 
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times.  In the antebellum South, only a small minority of the population, white or 
black, owned property, and particularly owned enslaved blacks.74
And, then, there is the question of the relevance of studying the antebellum 
South to understand the development of American law.  (This article relies heavily  
on Louisiana sources, dating between 1830 and 1860, as Louisiana’s significant 
economic growth and prosperity, following the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, 
represents a critical developmental stage in America’s history.75)  Some might 
partly because close intermingling encouraged sexual liaisons which sometimes led to 
manumission.”)
74See STAMPP, supra note 12, at 30 (noting that the “planter aristocracy was limited to 
some ten thousand families who lived off the labor of gangs (sic) of more than fifty slaves.”)  
KOLCHIN, supra note 11, at 180-84 (“As historian Gavin Wright demonstrated, the average 
wealth of slaveholders in the Cotton South in 1860 ($24,748) was 13.9 times the average wealth 
of non-slaveholders ($1,781); slaveholders owned 93.1 percent of the region’s agricultural 
wealth.”)  
75It has been suggested that Louisiana is not representative of southern enslavement: 
DAVIS, supra note 9, n.152 (“Louisiana, for instance, had its own distinctive sexual economy of 
slavery that was consonant with its more liberal attitudes toward sexuality and the ideology of a 
civil law system.”) Yet the black mistress anomaly described in this article was not limited to 
Louisiana. It occurred in each and every enslavement state in this country (as well as in other 
countries).  See WOODSON, supra note 29.  See also SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 117-20:
The great majority of the area’s affluent free persons of color–in 1860 nearly two out of 
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three–were residents of Louisiana.  Despite declines in New Orleans and a few other 
parishes, they remained by far the richest group of African descent in the United States, 
controlling substantially more property than prosperous free Negroes in the other states of 
the Lower South combined....  Even in New Orleans, where anti-free black sentiment 
seemed most pronounced, this was true.  According to the credit reports of R.G. Dun and 
Company, Pierre Casenave, who invented a secret embalming process, was able to 
increase his income during the period 1850-1857 from $10,000 to $40,000 each year....  
By 1860, five of the ten wealthiest free persons of color in the South–Bernard Soulie, 
Dumas, Lacroix, grocer J. Camps, worth an estimated $86,000, and landlord Francois 
Edmond Dupry–claimed the Crescent City as their place of residence....  [I]n Louisiana... 
farmers and plantation owners controlled a total of $1,850,000 worth of land, 24 percent 
of the property owned by Negroes in the entire South....  In 1850, the average realty 
holdings among these affluent mulattoes were worth $10,221, more than ten times the 
average for whites (including nonproperty owners) in the nation.  (Footnotes omitted.)
Louisiana was a great land of opportunity for many.  See SCARBOROUGH, supra note 12, 
at 126-27 (“The quintessential example of the transition from commercial to agricultural 
capitalism occurred just before the Civil War when John Burnside, a wealthy New Orleans 
merchant, purchased Houmas, the vast Ascension Parish sugar estate of John Preston, for a 
reported $1,000,000.  An immigrant from Northern Ireland, Burnside had come to America as a 
teenager and had started life in this country as a grocer’s clerk for Virginia merchant Andrew 
Beirne.  Subsequently, he moved to New Orleans and established a mercantile business in 
partnership with Oliver Beirne, the son of his former employer.  After Beirne’s retirement in 
1847, Burnside assumed full control of the firm, now known as John Burnside and Company, 
and five years later, he began acquiring sugar plantations.  The Houma estate, which contained 
12,000 acres of cultivable land and 550 slaves, was termed by one observer ‘the finest property 
possessed by any single proprietor in America.’  It became the nucleus of a multimillion-dollar 
sugar empire that endured long after the end of the Civil War.  At his death in 1881, the bachelor 
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believe that the Northern states constituted the “real” American society, and that 
the Southern states represented only a marginal aspect of American life.  Nothing 
could be further from the truth.  This is especially true when it comes to the law of 
enslavement.  Enslavement was a major driving force in the economic 
development of this country,76 and many Founding Fathers were slaveholders, 
including Presidents George Washington and Thomas Jefferson.
As this article evidences, our contemporary world is greatly influenced, if 
not controlled, by the vestiges of our property-enslavement-sexual legal history.  
One cannot adequately begin to understand and improve the plight of the African 
Burnside left an estate valued at some $8,000,000.”  (Footnotes omitted.))       
76Especially in the twenty years prior to the Civil War, the Southern economy grew at a 
faster pace than that of the North.  See ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, WITHOUT CONSENT OR 
CONTRACT: THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 87 (1989) (“If we treat the North and 
South as separate nations and rank them among the countries of the world in 1860, the South was 
more prosperous than France, Germany, Denmark, or any of the countries of Europe except 
England.”) Compare KOLCHIN, supra note 11, 174-76:
Such a conclusion, although technically accurate, provides an incomplete and distorted 
picture of the slave economy....  Even measured in terms of per capita income, the 
statistic most supportive of Southern development, the Southern economy lagged behind 
the Northern: in 1860, the South’s per capita income stood at $103, while the North’s 
totaled $141.  In all other aspects, the contrast was considerably more striking.
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American until we understand the African-American’s property experience.  We 
begin this journey with a presentation of the development of the white man’s 
American Dream.
II.  BLACK AS PROPERTY:  THE “AMERICAN DREAM” OF CHEAP 
LAND, CHEAP LABOR, AND CHEAP SEX
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and 
engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property or 
that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and 
exercises over the external things of the world, in total 
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.    
– William Blackstone77
Through the lens of black women’s private property ownership, this article 
seeks to provide a unique perspective on sex, race, status, and private property law.  
772 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (1766).  See 
generally on property, DAVID SCHULTZ, PROPERTY, POWER, AND THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
(1992); STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY (1990); and MARY JANE RADIN, 
REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993).
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It analyzes an enigma challenging three complementary paradigms:  the private 
property paradigm, the enslavement paradigm, and the sexual paradigm.  The 
private property paradigm promoted legal protection of private ownership.  The 
enslavement paradigm promoted the enslavement economy and the perpetual legal 
status of blacks as both enslaved and property-less.  The sexual paradigm was a by-
product of the enslavement paradigm, namely, that white men exploited black 
women’s sexuality as white men’s sexual property.  These three paradigms 
complemented one another and shared a quintessential nexus:  white males 
generating wealth and sexual prowess, through cheap land, the exploitation of 
enslaved blacks’ labor, and exploitation of black women’s labor and sexuality.  
Black women, who were free and property owners, were an enigma that challenged 
the nexus connecting the paradigms.  One study of the private property rights of 
free black women is to analyze the antithesis of the property-enslavement-sexual 
political economy of the antebellum South.  
A. CHEAP LAND:  THE AMERICAN PRIVATE PROPERTY 
OWNERSHIP PARADIGM
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In order to understand the context in which wealthy white men or “masters” 
and black women interacted in the antebellum South, e.g., the sexual economy, it is 
necessary to understand the legal world that the masters created:  the “American 
Dream.”  If one believes that law serves the interests of the powerful in society, 
then, in the antebellum South, the law served the interests of the white male 
master.  The question is, what did powerful white men want in antebellum America 
(and colonial America)?  The simple answer was primarily the ownership, use, and
fruits of property, particularly land.78
The common law, along with a cluster of privileges and rights, and indeed, 
the social system, revolved around private land ownership.79  What is interesting is 
78See FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1920) 
[hereinafter TURNER] (presenting a ground-breaking view of the role of “frontier” on the 
American psyche). 
79See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 202.  See EDWARD E. CHASE, PROPERTY LAW, CASES, 
MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 3 n.7 (2002) [hereinafter E. CHASE] (“A.M. Honore likewise 
distinguished between the rights of exclusion and of use and enjoyment, listing the incidents of 
ownership as follows:
(1) the right to exclusive possession; (2) the right to personal use and 
enjoyment; (3) the right to manage use by others; (4) the right to the 
income from use by others; (5) the right to the capital value, including 
alienation, consumption, waste, or destruction; (6) the right to security 
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how American common law principles deviated from English principles to serve 
the unique needs of the American masters.80   These American property law 
(that is, immunity from expropriation); (7) the power of transmissibility by 
gift, devise, or descent; (8) the lack of any term on these gifts; (9) the duty 
to refrain from using the object in ways that harm others; and (10) the 
liability to execution for repayment of debts; and (11) residual rights on 
the reversion of lapsed ownership rights held by others.
Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in Transition from Marx to Markets (sic), 
111 Harv. L.R. (sic) 621, 663 n.187 (1998), citing Honore, A.M. Honore, Ownership, in Oxford 
Essays in Jurisprudence (sic) 107, 112-128 (sic) (A.G. Guest ed., 1961) (emphasis added) (sic).”) 
To that list, one might add (12) the right to encumber, by mortgage, liens, and covenants; 
(13) the right to use as collateral; (14) the right of an insurable interest; (15) the right to shared 
ownership; and (16) the right of bailment.  See the RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, AM. L. INST., 
Res. Prop. §§ 1-10 (1936) (analyzing “property” based upon four basic legal relations, “right–
duty,” “privilege–absence of right,” “power–liability,” and “immunity–disability,” derived from 
W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 23-124 (1923)).  Compare the Hohfeldian 
approach to that of the European civil law, e.g., the Louisiana Civil Code (derived from the 
French Code Napoleon) that states: “Ownership is the right that confers on a person direct, 
immediate, and exclusive authority over a thing.”  LA. CIV. CODE ANN., art. 477 (1980).    
80Compare, e.g., the issue of right of or delivery of possession in leasehold law.  See 
DUKEMINIER, supra note 59, at 459, 461-62, citing Hannah v. Dusch, “The English rule is that in 
the absence of stipulations to the contrary, there is in every lease an implied covenant on the part 
of the landlord that the premises shall be open to entry by the tenant the time fixed by the lease 
for the beginning of his term....  [Under the American rule,] the landlord is not bound to put the 
tenant into actual possession, but is bound only to put him in legal possession, so that no obstacle 
in the form of superior right of possession will be interposed to prevent the tenant from obtaining 
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principles involved the settlement and development of American title to land.81
To support the master’s hunger for cheap land, early in its history, American 
law developed the paradigm of land as a private commodity: to be freely marketed 
(bought and sold), exploited, and freely willed.82   These private property law 
actual possession of the demised premises.”) See generally NELSON, supra note 51; Morton J. 
Horowitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1974) 
(showing that the modern will theory of contract did not appear until the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries with the spread of markets). 
81As to the constitutional development procuring white control of native-American title to 
land, see Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (wherein the court functionally 
disenfranchised native Americans from title to land they “occupied” (unless the United States 
government had expressly given specific recognition of title to specific lands):  “Indian 
inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants, to be protected, indeed, while in peace, in 
the possession of their lands, but to be deemed incapable of transferring absolute title to others.”  
See also Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 
STAN. L. REV. 500 (1969) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s struggle over the Indian land title 
issue).
82See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 206-15 (analyzing the transformation of land as a 
commodity, including changes in common tenancy presumption, the simplification of 
conveyancing, and efficiencies of land remedies:   “‘The title of our lands,’ wrote Jesse Root 
proudly in 1798, ‘is free, clear and absolute, and every proprietor of land is a prince in his own 
domains, and lord paramount of the fee.’” (Footnote omitted.))  See also, NELSON, supra note 51, 
at 159 (analyzing postrevolutionary Massachusetts (1780-1830) property law cases, concluded:   
“The most important way in which nineteenth-century courts promoted economic development 
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principles make up the American property paradigm, three pivotal aspects of which 
are of particular importance.  The first is the abolishment of the law of 
primogeniture.  This allowed the private owners of land to disinherit blood 
relatives or would-be “heirs” and to will their property to “strangers.”83   Hence, 
Americanization of English common law principles made land more alienable, 
more like a commodity.
The second private property principle is the abolishment of the rule 
prohibiting foreigners, or “aliens,” from owning land.  The English common law 
prohibited such ownership.  Such a limitation would not facilitate the “melting pot” 
of the white ethnic minorities that were already a part of colonial America.  Hence, 
the American rule took the position that prohibiting alien land ownership 
“‘originated in ages of barbarism, out of the hatred and jealousy with which 
in property cases was to overturn inherited rules that had conferred monopolistic privileges on 
initial users of valuable economic resources.”) 
83See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 205-06 (“Land-law reform was well under way even 
before the Revolution.  After the Revolution, legislatures carried on the work of dismantling the 
feudal past....  Primogeniture, dead in most of New England, vanished from the South by 1800.”)  
Compare, Louisiana law that throughout the 19th Century maintained its civil law- rooted “forced 
heirship” rights of legitimate children.  See generally Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Roman Sources 
and Constitutional Mandates: The Alpha and Omega of Louisiana Laws on Concubinage and 
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foreigners were regarded... [To] those [aliens] who are actually resident amongst 
us, the best policy’ would be ‘encourage their industry by giving them all 
reasonable facilities in the acquisition of property.’”84   This principle was 
especially significant to the integration into the United States of the people residing 
in the newly-acquired territory of the Louisiana Purchase, many of whom would 
have been considered “aliens” of French, Spanish, and even native American 
descent.85
The third private property principle is the tightening of the law of 
perpetuities, through the abolition of the fee tail, and the invalidation of future 
interests, that unduly “suspended” the “power of alienation.”86  This attitude was 
part and parcel of the new American private property paradigm, that private 
property be easily alienable, free of land monopolies and land dynasties.  This was 
reflected in the observation of Chancellor James Kent of New York State (1776-
Natural Children, 56 LA. L. REV. 317 (1995-1996) [hereinafter LORIO].
84See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 209 n.18, citing 1 AM. JURIST 87-88 (1829). 
85See generally GEORGE DARGO, JEFFERSON’S LOUISIANA: POLITICS AND THE CLASH OF 
LEGAL TRADITIONS (1975). 
86See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 210-11.
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1847):
Entailments are recommended in monarchical 
governments, as a protection to the power and influence 
of the landed aristocracy; but such a policy has no 
application to republican establishments, where wealth 
does not form a permanent distinction, and under which 
every individual of every family has his equal rights, and 
is equally invited, by the genius of the institutions, to 
depend upon his own merit and exertions.  Every family, 
stripped of artificial supports is obligated, in this country, 
to repose upon the virtues of its descendants for the
perpetuity of its fame.87
Such was the American private property paradigm.  It promoted availability 
of cheap land (usually at the expense of native Americans) through its free 
87KENT, COMMENTARIES, Vol. IV 12 (2nd ed., 1832), as quoted in FRIEDMAN, supra note 
32, at 210-11 n.21-22.
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alienation under law, without encumbrances and other undue restraints on 
alienation.  It maximized land utilization and promoted land as a commodity, 
allowing “aliens” to own land.  And it supported the egalitarian view that land 
should be for the meritorious living, free from family control even at death, 
through the causa mortis transfer to strangers.  Therefore, white male masters had a 
vested interest in the availability of cheap land, laws promoting free alienation, and 
free control over the use and disposal of private property.      
B. CHEAP LABOR:  THE AMERICAN ENSLAVEMENT 
PARADIGM
Next, in order to understand the context of the relationships between wealthy 
white men and black women, it is necessary to present the law of enslavement.   As 
white masters obtained their primary dream of cheap, freely alienable land, what 
was the next item on their dream list?  Consistent with the private property 
paradigm that promoted the availability of cheap land, white masters needed cheap 
labor to develop that land, to enhance the “American Dream.”  While cheap labor 
in northern states was eventually provided through the influx of Irish and European 
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immigrant labor, cheap labor in the southern states came mainly in the form of 
enslaved blacks.88
Apparently, the development of the American private property law paradigm 
is consistent was the development of the American enslavement system.  Early in 
our colonial history, blacks were tied intrinsically to land.  For example, in 1705, 
Virginia law stated that enslaved blacks were legally classified as “real estate,” 
governed by the same laws as land, houses, and trees.89  Other states had similar 
88See generally PHILLIPS, LIFE, supra note 35; LESLIE HOWARD OWENS, THIS SPECIES OF 
PROPERTY: SLAVE LIFE AND CULTURE IN THE OLD SOUTH (1976).  See also, THADIOUS M. DAVIS, 
GAMES OF PROPERTY, LAW, RACE, GENDER, AND FAULKNER’S GO DOWN, MOSES (2003) 
[hereinafter T. DAVIS] (analyzing the interrelationship between race, property, agency, game 
theory, critical legal studies, feminist critique, and literature is very thorough and thought-
provoking).
89See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 74 (“This law was meant to insure uniform rules of 
inheritance, and liability for debt, would govern the law of an estate–the land and its slaves.”) 
Friedman notes that in 1792, Virginia repealed this law, and, in 1794, passed a law prohibiting 
the sale of enslaved blacks to satisfy a master’s debts, unless all other personal property had been 
exhausted. (Id. at 197-98). See also, LOUISIANA’S BLACK CODE (1806) (“Slaves shall always be 
reputed and considered real estates (sic).”);  LOUISIANA DIGEST OF 1808, Chap. 2, Art. 19 
[hereinafter “DIGEST”] (“Slaves in this territory are considered as immovables by the operation 
of law, on account of their value and utility for the cultivation of the lands.”); CIVIL CODE OF THE 
STATE OF LOUISIANA (1825), Art. 461 [hereinafter CIVIL CODE] (“Slaves, though movables by 
their nature, are considered as immovables, by the operation of the law.”)  See generally A. Leon 
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laws, including Kentucky in 1789 and the Louisiana Territory in 1806.90
Eventually, enslaved blacks were mainly classified as “chattel or movables,” 
although for some purposes they remained classified as “real estate or 
immovables.”91  As “property,” blacks were bought and sold, passed by will, stood 
Higginbotham, Jr., & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Property First, Humanity Second: the Recognition of 
the Slave’s Human Nature in Virginia’s Civil Law, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 511 (1989).
90See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 197 n.54, citing HENRY W. FARNAM, CHAPTERS IN 
THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES TO 1860, 183 (1938).
91See MORRIS, supra note 51, at 91, Chapter 3, “Slaves as Property– Chattel Personal or 
Realty, and Did It Matter?  Compare SHAW, supra note 58, at 161-62:
...whether slaves were to be regarded as chattels or as real estate....  In several of the 
colonies slaves were designated, at a very period, as real estate....  In Louisiana Chapter 
XXXIII of the Black Code of 1806 declared slaves to be real estate....  Eventually, slaves 
came to be almost universally treated as chattels, or movable property, although certain 
characteristics of real estate were still applied to them.  In particular, it was commonplace 
to mortgage them to creditors.
See also Judith Kelleher Schafer, Open and Notorious Concubinage: The Emancipation of Slave 
Mistresses by Will and the Supreme Court in Antebellum Louisiana, 28 LA. HIST. 165 (1987) 
[hereinafter SCHAFER, OPEN].  Whether enslaved blacks were legally real estate or chattel was 
critical in determining certain concubinage cases in Louisiana, wherein it was illegal to gift 
“immovables” to concubines.  Hence, when a white master sought to free his black concubine 
and their children, in his will, he could not do so if enslaved blacks were legally classified as 
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attachable for debts, were insurable, and subject to taxation.92
American enslavement of blacks, although clearly contrary to natural law, 
was equally a product of law.93  “Enslavement law” has perhaps three features.  
The first is the obvious:  the state enacted “slave codes.”94  The second is what one 
“immovables.”  LA. CIV. CODE, art. 1468 (1825).  See generally QUIGLEY, supra note 51.
92See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 74.
93See MORRIS, supra note 52, at 1 (e.g., enslavement and its relation to law was provided 
in the Code of Alabama (1852): “the state or condition of negro or African slavery is established 
by law in this State; conferring on the master property in and the right to the time, labor, and 
services of the slave, and to enforce obedience on the part of the slave to all his lawful 
command.” (Emphasis added.)) 
94See PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 514:
The statutes, copious and easily available, describe a hypothetical regime, not an actual 
one.  The court records are on the one hand plentiful only for the higher tribunals, whither 
questions of human adjustments rarely penetrated, and on the other hand the decisions 
were themselves largely controlled by the statutes, perverse for ordinary practical 
purposes as these often were.  It is therefore to the letters, journals and miscellaneous 
records of private persons dwelling in the regime and by their practices molding it more 
powerfully than legislatures and courts combined, that the main recourse for intimate 
knowledge must be had.  Regrettably fugitive and fragmentary as these are, enough it 
may be hoped have been found and used herein to show the true nature of the living 
order.
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writer has referred to as “plantation law.”95  And the third is the judicial 
pronouncements or enslavement case law.96  The following section will focus on 
the “black or slave codes.”  “Plantation law” is a study that needs to be developed.  
95See FOGEL & ENGERMAN, supra note 12, at 128-29: 
Within fairly wide limits the state, in effect, turned the definitions of the codes of 
legal behavior of slaves, and of the punishment for infractions of these codes, 
over to planters.  Such duality of the legal structure was not unique to the 
antebellum South.  It existed in medieval Europe...; and in lesser degree, it exists 
with respect to certain large institutions today (for example, with respect to 
university regulations).  
The importance of the dual legal structure of the antebellum South is that 
the latitude which the state yielded to the planter was quite wide.  For most slaves 
it was the law of the plantation, not of the state, that was relevant.  Only a small 
proportion of the slaves ever had to deal with the law-reforcement mechanisms of 
the state.  Their daily lives were governed by plantation law. 
See also GENOVESE, ROLL, supra note 14, at 47 (referred to the master’s control in 
enslavement law, as a “system of complementary plantation law” in which the State empowered 
enslavement jurisdiction to the master.”) 
96Non-statutory or judicial case law is often referred to as the common law and composes 
a body of principles or precedents derived mainly by judges.  See generally JUDICIAL CASES 
CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO, VOLS. 1-V (Helen Tunnicliff Catterall, ed., 
Octagon Books, Inc. 1968) (1926) [hereinafter CATTERALL] (composing a definitive 
enslavement, most annotated compilation of enslavement cases).
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And the judicial pronouncements, as they relate to miscegenation and black 
women’s property rights, are discussed later in this article.   
While contemporary American property textbooks avoid the subject,97 “the 
fact remains that the slave as property is central to any consideration of the 
relationship between slavery and the law.”98  There are a number of legal topics 
relative to the relationship between wealthy white men and enslaved black women 
that are useful to our understanding of the general relationship of sex, race, status, 
and the law of private property.  The first is the legal status of the enslaved as 
“property.”  The second is the criminality of white men raping enslaved black 
97See, e.g., DUKEMINIER, supra note 59, a leading Property Law textbook devotes three 
entries to the topic of  “slavery:”  “Chief Justice Holt was one of the greatest English judges....  
He laid down the rule that the status of slavery could not exist in England; as soon as a slave 
breathed the air of England he was free.  Smith v. Brown & Cooper, 2 Salk. 666, 90 Eng. Rep. 
1172 (1703).”  Id. at 30-31, n.12.  “(Citing Justice Mosk’s dissent in Moore v. Regents of the 
University of California) Another is our prohibition against indirect abuse of the body by its 
economic exploitation for the sole benefit of another person.  The most abhorrent form of such 
exploitation, of course, was the institution of slavery.  Lesser forms, such as indentured servitude 
or even debtor’s prison, have also disappeared.”  Id. at 77.  “History shows that it is possible to 
maintain appropriate normative boundaries regarding market activities.  Indeed, in many 
instances we have narrowed the role of markets and commodification, as with slavery and child 
labor.”  Id. at 84. 
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women.  The third is the prohibition against interracial marriage.  The fourth is the 
legal status of issue of white men and enslaved black women.   The fifth is the 
prohibition against the enslaved owning property.  And the sixth is the law’s 
failure to recognize the marriage of enslaved persons.  
Generally, the legal rules to these legal issues in the antebellum enslavement 
economy were as follows:   First, enslaved blacks were, in every sense of the word, 
“property:” either real estate (land) or chattel (moveables).99  Second, white men 
could freely rape enslaved black women, without adverse legal consequence.100
Third, interracial marriage was strictly prohibited,101 although “concubinage” was 
98See MORRIS, supra note 51, at 2.
99See PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 499 (“Property in slaves, though by some of the statutes 
assimilated to real estate for certain technical purposes, was usually considered as of chattel 
character.”)  See also, supra note 89.
100See MORRIS, supra note 51, at 305 (“Race, age, and status were all elements in the law 
of rape in the South.  Every state that adopted statutes to deal expressly with rapes committed by 
slaves (and in some cases (by) free persons of color) added that the victim was to be a white 
female....  On the other side, no white could ever rape a slave woman.”  Emphasis added.)   See 
also PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 500 (“...although the wilful killing of slaves was generally held 
to be murder, the violation of their women was without criminal penalty.”)   
101See SHAW, supra note 58, at 44 (“One such crime was an illegal marriage; a Maryland 
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legally recognized, with restrictions as to the ability to transfer property.102  Fourth, 
the legal status of the issue or children of white men and enslaved black women 
followed that of their mother, e.g., enslavement.103   Fifth, enslaved blacks could 
law of 1715 prohibited any white person from marrying any negro or a mulatto slave (the 
marriage of a white person and a free mulatto was not proscribed by this act).”)    
102See STAMPP, supra note 12, at 350, 355, 356:
Everywhere in the ante-bellum (sic) South marriages between whites and Negroes or 
‘mulattoes,’ whether free or unfree, were prohibited.  The prohibition against marriages, 
however, did not prevent other forms of interracial sexual contacts....  The lower-class 
whites, however, were by no means the only Southerners who had sexual relations with 
slave women and fathered the mulatto population.  Unmarried slaveholders and the 
young males who grew up in slaveholding families, some bearing the South’s most 
distinguished names, played a major role....  Though the cases of concubinage involving 
young Louisiana Creoles and quadroon women are familiar, these alliances were 
confined neither to persons of French or Spanish descent nor to Louisiana....  These 
sexual relationships with slaves did not always end when the master married; and others 
actually began after, rather than before, his marriage.  
See also PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 193-94 (“Concubinage itself was fairly frequent, particularly 
in southern Louisiana; but no frequency of purchase for it as a predominant purpose can be 
demonstrated from authentic records.”) 
103See PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 77:
Then in 1662 it was enacted that ‘whereas some doubts have arrisen (sic) whether 
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not legally own property; any property that they acquired was considered to belong 
to their master.104  And sixth, enslaved blacks were not allowed to legally marry.105
One of the most important tenets of the enslavement system was an enslaved 
black’s total reliance on the master for support.  As a result, the black codes 
generally forbade enslaved blacks from owning property.106  Their ownership of 
property would be a direct contradiction of the enslavement economy.  How would 
children got by any Englishman upon a negro woman shall be bond or free,... all children 
born in this colony shall be bond or free only according to the condition of the mother.’ 
(Hening, II, 26) 
104See STAMPP, supra note 12, at 197 (“Legally a bondman was unable to acquire title to 
property by purchase, gift, or devise; he could not be a party to a contract.”)  See also PHILLIPS,
supra note 14, at 500 (“...any property they might acquire was considered as belonging to the 
master....”)
105See KOLCHIN, supra note 11, at 122 (“Legally, slave families were nonexistent:  no 
Southern state recognized marriage between slave men and women, and legal authority over 
slave children rested not with their parents but with their masters.”)  See also PHILLIPS, supra
note 14, at 494 (“Slave marriages, furthermore, were declared void of all civil effect....”) 
106See supra note 104.  See also SHAW, supra note 58, at 167 (“As an almost invariable 
rule, the slave had no right to contract with any party or, at least, no means of enforcing such a 
contract.”)   It is fair to say that enslaved blacks had no property rights that the law needed to 
respect.  In some instances, white masters allowed their enslaved blacks to “hire out their time” 
or attempted to gift property to them.   
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they obtain property?  All the fruits of their labor belonged to the master.  They 
were not allowed to receive gifts inter vivos or causa mortis.107
It appears that the enslavement paradigm was a perfect corollary to the 
principles of private property ownership.  First, enslaved blacks were private 
property, and were a commodity, like “chattel.”   Second, they could be easily 
alienated and subjects of inheritance.  Third, they could be used to maximize 
profits, including being leased and bred.  Hence, the enslavement paradigm greatly 
complemented the private property ownership paradigm, and, as it related to 
enslaved black women, gave white men an added bonus.  
C.  CHEAP SEX: THE AMERICAN SEXUAL PARADIGM
In order to understand the context of the relationships between wealthy 
white men and black women, it is necessary to discuss the control white men had 
over the sexuality of black women.  As masters got cheap land and cheap labor, 
there was only one thing they apparently needed or wanted to complete the 
“American Dream”:  sexual prowess.  Put in crude terms, white masters exploited 
107See supra note 104.
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enslaved black women to satisfy their desire for cheap sex.    
The most unfortunate feature of the property-enslavement nexus was the 
reality that a white master not only owned and controlled his enslaved blacks’ 
labor, but he also controlled their sexuality.  From a property perspective, every 
white master who invested in enslaved blacks recognized the “dividend” of their 
investment in the form of enslaved offspring.108  Not unlike cattle, enslaved blacks 
were expected to “breed” enslaved children, adding to their master’s wealth.  
White masters often oversaw the breeding process, very much invested in the 
outcome–healthy enslaved black children to provide cheap labor, or to be sold or 
collateralized for capital.  Unfortunately, some white masters also took liberty to 
108See STAMPP, supra note 12, at 245 (“The magnitude of the interstate slave trade caused 
some critics to charge that many of those who supplied the speculators with merchandise were 
engaged in ‘slave breeding’–in raising slaves for the specific purpose of marketing them.  In 
Virginia, Olmsted (a noted and respected Northern traveler throughout the South) remarked... ‘It 
appears to me evident, however, from the manner in which I hear the traffic spoken of 
incidentally, that the cash value that of a slave for sale, above the cost of raising it from infancy 
to the age at which it commends the highest price, is generally considered among the surest 
elements of a planter’s wealth....  That a slave woman is commonly esteemed least for her 
laboring qualities, most for those qualities which give value to a brood-mare is, also, constantly 
made apparent.’”(Emphasis added.))
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control enslaved black women sexually by rape or seduction.109  And, consistent 
with the tenets of the legal support given to the property-enslavement nexus, the 
law added a third tenet:  that of a white master to legally “rape” his enslaved black 
women.  Adding one tragedy to another, one white master both sexually abused his 
enslaved black woman, and later sold her and their son to another white master.110
109See supra note 100.
110See “Ex-Slave Story 11-A,” interview with Mary Harris and her son, by POSEY, WPA 
WRITERS PROJECT (10-28-1940), xerox from Louisiana Department, Louisiana State Library, 
Baton Rouge:
I never got a whippin’ either, because I was good an’ did my work 
an’ never talked back.  My ma tol’ me she was brutally beaten an’ 
she was bitter all her life.  The plantation was owned by Mr. 
Gaudet [Adam Gaudet, sugar planter, St. James Parish]-and I’ve 
learn tell that Frenchmen were the hardest people an’ almos’ 
sqes’d blood outen their slaves... so jes’ set it down when you hear 
of brutal treatment that it was foreigners. [and her mulatto son 
recounts:]  
Bitter?  Yes, I’m bitter- I have a right to be.  My mother tells me about the 
brutality of those days, how they whipped unmercifully their slaves.  Yes, I’m 
bitter and the more I think about it the madder I got.  Look at me they say I 
could pass for white.  My mother is bright too.  And why?  Because the man 
who owned and sold my mother was her father.  But that’s not all.  That man I 
hate with every fibre of my body and why?  A brute like that who could sell his 
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Such was the world the white masters made, their “American Dream,” one 
that gave them cheap land, cheap labor, and cheap sex.  It was a world of white 
male control and domination.  For the enslaved black women, it was the 
“American Nightmare:” no land, no right to their labor, and their sexuality 
exploited.  Ultimately, the white man’s American Dream and the legal system that 
supported it would have an interesting challenge:  How should the legal system 
respond to white men, who exercised their private property ownership rights, by 
bestowing on their enslaved black women sex partners (and their children) private 
property bequests, the issue of “wealth miscegenation?”
III. RESTRICTING BLACK INHERITANCE RIGHTS: REGULATING 
MISCEGENATION
A marriage between a person of free condition and a slave, or 
between a white person and a negro, or between a white person 
and a mulatto, shall be null.
– 1786 Virginia bill, drafted by Thomas Jefferson 
own child into unprincipled hands is a beast- The power, just because he had 
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(Jefferson 557, bill 86)111
 A.  VARIOUS MISCEGENATION MODELS
the power, and thirst for money.  
111See INTERRACIALISM, BLACK-WHITE INTERMARRIAGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 
LITERATURE, AND THE LAW 3 (Werner Sollors ed. 2000) [hereinafter SOLLORS] (presenting a 
quintessential reader on the history and laws of miscegenation, and quoting Jefferson’s anti-
miscegenation bill.)  See also, id. at 5 (wherein Sollors points out that “Even the word used to 
describe interracial sexual and marital relations, miscegenation, in an Americanism.  Sidney 
Kaplan’s essay in this volume (“The Miscegenation Issue in the Election of 1864,” at 219-65) 
reveals how the word was coined by two New York journalists in an 1863 pamphlet, a political 
hoax designed to hurt abolitionists and Republicans who were invited to endorse it.  Derived 
from Latin miscere and genus, the made-up word that faintly echoes the term for the European 
class mismatch, misalliance, and replaced amalgamation.  It became a catchall term, used in 
phases like “miscegenation law” that are hard to translate into some other languages.”  
(Emphasis added in parts.))  See also GARY B. NASH, FORBIDDEN LOVE, THE SECRET HISTORY OF 
MIXED-RACE AMERICA 92-93 (1999) [hereinafter NASH] (“As the election of 1864 approached, 
the Democrats played the race card to the hilt.  Appealing to widespread white racism, they 
accused Lincoln’s Republican Party of turning the Civil War into a ‘nigger crusade.’  In 
campaign literature labeled ‘Miscegenation, or the Millennium of Abolitionism,’ they portrayed 
white women sitting on the laps of black men, white men with black wives strolling through the 
park, and intermarried blacks, in fractured English, exulting that they had reached the heaven of 
social and political equality.  Democratic Party newspapers spread the word of a Republican 
leader who wanted to ‘add to emancipation, to confiscation, and to miscegenation, a policy of 
polygamy’ so that ‘a man could have a yellow wife from China, a brown wife from India, a black 
wife from Africa, and a white wife from his own country, and so have a variegated family and 
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1.  America’s Varying Views on Miscegenation 
Analyzing the legal history of miscegenation in the American South makes 
for an obvious conclusion:  the law was generally pitted against interracial 
relationships.112  Even in recent contemporary times, southern state legislatures 
put a sign over the door: ‘United Matrimonial Paint Shop.’”)     
112SOLLORS, supra note 111, at 3 (“One theme that has been pervasive in U.S. history and 
literature and that has been accompanied by a 300-year-long tradition of legislation, 
jurisprudence, protest, and defiance is the deep concern about, and the attempt to prohibit, 
contain, or deny, the presence of black-white interracial sexual relations, interracial marriage, 
interracial descent, and other family relations across the powerful black-white divide.”)  See 
generally KENNEDY, supra note 12; PETER BARDAGLIO, RECONSTRUCTING THE HOUSEHOLD: 
FAMILIES, SEX, AND THE LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY SOUTH (1995); IN JOY AND IN 
SORROW: WOMEN, FAMILY, AND MARRIAGE IN THE VICTORIAN SOUTH, 1830-1900 (Carol Bleser 
ed. 1991); THE DEVIL’S LINE: SEX AND RACE IN THE EARLY SOUTH (Catherine Clinton & 
Michele Gillespie eds., 1997); ROBERT B. MCNAMARA, et al., CROSSING THE RACE LINE: 
INTERRACIAL COUPLES IN THE SOUTH (1999); RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE 
REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE (2001) [hereinafter MORAN]; NELL IRVIN PAINTER, 
SOUTHERN HISTORY ACROSS THE COLOR LINE (2002); JOSHUA D. ROTHMAN, NOTORIOUS IN THE 
NEIGHBORHOOD: SEX AND FAMILIES ACROSS THE COLOR LINE IN VIRGINIA, 1787-1861 (2003); 
WE ARE YOUR SISTERS: BLACK WOMEN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (Dorothy Sterling, ed.,
1997); A. Leon Higginbotham Jr., & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in 
the Law of Colonial And Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L. J. 1967 (1988-89) [hereinafter 
HIGGINBOTHAM & KOPYTOFF]; CARTER G. WOODSON, FREE NEGRO HEADS OF FAMILIES IN THE 
UNITED STATES IN 1830, TOGETHER WITH A BRIEF TREATMENT OF THE FREE NEGRO x-xiv (1925) 
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attempted to control the sexual lives of Americans along racial lines.113  These 
legal attempts to prohibit interracial sexual relationships had at least one intended 
effect–  that of limiting the transference of wealth from whites to blacks, in other 
words, “wealth miscegenation.”114
America’s miscegenational legal history is rooted in its American Dream, 
that which gave white men, as a right of ownership, control of enslaved black 
women’s sexuality, as white property.115  Throughout the antebellum South, white 
[hereinafter WOODSON, HEADS] and Carter G. Woodson, The Beginning of Miscegenation of the 
Whites and Blacks, 3 J. OF NEGRO HISTORY 335 (1918) [hereinafter WOODSON, 
MISCEGENATION]. 
 
113See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down, as unconstitutional, 
theretofore criminal bans on interracial marriage in Virginia, fifteen other states, and the District 
of Columbia).
114See SOLLORS, supra note 111, at 69, excerpt from Eva Saks, “Representing
Miscegenation Law” [hereinafter SAKS] (“Interracial sex and marriage had the potential to 
threaten the distribution of property, and their legal prohibition was an important step in 
consolidating social and economic boundaries.”)  It is “Saks’s view of miscegenation’s rationale 
that this article refers to as “wealth miscegenation.”
115See THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1, 235-39 (Univ. of Georgia Press 1999) (1858) [hereinafter COBB] 
(described by Paul Finkelman as “the most comprehensive antebellum restatement of the law of 
slavery and the only treatise on slavery written by a southerner.”) (Cobbs, on an enslaved black’s 
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men sexually exploited their enslaved black women, even in front of their white 
wives with immunity.116  These sexual intimacies between white men and black 
women also led to miscegenational relationships that were more “involved” than 
right of private property stated: “Of the other great right of a freeman, viz., the right of private 
property, the slave is entirely deprived.  His person and his time being entirely of his master, 
whatever he may accumulate by his own labor, or is otherwise acquired by him, becomes 
immediately the property of his master....  Though our law allows no peculium to the slave, yet 
as a matter of fact, such peculium is permitted, ex gratia, by the master.... of which the master 
might at any time deprive him...  (I)f a chattel is given and delivered to a slave, the title thereto 
would vest in the master; and it seems if land were conveyed to a slave, and possession given, by 
parity of reasoning, the master would be seized of the land.  A slave cannot take by descent, 
there being in him no inheritable blood....  The slave not being capable of acquiring property, if 
follows, that he cannot convey or give it away....  As a consequence, a slave cannot make a 
testament, and this was true even in those nations where the slave was allowed his peculium; on 
his death, it belonged to his master.” (Footnotes omitted.))  See also, JUDITH KELLEHER 
SCHAFER, SLAVERY, THE CIVIL LAW, AND THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA 6 (1994) 
[hereinafter SCHAFER, SLAVERY] (noting, “The Black Code and the 1807 act together destroyed 
two of the great freedoms of Spanish slave law....  First, the right of self-purchase ceased because 
slaves could no longer own property....”)      
116See KOLCHIN, supra note 11, at 124 (“Still those who dealt at all frankly with the 
subject noted–albeit from different perspectives–the prevalence of interracial sex.  South 
Carolina ideologue William Harper turned it into a virtue, insisting that it helped account for the 
absence of Southern prostitution and the purity of white women.  Patrician diarist Mary Boykins 
Chesnut, by contrast, countered that in fact, ‘we live surrounded by prostitutes... Like the 
patriarchs of old our men live all in one house with their wives and concubines, and the 
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casual.117
Historically, the miscegenational law’s options reflected white society’s 
changing views on blacks as property.  In the Colonial Period, when white 
America was still unclear about blacks’ role and place, there was ambivalence 
about whether the races should interrelate sexually.118  There is strong evidence 
mulattoes one sees in every family exactly resemble the white children.’”) 
117See, e.g., GARY B. MILLS, THE FORGOTTEN PEOPLE, CANE RIVER’S CREOLES OF 
COLOR, Chapter 2 (1977) [hereinafter MILLS] (documenting the romantic relationship (1768-
1784) between a white master, Pierre Metoyer, and his enslaved black woman, Marie Thereze 
Coincoin, and how their children went on to become the wealthiest black family in antebellum 
Louisiana, owning about two hundred enslaved blacks, and building Melrose Plantation, which 
still stands today, in Natchitoches, Louisiana).   See also, PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 434 
(documenting that a free black master, “Martin Donato of St. Landry (Parish, Louisiana) dying in 
1848, bequeathed liberty to his slave wife and her seven children and left them eighty-nine slaves 
and 4,500 arpents of land as well as notes and mortgages to a value of $46,000.”)  There were 
numerous instances in which white masters sought to provide for their black mistresses and 
mixed-race offspring, infra.
118See PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 74-76 (“Thus for two generations the negroes were 
few, they were employed alongside the white servants, and in many cases were members of their 
masters’ households....  Until after the middle of the (17th) century the laws did not discriminate 
in any way between the races.”(Emphasis added.))
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showing that whites accepted blacks as equals, and as human beings.119  At the 
same time, there is strong evidence showing that whites denied blacks as equals, 
and relegated them to property.120
Unfortunately, at least in the enslavement states, the proponents of blacks as 
(white) property won out.121  Certainly, by 1830 (the start of the antebellum 
period), in the enslavement states, it was legally accepted that enslaved blacks 
were property.122  By then, it was also clear that interracial marriage was illegal 
and miscegenation would not be promoted.123  What is interesting is that, during 
the antebellum period, miscegenation would not be totally outlawed.124  In fact, it 
was tolerated and legally recognized, at least when it came to white-men-and-
119See generally HIGGINBOTHAM AND KOPYTOFF, supra note 112.
120See generally WOODSON, MISCEGENATION, supra note 112.
121See supra note 91.  See generally MORAN, supra note 112.
122Id.
123See generally Karen Getman, Sexual Control in the Slaveholding South: The 
Implementation and Maintenance of a Racial Caste System, 7 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 115 (1984).
124See KOLCHIN, supra note 116.
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black-women relationships.125
During Reconstruction, when legal enslavement of blacks was abolished, 
southern black-influenced, if not controlled, legislatures changed the antebellum 
rules on miscegenation, allowing whites and blacks to legally marry.126  But this 
125See SLAVERY AND THE LAW 45 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1997) [hereinafter F INKELMAN] 
excerpt from William W. Fisher III, “Ideology and Imagery in the Law of Slavery” (“Lawmakers 
ostensibly sought to maintain a rigid separation of blacks and whites.  Accordingly, they banned 
racial intermarriage, established severe penalties for interracial fornication and adultery, and 
frequently in related contexts expressed repugnance for ‘commingling’ of the races.  In practice, 
however, they typically strongly condemned and harshly punished only sexual relations between 
black men and white women, while they commonly tolerated both consensual and forcible sex 
between white men and black women.”  (Footnotes omitted.))
126See KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 254: 
During Reconstruction, the color bar at the altar was breached in several places.  For a 
brief period, Alabama’s supreme court invalidated that state’s antimiscegenation law, and 
when reformers friendly to Reconstruction overhauled the laws of Arkansas, Mississippi, 
and South Carolina, they dropped existing antimiscegenation provisions from the statute 
books.  Reconstructionists likewise repealed Louisiana’s bar on mixed marriages.  
(Footnotes omitted.) 
See, e.g., supra note 568, Cornelia Hart, Tutrix v. Hoss & Elder, Administrators, 1874 WL 3865 
(La. 1874) (wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court validated a “marriage” between E.C. Hart, a 
white man, and Cornelia Hart, a colored woman).     
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change was short-lived, for along with post-Reconstruction restoration of white 
control of southern legislatures, pro-miscegenation rules were repealed.127  Oddly, 
in their place, the law did not return to the ante-bellum laws that merely prohibited 
interracial marriage, yet tolerated miscegenational relationships, at least between 
white men and black women.128  What the post-Reconstruction white legislatures 
decided was more stringent than before the Civil War: to criminalize interracial 
127See MORAN, supra note 112, at 5-6.  
During Reconstruction, the state high court in Alabama declared a ban of interracial 
marriage unconstitutional but reversed itself shortly thereafter.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld an antimiscegenation statute in Pace v. Alabama (106 U.S. 583 (1883)) in 1883, 
thereby cementing the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ marriages and families.  Only one 
state court declared antimiscegenation laws unconstitutional after the Pace decision.  In 
1948, the California Supreme Court in Perez v. Sharp (32 Cal. 2d 711, 948 P.2d 17 
(1948)) concluded that prohibition of interracial marriage violated the principle of racial 
equality and interfered with liberty to choose a spouse. (Footnotes omitted, case citations 
added.)
See also KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 22 (“During the reaction against Reconstruction, white 
supremacists exploited fears of interracial intimacy as perhaps the major justification for 
subverting the civil and political rights that had been granted to blacks, and the major reason for 
confining blacks to their degraded ‘place’ at the bottom of the social hierarchy.”)
128See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, STRANGE, supra note 64.
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marriage.129
This brief legal history of miscegenation raises an intriguing question: Why, 
in the antebellum South, was miscegenation not altogether prohibited, as it was in 
129See KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 76, 77:
Reconstruction’s egalitarian spirit had posed challenges to antimiscegenation laws, but these 
challenges were typically short-lived.  South Carolina’s history is instructive in this regard.  Prior 
to the Civil War, the state had declined to prohibit interracial marriage, but immediately 
following the abolition of slavery, white authorities enacted an antimiscegenation statute.  
Reformers removed the barrier in 1868, only to see it be reenacted in 1879.  In 1895 white 
supremacists embedded the prohibition in the state constitution, where it remained for 103 years.
Id. at 76, footnote *, Kennedy points out,
The same dynamic led to revisions of existing antimiscegenation laws in Alabama 
and Mississippi.  Alabama changed its laws to render all interracial marriages null 
and void, while Mississippi increased the punishment for the violation of its 
prohibition on interracial marriage: persons engaged in such unions, the state 
declared, could be confined to the penitentiary for life.  See Alabama Constitution 
of 1865, art. 4, sec. 31; Miss. Session Laws ch. 4, sec. 3 (1865).  See also Peter 
W. Bardaglio, Reconstructing the Household: Families, Sex, and the Law in the 
Nineteenth-Century South (1995), 179.
See also, Lee et al. v. New Orleans Great Northern R. Co., 127 La. 236, 51 So.182, at 
183 (“By Act No. 87 of 1908 concubinage between a person of the Caucasian or white race and a 
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the post-Reconstruction South and throughout much of the 20th Century South?  
This question requires an analysis of the various options the miscegenational law 
had available to it, and an analysis of antebellum southern legislatures’ reasons for 
their miscegenational regulations.
2.  The Miscegenational Law’s Options 
Before answering the question as to why the antebellum South chose the 
miscegenational regulations it did, it would be insightful to look at the law’s 
options.  Hypothetically, the antebellum South had many options, when it came to 
miscegenation, particularly between white men and black women.  Each option has 
two analytical aspects: The first aspect was a white man and a black woman’s legal 
authority to have an interracial sexual relationship.  The second aspect was a 
miscegenational black woman’s resulting property interest in her white partner’s 
estate.  
The first of these miscegenational options, at one end of the rights’ 
spectrum, is the “optimal rights” theory.  With “optimal rights,” a white man and a 
person of the negro or black race was made a felony.”)
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black woman (enslaved, subject to emancipation, or free) could legally marry.  
Under “optimal rights,” a black woman would receive all benefits of freedom and 
of marriage, including all inheritance rights for the offspring of herself and her 
white husband.  The “optimal rights” option would have treated interracial 
relationships as white-men-white-women relationships, allowing for legal 
marriage, and resulting property rights in the marital estate.
The second option or theory, at the other end of the rights’ spectrum, is 
“total prohibition.”  Under “total prohibition,” a white man and a black woman 
(enslaved or free) would be absolutely prohibited from any and all sexual contact 
of any kind.  With “total prohibition,” interracial marriage, cohabitation, casual 
sexual relations, and a white man’s rape of a black woman would run afoul of both 
the criminal and the civil laws.  Under “total prohibition,” a black woman would 
receive no property interests of any kind, resulting from any type of sexual activity 
with her white sex partner.  The “total prohibition” option would treat 
miscegenational relationships between white men and black women just the same 
as the antebellum South treated similar miscegenational relationships between 
white women and black men.
There are several permutations between these two extremes, but two of them 
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are particularly worth noting.  One is the “marriage/no property” option, wherein a 
white man and black woman (enslaved or free) could legally marry, but the black 
woman (enslaved or free) would not be entitled to any property interest in her 
husband’s estate.  This option would legitimize the sexual relationship, while not 
allowing for white-to-black wealth transference.  The immediate beneficiary of the 
“marriage/no property” option would be the miscegenational offspring of the 
marriage who would be legally presumed legitimate, and thereby subject to 
inheritance rights from both parents’ estates.
The other is the “no marriage/property” option or theory, wherein a white 
man and a black woman (enslaved or free) could not legally marry, but the black 
woman would have some property interest in her white sexual partner’s estate.  
This option would not permit interracial marriage, but would reward a black 
woman with  some property interest in her white sexual partner’s interest.  Under 
the “no marriage/property” option, the miscegenational black woman would 
receive some property rights, but in exchange, it would not be presumed that the 
offspring of the relationship were legitimate. 
There are a few other legal considerations that should be mentioned in 
analyzing these hypothetical miscegenational options.  The first is what effect 
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existing relationships should have on these options?  For example, what if the 
interracial relationship is “extramarital,” as if the white man is already married to a 
white woman and has a white family?   The second is what effect should the black 
woman’s legal status have?  For example, what if the black woman is enslaved and 
another white man, who is not her sexual partner, owns her?  The third is what 
effect should each option have, if any, on the property rights of the offspring or 
issue of those relationships?  And the fourth, and most common in antebellum 
jurisprudence, is what effect should emancipation laws, and the white family’s 
interests, have on property rights?130 For example, what should the law do with the 
property of a white man who died leaving white family members, but who directed 
in his will that his enslaved black female sexual partner and their children be gifted 
their freedom?  If his enslaved black woman and their children were largely the 
testator’s only property, what property interest should the law provide on behalf of 
the white family members?
130See, e.g., Article 193 of the Louisiana Civil Code (1825) which stated, “The slave who 
has acquired the right of being free at some future time, is from that time, capable of receiving by 
testament or donation.  Property given or devised to him must be preserved for him, in order to 
be delivered to him in kind, when his emancipation shall take place.  In the mean time it must be 
administered by a curator.”
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Now that we have reviewed the many options from which antebellum 
southern legislatures had to choose, there is still the question, why didn’t they 
choose to totally prohibit miscegenation; as they, in fact, permitted interracial 
affairs between white men and black women?  Before we can answer the why, let 
us review the how:  How did antebellum southern legislatures regulate 
miscegenation between white men and black women?   
B.  LEGISLATIVE REGULATION OF SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS IN 
THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH131
In the antebellum South, when it came to sexual relationships between the 
131As to some sources on enslavement law, see COBB, supra note 115; F INKELMAN, supra
125; THE REVISED STATUTES OF LOUISIANA (U. B. Phillips, compiler, 1856); JOHN CODMAN 
HURD, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES, VOLS. I  AND II (Negro 
Universities Press 1968) (1858); J.D. WHEELER, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
SLAVERY (1837); JOHN CURTIS BALLAGH, A HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN VIRGINIA (Johnson Reprint 
Corp. 1968) (1902), THE NEGRO LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA (John Belton O’Neall, collector and 
digest, 1848); THE CENTURY EDITION OF THE AMERICAN DIGEST: A COMPLETE DIGEST OF ALL 
REPORTED AMERICAN CASES FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO 1896, VOL. XLIV, SHIPPING–
SUBSCRIBING WITNESS (1903); CATTERALL, supra note 96.  See also, for excellent summaries on 
miscegenation legislation, MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE 
FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 136-40 (1985). 
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races, the law of miscegenation was somewhat peculiar: it was race, gender, and 
status driven.132  This can be illustrated through an analysis of legislation 
132The law appeared, on the surface, less concerned with regulating sexual relationship 
between free white women and enslaved black men, that is, except for the presumption that such 
an arrangement was prima facie evidence of the black man’s rape of the white woman.  See, e.g., 
MORRIS, supra note 51, at 304-05 (quoting Pleasant, (a slave), v. State (Arkansas, 1855), “The 
presumption that a white woman yielded... to the embraces of a negro, without force... would not 
be great.”  And citing Bertram Wyatt-Brown who argued, “it goes without saying that the 
penalty for a slave who dared lust after white women’s flesh was castration, first by the law of 
the slave code, later by community justice alone.”  (Footnote omitted.))
Despite these legal and community-based restrictions, there is evidence that these types 
of miscegenational relationships existed.  See, e.g., STAMPP, supra note 12, at 352: “Though 
white women were less involved in interracial sexual contacts than men, their role, especially in 
the colonial period when slaves and indentured servants worked on the same estates, was never 
entirely negligible.  A Maryland statute of 1663 noted that ‘divers freeborn English (sic) women, 
forgetful of their free condition, and to the disgrace of our nation, do intermarry with negro 
slaves’; but the penalties provided in this and other southern statutes did not put an end to the 
practice.... [t]hese women were not all paupers or prostitutes.  In New Orleans a ‘seemingly 
respectable’ white female was arrested on charges of having been in an ‘indecent 
companionship’ with a slave....  Occasionally a white female who loved her colored paramour 
lived with him as a common-law wife.”  See also, BLASSINGAME, supra note 3, at 156 (“The 
evidence from a Virginia divorce petition is conclusive... a Norfolk white man asserted in 1835 
that his wife had ‘lived for the last six or seven years and continues to live in open adultery with 
a negro man....’”)   
Relative to miscegenational relationships between free black men and free white women, 
the law forbade marriage, but allowed intimate liaisons between them to exist.  See BERLIN, 
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regulating sexual relationships between white men and black women.133  There 
supra note 7, at 269 (“When a Richmond white woman claimed she had been raped by a free 
Negro, the police simply ignored the charge.  Since she associated with ‘none other than the 
lowest and debased free Negroes in the Valley....’”)  But see BERLIN, supra note 7, at 268 (“Yet 
Southern leaders despised these illicit combinations of whites and free Negroes.”)  
133See STAMPP, supra note 12, at 206 (“Fundamentally the slave codes were much alike.  
Those of the Deep South were somewhat more severe than those of the Upper South, but most of 
the variations were in minor detail.”)  Hence, this article will focus on one state’s code, the State 
of Louisiana, as representative of southern states’ enslavement codes, including laws relative to 
free blacks.  See also BERLIN, supra note 7, at 317 (noting that “as the nineteenth century wore 
on, Southern legislators reviewed each other’s statute books and gradually made their laws 
uniform.  New states generally adopted the legal codes of the older states, thereby adding still 
greater uniformity to the system.  By 1860, despite regional variations in racial ideology, the free 
Negro’s legal status was strikingly similar in every Southern state.”)  Compare PHILLIPS, supra
note 14, at 493-94:
Louisiana alone in all the Union, because of her origin and formative experience as a 
Latin colony, had a scheme of law largely peculiar to herself.  The foundation of this lay 
in the Code Noir decreed by Louis XV for that colony in 1724....  Nearly all the 
provisions of this relatively liberal code were adopted afresh when Louisiana became a 
territory and then a state of the Union.  In assimilation to Anglo-American practice, 
however, such recognition as had been given to slave peculium was now withdrawn, 
though on the other hand slaves were granted by implication a legal power to enter 
contracts for self-purchase.
Hence, despite some disclosed reservations, the following discussion of American 
enslavement law focuses on the law of the State of Louisiana, although not limited to that State’s 
laws.  There are several reasons for this.  First, while Louisiana law has a different history, being 
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based on the Code Noir decreed by Louis XV for the French colony of Louisiana in 1724, its 
nineteenth century legislative pronouncements reflect the pressing enslavement legal issues 
experienced by all the enslavement states.  Second, the United States’ acquisition of the 
Louisiana Territory via the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 fueled the “private property” paradigm 
through the newly-available expanse of land.  And third, the City of New Orleans was a major 
southern commercial hub that made the State of Louisiana important to nineteenth century 
economic development.  The author acknowledged that there are some unique features of 
Louisiana’s antebellum law, such as “forced heirship,” its approach to “bastards” inheritance 
rights, and its attitude about concubinage that reflect its civil law roots.  See generally LORIO,
supra note 83; SCHAFER, OPEN, supra note 91.
Yet Louisiana may have been a more “permissible” state (along with South Carolina), 
for, as this article details, its legislature legally recognized concubinage between white men and 
black women (enslaved and free), formally allowed black women concubines limited property 
inheritance rights, and allowed white men to formally acknowledge their mixed-race children 
with black women (along with inheritance rights).  See supra note 147.  But see SCHAFER, 
SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 184-85:
Freeing a slave mistress meant not only overcoming legislative restrictions, but also 
surmounting two additional legal obstacles firmly embedded in the Louisiana Civil Code. 
The first of these was forced heirship.  Forced heirship required that legitimate children, 
which the court call “descending heirs,” at a minimum receive a specified portion of the 
property of the deceased parent or grandparent.  Forced heirs could be disinherited for 
committing serious offenses against a parent....  If an individual died childless but one or 
both parents survived, they were forced heirs–‘ascending heirs’–and entitled to a 
specified portion of the estate.  With either ascending or descending heirs, the forced 
portion varied according to the number of forced heirs, and the Code clearly spelled out 
every possible configuration of heirship.  Under Louisiana law, freeing a slave was 
considered a monetary donation to that person, and the state’s forced heirship doctrine 
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were different types of sexual relationships between white men and black women 
in the antebellum South, from rape to marriage.134  We shall begin with the type 
that was unfortunately, the most prevalent of them, a white man’s rape of his 
enslaved black woman.135
came into play.  Article 190 of the Civil Code held that ‘any enfranchisement made in 
fraud of... the portion reserved by law to forced heirs, is null and void... [if] (sic) it shall 
appear that at the moment of executing the enfranchisement, the person granting it had 
not sufficient property... to leave to his heirs the portion to them reserved by law.  
134See generally KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 41, n. 2, 529-30 (providing a splendid 
overview of the subject and, inter alia, an exhaustive list of scholarship on interracial sex during 
the enslavement era).
135See KOLCHIN, supra note 11, at 124-25:  
Far more often, however, slaves who had sex with whites did so against their will, 
whether the victims of outright rape or of the powerlessness that made resistance to 
advances futile and the use of force in such advances unnecessary....  Sex between white 
men and black women was a routine feature of life on many, perhaps most, 
slaveholdings, as masters, their teenage sons, and on large holdings their overseers took 
advantage of the situation to engage in the kind of casual, emotionless sex on demand 
unavailable from white women. 
See also, supra note 56.
See KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 163 (“The sexual abuse of enslaved women was a 
constant refrain, for example, in Frederick Douglass’s indictment of bondage:
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1.  White Men Could Legally Rape Their Enslaved Black Women.
The most significant miscegenational rule, in the antebellum South, was that 
a white man/master could legally rape his enslaved black woman, and the black 
woman had no legal recourse.136  From the white master’s perspective, 
More than a million women, in the Southern States... are, by the laws of the land, 
and through no fault of their own, assigned to a life of revolting prostitution.... 
Youth and elegance, beauty and innocence are exposed for sale upon the auction 
block; while villainous monsters stand around, with pockets lines with gold, 
gazing with lustful eyes upon their prospective victims....  Every slaveholder is a 
party, a guilty party, of this awful wickedness.”  (Footnote omitted.))
136See HIGGINBOTHAM & KOPYTOFF, supra note 112, at 2008 (“In cases of interracial 
rape, in contrast, only black men were called to task.  White men were not punished at all for the 
rape of black women, and black men were punished more severely than were white men who 
raped white women.”).  See also FINKELMAN, supra note 125, at 50 (citing from William W. 
Fisher III, “Ideology and Imagery in the Law of Slavery,” 
In situations implicating the sexuality of female slaves, the Jezebel image 
predominated.  For example, the supposed licentiousness and poorly developed 
parental instincts of Negro women were commonly invoked to justify denying 
them the right to marry or to retain custody of their children.  Similar 
characterizations were used to justify the failure of almost all jurisdictions to 
criminalize rape of a slave woman.  (Footnotes omitted.))
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miscegenation between himself and his enslaved black women was entirely 
unregulated.137   Where it related to white masters and enslaved black women, 
See also, SCHAFER, SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 85 (“No Louisiana law made rape of a black 
woman, slave or free, a crime.  Rape was specifically limited to white women under the state’s 
law.”)  Compare PAUL FINKELMAN, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE: A CASEBOOK 260-1 
(1986) [hereinafter FINKELMAN, CASEBOOK]) (citing George (a Slave) v. The State, 37 
Mississippi 316 (1859) (in the case of an enslaved black man’s indictment for the rape of 
enslaved female child under ten years old, the Court held that no indictment could be sustained 
either at common law or by statutory law.  The Court stated the terrible legal position that 
enslaved black women (of any age) faced, when raped, “From a careful examination of our 
legislation, on this subject, we are satisfied that there is no act which embraces either the 
attempted or actual commission of a rape by a slave on a female slave.”  One can be sure that if 
the law did not hold an enslaved man liable for raping an enslaved ten-year-old child, it would 
not have a white master liable for the same horrid act!)  
137See JOE GRAY TAYLOR, NEGRO SLAVERY IN LOUISIANA 20 (1963) [hereinafter 
TAYLOR] 
The existence of extramarital relation between whites and Negroes can be accepted 
without doubt.  To some extent this had occurred on the slave coast, and it continued 
amidst the stench of the slave ships.  When the slave woman reached the New World she 
was in no position to resist white insistence....  Citations are after all unnecessary, 
because the increasing number of references to mulattoes as time went on and a realistic
appreciation of the conditions which exist when women are the property of men make the 
conclusion inevitable that there were many children born of mixed parentage.  Nor do the 
sources available indicate any strong disapproval.  Men in court frequently accounted for 
their whereabouts at a certain time by asserting that they had been ‘sleeping with a 
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plantation law (e.g., the master’s desires) ruled.138   An enslaved black woman 
legally had no will that her white master needed to respect, and she owed total 
obedience to him.139
negress.’ (Footnotes omitted.)
138See COBB, supra note 115, at 99-100:  
Another consequence of slavery is, that the violation of the person of a female slave, 
carries with it no other punishment than the damages which the master may recover for 
the trespass upon his property....  It is a matter worthy of consideration of legislators, 
whether the offence of rape, committed upon a female slave, should not be indictable; 
and whether, when committed by the master, there should not be superadded (sic) the sale 
of the slave to some other master.  The occurrence of such an offence is almost unheard 
of; and the known lasciviousness of the negro, renders the possibility of its occurrence 
very remote.  Yet, for the honor of the statute-book, if it does occur, there should be an 
adequate punishment.  (Footnotes omitted.)  
See also, supra note 56.
139See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 198: 
Slaves themselves had little claim on the law for protection.  A South Carolina judge, in 
1847, put the case bluntly.  A slave, he said ‘can invoke neither magna charta nor 
common law....  In the very nature of things, he is subject to despotism.  Law as to him is 
only a compact between his rulers.’  The Louisiana Black Code of 1806 (sec.18) declared 
that a slave ‘owes to his master, and to all his family, a respect without bounds, and an 
absolute obedience, and... is... to execute all... orders.’
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2.  White Men and Black Women Could Not Legally Marry.
The next most significant miscegenational rule was that a white man could 
not legally marry a black woman of any status, whether he owned her, whether 
another person owned her, or whether she was free.140
See also ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE (1987) (presenting the feminist view that under 
conditions of patriarchy, most, if not all, heterosexual sex amounts to coerced sex).  See 
generally DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, AR’N’T (SIC) I  A WOMAN: FEMALE SLAVES IN THE 
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1985).
140See KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 219:  
The race bar at the altar has a long history in America.  In 1664, Maryland severely 
punished white women who married Negroes or slaves, calling such unions ‘shameful 
matches.’  To prevent ‘abominable mixture and spurious issue’–meaning mixed-race 
offspring–the Virginia Assembly decreed that whites who married blacks, mulattoes, or 
Indians would be banished from the dominion forever.   By 1800 ten of the sixteen states 
then constituting the United States proscribed interracial marriage.  By 1913, when 
Wyoming became the last state to impose a statutory impediment to marital 
miscegenation, forty-one others had already enacted similar laws, and in doing so armed 
public authorities and private persons with the means to create and police racial divisions 
in matters of sex and matrimony.
See, e.g., La. BLACK CODE, art. VI (1724) (provided that marriage of whites to enslaved blacks 
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was forbidden, and that concubinage of whites with manumitted or freeborn blacks was also 
forbidden.)  Article 95 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 prohibited marriage between a white 
person and a colored person.  Compare KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 76 (noting that South 
Carolina did not prohibit interracial marriage during the antebellum period).  See also MICHAEL 
P. JOHNSON &  JAMES L. ROAKE, BLACK MASTERS, A FREE FAMILY OF COLOR IN THE OLD 
SOUTH 128-29 (1984) [hereinafter JOHNSON] (“In South Carolina, unlike many other Southern 
states, a marriage between a free person of color and a white person was perfectly legal.”)
As to marriage between free blacks and whites, see COBB, supra note 115, at 313: 
Free persons of color, unless restricted by statute, may contract marriage with those of 
their own condition, or any free person capable of contracting.  Intermarriage with the 
whites is prohibited in a large majority of the States of the Union.  Public policy has 
made it necessary for the slaveholding States, by statute, to impose other restrictions 
upon free persons of color... to place them on the same footing with slaves as to their 
intercourse with white citizens....”  (Footnotes omitted.)  
See also STAMPP, supra note 12. 
Compare A LAW UNTO ITSELF?  ESSAYS IN THE NEW LOUISIANA LEGAL HISTORY 196-98 
(Warren M. Billings & Mark F. Fernandez eds., 2001) [hereinafter BILLINGS], Ellen Holmes 
Pearson, “Imperfect Equality, The Legal Status of Free People of Color in New Orleans, 1803-
1860:” 
The Code Noir’s interdiction against interracial marriage was reiterated in the 
Digest of 1808 and the Civil Code of 1825, but it was not tested in the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana until 1855, in Dupre v. Boulard.  That case arose out of a 
disputed succession, and the issue turned on the validity of a French marriage 
between a white man and a free woman of color.  The children of Marie Elizabeth 
Boulard attempted to block Jean Pierre Michel Dupre from claiming any of their 
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3.  White Men Could Legally Buy and Sell Enslaved Black Women 
for Sexual Exploitation.
The next most significant miscegenational rule was that a white man could 
legally buy, and, if disobedient, sell, an enslaved black woman for any lawful 
purpose, including sexual exploitation.141  In fact, there is evidence that law 
mother’s estate because Dupre and Boulard’s marriage was illegal in Louisiana.  
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Henry Spofford expressed his disapproval, 
calling the marriage an “unnatural alliance” and refusing to sanction an evasion of 
Louisiana law by legitimating the union. The fact that the first challenge to this 
law came so close to the Civil War is somewhat surprising.  Because New 
Orleanians tended to overlook cohabitation between white men and women of 
color, perhaps the marital status of Marie Elizabeth and Jean Pierre Michel Dupre 
would have gone unnoticed had it not been for the dispute over an estate worth 
almost $23,000.  (Footnotes omitted.))
See also, H.E. STERKX, THE FREE NEGRO IN ANTE-BELLUM LOUISIANA 243-44 (1972) 
[hereinafter STERKX].
141See STAMPP, supra note 12, at 196: 
Some slaveholders preferred to use ‘bright mulattoes’ as domestics; a few paid premium 
prices for light-skinned females to be used as concubines or prostitutes.”  Id. at 259 
(“Lewis C. Robards, Lexington’s best-known trader in the 1850's, had special quarters on 
the second floor of his ‘Negro jail’ for his ‘choice stock’ of quadroon and octoroon girls.  
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allowed white men to buy enslaved women merely for their sexual and physical 
attraction and pleasure, as there was quite a demand in the enslavement market for 
certain black women.142
4.  White Men Could Legally Cohabit with a Black Women, as 
‘In several rooms,’ reported a visitor, ‘I found very handsome mulatto women, of fine 
persons and easy genteel manners, sitting at their needlework awaiting a purchaser.  The 
proprietor made them get up and turn around to show to advantage their finely developed 
and graceful forms–and slaves as they were, this I confess, rather shocked my gallantry.  
New Orleans was known to be a good market for ‘fancy girls,’ but traders found 
purchasers elsewhere too.”  (Footnotes omitted.)  
See also, supra notes 14 and 52.  
142The author has reviewed the enslavement sales found in the 1829-1831 Slaves Sales of 
Notary William Christy in the Orleans Parish Courthouse, New Orleans, Louisiana and found 
that the average price, between 1829 and 1831, for an 18-year-old black woman was $400 
(average of 100 such sales).  And yet, in 1830, an agent of a Virginia white master bought an 18-
year-old “mulatto” woman for $1200!  See SIR EDWARD ROBERT SULLIVAN, RAMBLES AND 
SCRAMBLES IN NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA 210 (1853) (making observations about the 
desirability of attractive black women on the enslavement sale block: “Their movements are the 
most easy and graceful that I have ever seen....  A handsome quadroon could not, though the 
market is well supplied, be bought for less than one thousand or fifteen hundred dollars!”).  
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Concubines.143
The next most significant miscegenational rule was that a white man could 
143A “concubine” is defined as “a woman who cohabits with a man without being his 
wife; a kept mistress.  A male paramour.” OXFORD DICTIONARY, VOL. III, supra note 5, at 674.   
This article defines a concubine as either a man or a woman (primarily) who live together, 
without being married.  They were parties cohabiting out of wedlock.  Often, the term was used 
to describe the woman (usually black) in such a relationship, while the more positive term 
“paramour” was used to describe the man (usually white). There were some other types of 
miscegenational relationships between white men and black women.  These included a white 
man/master legally prostituting an enslaved black woman he owned for profit; a white man 
legally having casual sexual activities with an enslaved black woman he owned; a white man 
legally cohabiting secretly with an enslaved black woman he owned; and a white man having the 
same types of the aforementioned relationships with an enslaved woman that he did not own, or 
with a free black woman.
See JOHNSON, supra note 140, at 52-53: 
Others among the women without co-residing spouses were concubines of white men.  
Some of the white men who fathered these women’s children were their former masters.  
Others were white men who chose not to reside with the women who bore their children.  
In the racial climate of antebellum South Carolina, most white men would not want to 
acknowledge their mulatto children or their Negro concubine.  Although the exact 
proportion of concubines among the free Afro-American women without co-residing 
spouses cannot be known, a rough estimate is that they numbered about a third of these 
women, or about one free colored household in ten.  In South Carolina, unlike many other 
Southern states, a marriage between a free person of color and a white person was 
perfectly legal.  (Footnotes omitted.)
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legally cohabit “open and notoriously” with an enslaved black woman that he 
owned, or with a free black woman, a “concubine.”144  In addition, the law in some 
instances provided that an enslaved black woman was capable of receiving 
property by will or inter vivos, if she had acquired the right to be set free in the 
future.145
144See LA. CIV. CODE, art. 1468, infra note 147. Compare HIGGINBOTHAM & KOPYTOFF, 
supra note 112, at 2003: 
Cases in which white men were prosecuted for interracial sex rarely reached the highest 
courts of Virginia.  We have found only two, despite the frequency with which mulatto 
children were born of black mothers.  One reason lay in the rules of evidence: no black or 
mulatto could testify against a white at trial.  Therefore, another white would have had to 
bring the complaint.  Another reason was that society tended to wink at the casual 
liaisons of white men and black women.
145See supra note 130, LA. CIV. CODE, art 193 (1825), stating “A slave who has acquired 
the right of being free at a future time, is from that time capable of receiving by testament or 
donation.  Property given or devised to him must be preserved for him, in order to be delivered to 
him in kind, when his emancipation shall take place.  In the meantime it must be administered by 
a curator.”  Unfortunately, in 1855, the State of Louisiana followed other enslavement states and 
tightened the legal restrictions on blacks, enslaved and free.  Some of its provisions included a 
prohibition against free blacks marrying both whites and enslaved blacks, essentially permitting 
free blacks to marry only other free blacks or to live illegally with whites or enslaved blacks.
See SCHAFER, SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 183-84 (“On March 6, 1857, the Louisiana 
legislature eliminated all loopholes and totally prohibited emancipations: ‘From and after the 
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5.  White Men Could Transfer Limited Personal Wealth to 
Their Black Concubines. 
Even though white men could and often did “cross the color line” to 
have sexual relations with enslaved black women, the law made it very difficult, 
but not impossible, for white wealth to cross over as well.146  A statute did, in fact,  
formally allow for some property transfer in such “illicit” relationships.147  It would 
appear from this study that white men wanted the right to reward their black 
women with property favors.148
passage of this act, no slave shall be emancipated in this state.’”) 
146See generally DAVIS, supra note 9.
147See, e.g., LA. CIVIL CODE, art. 1468 (1825), which provided:
Those who have lived together in open concubinage are respectively incapable of 
making to each other, whether inter vivos or mortis causa, any donation of 
immovables; and if they make a donation of movables, it can not exceed one-tenth 
part of the whole value of their estate.  Those who afterwards marry are excepted 
from this rule.
148See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 268:  
The strength and persistence of these liaisons were demonstrated whenever 
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6.  White Men Could Legally Transfer Personal Wealth to Their 
“Colored” Children, Their Offspring with Black Concubines.
One obvious concern over miscegenation between white men and black 
women was the procreation of mixed-race or “colored” children.149  Consequently, 
officials challenged them.  An attempt to prevent black women from inheriting a 
portion of their white lovers’ estate brought howls of protest in the Louisiana 
legislature (in 1840). One representative assured the assembly that ‘a black 
woman who lived with a white man might be as virtuous as if she were his wife,’ 
and doubtless more virtuous than a white woman who lived in similar 
circumstances since she (the black woman) was (legally) prohibited from 
marrying her paramour....  (In 1860) the South Carolina General Assembly quietly 
buried a petition lamenting that whites were ‘frequently found living in open 
connection with negro and mulatto women’ by simply declaring ‘the evil 
complained of cannot be prevented by legislation.  (Emphasis added, footnotes 
omitted.))
149See HIGGINBOTHAM & KOPYTOFF, supra note 112, at 1994-95:
Significantly, the new and harsher legal attitude toward interracial sex appeared in 
the 1662 statute designed to solve the ‘problem’ of fitting the mulatto children of 
such unions into the social order.  This suggests that what prompted the harsher 
punishment was not simply the act of interracial sex itself, but its likely outcome: 
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early in the Colonial period and throughout the antebellum period, the law treated 
the offspring of miscegenational relationships between white men and black 
women as their white father’s “bastards,” or illegitimate, without the father’s 
inheritable blood.150  Their inheritance was that of their enslaved black mother, the 
legal status of “enslaved.”151
The law clearly justified this rule to punish miscegenational relations.  The 
alternative–the presumption of legitimacy–would reward miscegenational 
behavior, and would transfer wealth to mulatto children.   (Imagine the 
psychological effect on the enslaved child, to be your father’s legal property, to be 
bought, sold, or abused as he willed!152)   Oddly, the antebellum legislatures did 
not completely close the door to the inheritance rights of “colored” or “mulatto” 
mulatto children....  A 1691 statute... stated... ‘[I]t is hereby enacted, that for the 
time to come, whatsoever English or other white man or women being free shall 
intermarry with a negroe (sic), mulatto, or Indian man or woman bond or free 
shall within three months after such marriage be banished and removed from this 
dominion forever.’  (Footnotes omitted.))
150See COBB, supra note 115.
151See RUSSELL, supra note 14.
152See supra note 110.
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children of miscegenational relationships between white men and black women, 
allowing a more stringent but available means of legitimatization.153
And what should the law do if a white master decided to exercise his private 
property rights so as to emancipate his enslaved black female lover and their 
enslaved children?154  Unfortunately, later in the antebellum period (1840-60), 
southern state legislatures made manumission of enslaved persons a more difficult 
legal exercise, often requiring that the freed enslaved be sent out of the state.155
153See LA. CIV. CODE, art. 221 (1825), providing strict requirements for a white father to 
legally acknowledge a colored child as his offspring.  This Article required that if a white father 
desired to legally acknowledge a colored child, he must provide evidence in a notarial act, in 
front of and signed by two witnesses.      
154See JOHN D’EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF 
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 103 (1988) [hereinafter D’EMILIO] (“When white men emancipated their 
mistresses and mulatto children in their wills they implied that more than mere physical 
exploitation characterized these relationships.”) 
155See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 138-139:
The master’s right to free his slaves shrank as slavery expanded....  By the 1850s, when 
many states prohibited manumission altogether, only the border states of Delaware and 
Missouri and newly settled Arkansas allowed masters to liberate their slaves and 
permitted manumitted blacks to remain in the state.”  (Footnote omitted,  lists various 
states’ manumission laws and source references.)
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The strength of the law’s abhorrence of  “colored” children receiving 
property from their white fathers is observed in the case of Robinett v. Verdun’s 
Vendees.156  In that case, the deceased, Alexander Verdun had sold certain tracts of 
land to Jean Baptiste Gregoire and six or seven other colored persons whom 
Verdun’s white heirs alleged were Verdun’s illegitimate children.157  The court 
annulled the sale, finding that the deceased, Verdun, had not properly 
acknowledged his illegitimate colored children.158  Justice Simon recognized the 
obstacles that white men faced in attempting to pass on property to their “colored” 
children:  
‘A part of the population of that (sic) state has been 
placed by law under certain disabilities and incapacities, 
from which it is not the province of the courts of justice 
to relieve them; and there are very important 
considerations which impose on our courts a stricter 
156Robinett et al. v. Verdun’s Vendees, 14 La. 542, 1840 WL 1092 (La. 1840).
157Id.
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observance of the laws relative to illegitimate children, 
especially to those of color.’159
In summary, when it came to miscegenation between white men and black 
women, antebellum southern legislatures imposed a double standard, allowing 
white men to enjoy a black woman’s sexual favors, while granting her and their 
offspring little or no property rights.  Rather than completely prohibit any 
meaningful sexual contact between them, the law condoned them, and, at least in 
Louisiana, legislatively provided black women who participated in these 
relationships and their offspring an opportunity to enjoy limited property rights.  
Why the apparent inconsistency?  Why not prohibit all interracial sexual 
relationships?  And, even if some were recognized, why not cut off all property 
rights to black women in miscegenational relationships?  The answers to these 
questions and whether those answers support or oppose Professor Bell’s “interest-
convergence” principle is analyzed next.
158Id. at *4.
159Id. at 3, citing Jung et al. v. Doriocourt et al, 4 La. 175, 1832 WL 820 (La. 1832).
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C. WHY MISCEGENATION LAW PERMITTED WHITE MEN AND 
BLACK WOMEN TO COHABIT, AND GAVE BLACK WOMEN 
LIMITED PROPERTY RIGHTS?
As there is little legislative history explaining antebellum Southern 
legislatures’ reasons for their approach to white man and black woman 
miscegenation, one is left to speculation.  First, there is the Jeffersonian theory of 
enslavement status: once an enslaved black, always enslaved, even descendants of 
free white men and enslaved black women.160  But Jeffersonian theory fails to 
explain the law’s similar treatment of miscegenational relationships between white 
men and free black women, and its treatment of free, albeit presumptively 
illegitimate, children.
Another explanation is racism, or the boundary of color, that despite “free,” 
non-enslaved status, white society aspired to remain “white” and racially 
segregated.161  This “racism” theory is embodied in the Higginbotham theory of 
160See RUSSELL, supra note 14. 
161See FINKELMAN, supra note 125, at 395, excerpt from Jonathan A. Bush, “The British 
Constitution and the Creation of American Slavery” (“The colonial boundaries of skin color and 
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racial purity and segregation, that to allow interracial sexual intercourse would lead 
to mulatto children.162  But the legislatures’ failure to make criminal a white 
master’s rape of his enslaved black refutes this theory.
Analyzing the law’s handling of blood issue of white men and black women 
is illuminating.163  Without racism, a white man would have been legally capable 
white racism did not always succeed in separating the races, particularly before the eighteenth 
century....  For masters the general answer to these boundary challenges was the same: keep 
slaves as slaves and not free by keeping blacks separate.  This explains the prominence of 
colonial penal statutes, miscegenation laws, restrictions on manumission, and similar acts.”) 
162See generally HIGGINBOTHAM & KOPYTOFF, supra note 112.
163See P. Keith Daigle, All in the Family: Equal Protection and the Illegitimate Child in 
Louisiana Succession Law, 38 LA. L. REV. 189 (1977-1978) (discussing the various 
classifications of children and their inheritance rights).  Historically, Louisiana has classified 
children as legitimates, natural (acknowledged by either parent but born out of wedlock), and 
illegitimates (unacknowledged and out of wedlock).  Illegitimates had no inheritance rights 
except for nourishment, lodging and “alimony” (support), if the father or mother had legitimate 
children or descendants.  An acknowledged natural child was ranked higher in the mother’s 
succession, inheriting ahead of ascendants, collaterals, and the surviving spouse, if there were no 
surviving legitimate descendants. In the father’s succession, an acknowledged natural child 
inherited only ahead of the state, and after any lawful relations and a surviving spouse. Id. at 
189-91.   See also, In the Matter of the Succession of Joseph L. Robins, 349 So. 2d 276 (La. 
1977) (holding that Civil Code Article 1488 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 1974 
Louisiana Constitution, by treated “adulterous bastards” different from other “illegitimates”).  Id.
at 198-200.
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of marrying a black woman.  Then, their children would have all the property and 
inheritance rights of legitimate children.  Without racism, a white male could 
easily bestow, by inter vivos gift or by will, property upon his “concubine” and 
their children.  On the other hand, with racism, a white father could not easily 
acknowledge his children with a black woman, as was the case under Louisiana 
law, which required greater formality164 than when acknowledging a white child, 
and still faced legal limitations on the portion of his estate he could give by will.  
These legal restrictions and impediments were greater if the black woman was 
enslaved, not free, and if the children were enslaved. 
Then there is the D’Emilio “romance theory,” that a white master who 
attempted to free his enslaved mistress and their mulatto children by will showed 
more than physical exploitation, and was likely in love.165   But, as we shall see, in 
the case law, these attempts at emancipation by will often failed.  One also has to 
wonder how romantic it was to the enslaved black mistress, to wait until her white 
master-lover died, to be emancipated (along with their children), when he could 
164La. CIV. CODE, art 221 (1845) (providing that acknowledgment of an illegitimate child 
should be made by a declaration before a notary public in the presence of two witnesses and no
other proof of acknowledgment shall be admitted in favor of children of color).
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have done so while alive!
The usual justification for these statutes regulating interracial relationships 
was, according to the Schafer “family theory,” protection of the “institution of the 
family.”166  That is, at least, the white family.  But as the Schafer “family theory” 
points out, it is unfair to judge miscegenational relationships between white men 
and black women by “legitimate” marital standards, as the law prohibited them 
from marrying.  At the end of the day, despite the law, white men and their black 
women often carried on relationships with them that mirrored, for better or worse, 
marriage.167  Many defied the law and sought legal loopholes to reward their black 
165See D’EMILIO, supra note 152.
166See SCHAFER, SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 200 (“Louisiana’s continental legal 
heritage is evident in these rulings.  Illicit and illegal liaisons were a threat to the institution of 
the family.  The Civil Code ensured that the legitimate family of the free partners in an illegal 
relationship would not be deprived of their inheritance.  Of course, slaves had no legitimate 
families under the law, could own no property, and were in fact property themselves.  These 
factors operated in most court decisions to make these laws more burdensome on them than on 
whites.”)  
167See KOLCHIN, supra note 116.
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mistresses with wealth and property.168
Can Bell’s “interest-convergence” principle provide the answer?  Should 
antebellum Southern legislatures have allowed black women and their 
miscegenational offspring with white men, to share in the American Dream?  
Reflecting on Bell’s “interest-convergence” principle is the Saks “wealth 
miscegenation” theory, that whatever property rights antebellum Southern 
legislatures provided black women in relationships with white men coincided with 
the interests of privileged, wealthy, powerful white men.169   The Saks “wealth 
miscegenation” theory is also consistent with the creation of the American Dream, 
based upon cheap land, cheap labor, and cheap sex.170  To allow black women to 
enjoy property rights would arguably reduce what would be available for deserving 
white Americans: wealth, power, and privilege.  
More critically, for antebellum Southern legislatures (and the contemporary 
U.S. Supreme Court) to provide black women property rights would undermine the 
very basis of the American Dream and of whites’ important rationale for 
168See generally DAVIS, supra note 9.
169See SAKS, supra note 114.
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enslavement: the inferiority of blacks.  How could blacks be both inferior and 
treated as equal?  The answer, in the eyes of antebellum Southern legislatures, was 
that black women were not equal.171  As enslavement was a human institution 
where white men ruled, the law bent to accommodate their sexual desires and guilt, 
so as to allow white men-black women miscegenation and to apparently reward 
black women some limited property rights.    
While antebellum Southern legislatures provided some insights into the 
answers to these questions,172 one must look to case a law and judicial 
pronouncement to get a full picture of how these laws were actually implemented 
and the judicial rationales for their decisions.  Even though the legislature granted 
miscegenational black women some limited property rights, did antebellum 
Southern judges reinforce or impede such rules?  And most important, why did the 
judges do what they did?  
170See supra, Section II.
171See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 268 (“Whites maintained their dominance by 
differentiating themselves from blacks and monopolizing the symbols of superiority.”)    
172See supra, Section III, B.
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IV.     COURT DECISIONS RESTRICTING WHITE WEALTH 
TRANSFERENCE TO BLACKS173
In a market economy, property is freely bought and sold, 
and freely transferred by way of gift.  Most gift 
transactions take place within the family.  Few property 
owners make major gifts during their lifetime; but, when 
they die, all must be given away.  Almost the entire stock 
of private wealth turns over each generation, by last will 
and testament, or through the intestacy laws, or by a gift 
in the light of death.  Only public, corporate, and dynastic 
property is immune from this law of mortality.174
– Lawrence M. Friedman
173There are many cases from enslavement states providing examples of white men who 
attempted to transfer wealth to their enslaved black women and their children.  See generally
DAVIS, supra note 9.  Louisiana, a state that Davis expressly does not cover, provides an 
abundant variety of these cases.  See SCHAFER, SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 184.
174See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 218 (introducing the American law changes to the 
English rules concerning succession).
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A.  LOUISIANA “PERMISSIVE” LEGISLATIVE TREATMENT OF 
CONCUBINAGE.
This next section will focus on the Louisiana Supreme Court’s reaction to 
the legislative concubinage wealth transfer statute, to determine whether Louisiana 
did, in fact, provide a greater wealth opportunity for enslaved black women (and 
their miscegenational children), as its legislative scheme implied.  This will be 
followed by an analysis of cases wherein white men transferred wealth to free
black women or “black mistresses.”
One scholarly study of nineteenth century case analyzed inheritance rights of 
enslaved women against postmortem transfers of wealth.175  It concluded, “The 
distributive rules of succession reinforced the exploitative roles of enslaved women 
in the sexual economy.”176   That study chose not to focus on two important areas: 
175See DAVIS, supra note 9. 
176Id. at 285 (continuing, Davis explains, “The reproduction of the enslaved could never 
produce property rights, only property.  Sexual relationships never yielded economic rights, 
regardless of the degree of affect, length of commitment, or adherence to monogamy.  Southern 
succession doctrine blocked the intimate sphere, as well as the commercial, as a source of 
economic personality for the enslaved.”)  
Blackness as Property
Page 126 of 302
interracial transfers in the State of Louisiana and interracial transfers to free black 
mistresses.177
The first important inquiry is that of postmortem, interracial transfers in the 
177Id.  At first glance, the miscegenational relationships described in the following case 
study might appear somewhat romantic.  Perhaps some of them were, but one should not assume 
that all such relationships were other than brutality.  For an example of the extend of brutality in 
an antebellum concubinage relationship, see SCARBOROUGH, supra note 12, at 113-16:
Of all the great slaveholders included in this study, however, no others were more 
callous or more brutal in the treatment of their human property than Judge Samuel 
S. Boyd of Natchez and his partner, the former slavetrader Rice C. Ballard....  The 
records indicate that throughout the term of their joint planting venture Ballard 
and Boyd were constantly buying and selling slaves, apparently in utter disregard 
of family ties....  But trafficking in slaves was not the most egregious of Judge 
Boyd’s sins.  His treatment of a female house servant named Maria bordered on 
sadism....  The attorney described Maria’s treatment in graphic detail.  She was, 
he charged, ‘lashed... like an ox, until the blood gushes from her.’....  Outrageous 
as was Judge Boyd’s abuse of Maria, it was exceeded by his subsequent treatment 
of another female slave, his long-term mistress Virginia.  The relationship had 
evidently been one of extended duration, for by 1853 she had already borne him 
two children and was pregnant with a third.  Apparently fearful that the 
relationship was about to be revealed to his wife, Boyd, in March of that year, 
directed Ballard, acting through the agency of the slave dealer C.M. Rutherford, 
to send Virginia and her children–his own children–to Texas to be sold....  In early 
August, Rutherford informed Ballard that he had just received word from Texas 
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State of Louisiana.  And the second important inquiry is that of cases, involving 
white men’s postmortem wealth transfers to free black women.  The next section 
of this article will analyze cases in these two important areas:  First, we analyze the 
Louisiana Supreme Court’s interpretation of the state’s “permissive” concubinage 
statute, allowing white men to transfer limited wealth to their black female sexual 
partners. 
B. ENSLAVED BLACK WOMEN’S SEXUAL SERVICES 
LEGISLATIVELY PAID, JUDICIALLY DENIED                    
There are many ways by which wealth could be acquired in the antebellum 
South, including purchase, gift, or inheritance.178  By way of summary, each of 
these wealth acquisition tools were denied to enslaved black women.179  They were 
not legally allowed to own property,180 acquire by gift,181 labor for money to 
that Virginia and her youngest child had been sold.         
178See supra note 79.
179Id.
180See supra note 104.
Blackness as Property
Page 128 of 302
purchase,182 contract for purchase,183 or inherit.184  Their inability to acquire wealth 
or property was controlled by their legal status as property.185
An enslaved black woman would have to be manumitted or freed in order to 
enjoy the full rights of private property ownership.186  In the early days of 
enslavement, the laws of manumission made it easier for enslaved blacks to obtain 
their freedom.187  Some legal avenues for manumission included allowing blacks to 
“hire out their own labor” and purchase their freedom,188 successfully bring a 
lawsuit for their freedom,189 travel with their master to a free state and be freed 
181Id.
182See supra note 115.
183Id.
184Id.
185See supra note 51.
186See generally SCHAFER, FREE, supra note 45.
187Id.
188Id.
189Id.
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there,190 or receive an inter vivos or causa mortis gifts of emancipation.191
Particularly, for the enslaved black woman, enslavement law and plantation 
practices greatly diminished her ability to use her sexuality as socio-economic 
bargaining chip, as her master had legal control over her sexuality and could rape 
her without legal repercussions.192  That being said, some enslaved black women 
were still able to negotiate their sexual relationships with white men, in exchange 
for their freedom and that of their miscegenational children.193  Many of them were 
manumitted during their white masters’ lifetimes.194  Unfortunately, many white 
masters, for varying reasons from negligence to intent (and some because their 
190See STAMPP, supra note 12, at 2234-35 (“The truth was... that living masters in all the 
southern states–even in those which prohibited manumission by last will and testament–always 
had the right to remove their slave to a free state and there release them from bondage.  Though 
no slave state could deprive them of this right, few made use of it.”)  But see, infra note 213, 
Cole v. Lucas, 2 La. Ann. 946, 1847 WL 3490 (La. 1847) (wherein a white master, Samuel 
Miller, did just that, sending his enslaved black woman, Patsy, to Indiana, where she was 
emancipated). 
191See generally SCHAFER, FREE, supra note 45.
192See supra note 136.
193See supra note 117.
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miscegenational relationships were extramarital), chose to manumit their enslaved 
black female sexual partners when they died, by their wills.195
It has already been established that the State of Louisiana, during the 
antebellum period, had legislatively established a “permissive” scheme for white 
men, living in “open and notorious” concubinage relationships with black women, 
to give them limited property interests in their estate.196  Louisiana’s statutes were 
“permissive” in that they 1) legally recognized concubinage between white men 
and enslaved black women,197 2) expressly provided limited property rights to 
enslaved black women (and their miscegenational children) in concubinage 
relationships,198 and 3) treated manumission and free blacks favorably.199
194Id.
195See DAVIS, supra note 9.
196See supra note 147. 
197Id.
198Id.
199See SCHAFER, FREE, supra note 45, at 2-3:
Slaves in Louisiana had two unique rights.  State law allowed them to contract for 
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The following analyzes antebellum Louisiana Supreme Court cases in which 
that “permissive” legislative scheme was challenged by white family members of 
miscegenational white men, seeking to frustrate the stated wills, to transfer 
property (usually freedom) to their enslaved black women and their 
miscegenational offspring.
1.  Enslaved Women as Whore-ish White Property.
In the following cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled on critical issues, 
involving a deceased white man’s will, providing that his enslaved women (and 
usually, their children) receive some property interest in his estate.  In doing so, the 
Court was called upon to weigh the property claims of two competing groups: the 
testator’s mixed-race, enslaved family against his white, legitimate one.  Should 
the testator’s desire to grant his enslaved black woman property be respected?  Or 
their freedom and to initiate a law suit for their liberty.  Article 174 of the Civil 
Code of the State of Louisiana (1825) allowed slaves to enter into only one form 
of contract–for their freedom....  Slaves’ right to sue for their freedom constituted 
an exceptional legal act in antebellum Louisiana.  Article 177 of the Civil Code 
held that slaves could not be parties in any civil action, either as plaintiffs or 
defendants, except to claim their freedom. 
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should the testator’s white relatives’ interests supersede his miscegenational 
bequests? 
But there was more at stake here than the mere disposition of probate 
property: usually at stake in these cases was the very freedom of the enslaved black 
woman and her miscegenational offspring.  Typically, in these cases, they were the 
property in controversy.200  This reality raised and often turned on a legal fiction of 
great significance: that enslaved blacks were legally immovable property.  
Louisiana’s concubinage statute expressly forbade gifts of immovables to 
concubines.201  Could a white master will freedom as property to his enslaved 
black woman when the Louisiana law considered (for most purposes) enslaved 
200The concubinage cases that the Louisiana Supreme Court heard clearly represent a 
limited universe of concubinage cases.  There were many concubinage cases, that were likely 
properly disposed of at the lower court level, requiring no high Court review.  For example, the 
high Court did likely not review cases, where the testator clearly complied with the 10% total 
value limitation, where the testator clearly failed to comply with the 10% rule, or where no one 
challenged the miscegenational bequest.  Hence, the cases that the Louisiana Supreme Court 
reviewed usually involved fundamental issues, requiring their involvement.  And then there were 
likely some concubinage matters that the Probate Court was able to hear.  
201See supra note 147, at 185-200 (Professor Schafer anticipated some of the case 
analysis in this section.  The author is grateful for much of her foundational work in this area.).
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black people to be “immovables?”202
a.  Maria v. Destrehan203
In an early case, in 1831, the Louisiana courts established a doctrine that 
would resonate throughout their handling of concubinage cases: that enslaved 
black women were not merely the immediate property of their white master, they 
were “indefeasible” property, a continuing legacy of the white master’s white 
heirs.  In Maria v. Destrehan,204 the Court sought to balance a white daughter’s 
forced heirship claim to her white father’s estate, against his bequest of freedom 
for his enslaved black woman and her daughter.205  That estate consisted mainly of 
202See SCHAFER, SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 185 (“The second barrier, ignored by the 
Louisiana Supreme Court until the 1850s, was more formidable: people living in open 
concubinage could not donate immovable property of any value to each other while they were 
alive or by will–and slaves were immovables under Louisiana law.”)  
203Maria et al. v. Destrehan et al., 3 La. 434, 1832 WL 701 (La. 1831).  See SCHAFER, 
SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 186-87.
204Maria et al. v. Destrehan et al., 3 La. 434, 1832 WL 701 (La. 1831).
205Id.
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her father’s enslaved black woman, Maria, and her ten-year-old daughter.206
In Maria v. Destrehan,207 Jacob Philips died and willed that his enslaved 
woman, Maria, and her ten-year-old daughter, Angel, be freed.208  He instructed his 
white daughter to see to the emancipation “as a particular favor to her father.”209
Additionally, he left Maria and Angel all of his movable property.210  The entire 
estate was valued at $1,497.25, of which Maria and Angel accounted for $850.211
The lower court held that the daughter must be given her required portion of the 
Philips’s estate, under Louisiana’s forced heirship laws.212  (The Supreme Court 
remanded the case to the lower court on a procedural issue.) 
206Id.
207Maria et al. v. Destrehan et al., 3 La. 434, 1832 WL 701 (La. 1831).
208Id.
209Maria et al. v. Destrehan et al., 3 La. 434, 1832 WL 701 (La. 1831).  
210Id.
211Id.
212Id.
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b.  Cole v. Lucas213
In this case, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Patsy, a formerly enslaved, 
then free, black woman, an inter vivos bequest of promissory notes for 
approximately $24,000, secured by a plantation and enslaved blacks.214  The case 
was determined on a technical issue of the date of delivery of the notes.215  More 
important, the Court reiterated its doctrine of blackness as white property, in 
stating that a slave cannot inherit, nor receive inter vivos gifts of property.216  The 
Court found that despite evidence that the white testator, Samuel Miller, had gone 
to great lengths to transfer title to Patsy, that at the time of the transfer, she was 
still a slave, even though she was shortly thereafter freed.  
In Lucas v. Cole,217 on May 11, 1843, Samuel Miller, a white man, sold his 
213Cole v. Lucas, 2 La. Ann. 946, 1847 WL 3490 (La. 1847).  See SCHAFER SLAVERY, 
supra note 115, at 277, n.35.
214Cole v. Lucas, 2 La. Ann. 946, 1847 WL 3490 at *2 (La. 1847).
215Id.
216Id.
217Cole v. Lucas, 2 La. Ann. 946, 1847 WL 3490 (La. 1847).
Blackness as Property
Page 136 of 302
plantation and enslaved blacks in Louisiana, taking the property as collateral for 
promissory notes of approximately $24,000.218  Patsy, his enslaved black woman, 
was Miller’s concubine.219  Miller desired to free Patsy, and made arrangements for 
her to travel to Indiana, and there she was emancipated on the 13th or 14th of May 
1844.220  The miscegenational couple decided to move to St. Louis, Missouri, and 
did so in April of 1844.221
Prior to Patsy’s emancipation, Miller endorsed the notes and handed them to 
Miller’s associate named Kirk to hold for Patsy’s benefit.222  The notes were 
redelivered from Kirk to Miller in St. Louis, and given to Patsy after her 
emancipation.223  The issue the Court faced was how Patsy’s legal (enslavement) 
status at the time of the gift, and the concubinage, should affect Miller’s 
218Id. at *2.
219Id.
220Id.
221Cole v. Lucas, 2 La. Ann. 946, 1847 WL 3490 at *3  (La. 1847). 
222Id.
223Id.
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bequests.224
The tone of the Court’s decision was most important: “She was the slave of 
Miller and his concubine, and we think the evidence establishes that their 
concubinage was open and notorious.  Under the cumulated incapacity of slave and 
concubine, she could not receive these notes from Miller as a valid gift, under our 
laws.  The concubines can only receive, in movables, one-tenth part of the whole 
estate of her paramour, and the slave can receive nothing by donation (gift).”225
(Emphasis added.)  As to the validity of the gift, and its position on the importance 
of protecting versus punishing miscegenational relationship, the Court stated, “We 
have already stated our opinions of the relations subsisting between the parties to 
this donation.  The disabilities under which the law places persons who have lived 
224Id. at *2:
But it is said she was emancipated on the 13th or 14th of May, 1844, at Madison 
city, in the State of Indiana, and that her incapacity to receive as a slave was 
removed by the act of emancipation.  To render the gift valid under that 
hypothesis, it would be incumbent on the plaintiff to show that the notes were 
transferred, or give, to her subsequent to the act of emancipation.  The mere 
possession of the notes by her is no evidence of the time when they were 
delivered to her.
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in this condition, are created for the maintenance of good morals, or public order,
and for the preservation of the best interests of society.”226  Therefore, the Court 
found that Miller’s gift to Patsy failed, as it was delivered when she was an 
enslaved concubine, and belonged to Miller’s white heirs.227
c.  Vail v. Bird228
In 1851, the Louisiana Supreme Court clearly articulated its quintessential 
bias against white men’s bequests to free their enslaved black women and their 
miscegenational children in its dicta in Vail v. Bird.229  The Court found that the 
miscegenational bequest in that case, freedom for an enslaved black woman, 
225Id. at *2, and see supra, Article 1468, note 147.
226Id. at *5.
227Id. at *5-6.
228Abraham B. Vail et al. v. Abraham Bird, Executor, 6 La. Ann. 223, 1851 WL 3583 
(La. 1851).  See SCHAFER, SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 187-88.
229Abraham B. Vail et al. v. Abraham Bird, Executor, 6 La. Ann. 223, 1851 WL 3583 
(La. 1851).
Blackness as Property
Page 139 of 302
violated the expressly statutory prohibition of gifts of immovables.230  The Court 
grounded its decision on the well-founded Louisiana law that enslaved blacks were 
not only property, but were immovables.231 Vail v. Bird established that an 
enslaved black is not merely the property of her present owner, but is a permanent 
fixture of the family’s estate, and hence, indefeasible by will.  It also established 
the Court’s racist-sexist bias against the unfortunate position that enslaved black 
women often found themselves.
In Vail v. Bird,232 Henry Clay Vail died, and his will provided freedom for 
his enslaved black woman, Jane, and left her two promissory notes of $100 each.233
Vail’s white heirs sought to annul the will, arguing that as enslaved blacks were 
legally classified as immovable property, Jane could not be the subject of Vail’s 
gift.234  Following the “enslaved as indefeasible immovables” argument, the Court 
230Id. at *2.
231Id.
232Abraham B. Vail et al. v. Abraham Bird, Executor, 6 La. Ann. 223, 1851 WL 3583 
(La. 1851).
233Id.
234Id. 
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accepted the challenge of Vail’s white heirs.235
In a very lucid moment, Justice Isaac Preston, for the majority, presented his 
“blackness as permanent white property” view of the operation of the statute on 
concubinage:  
Slaves are made by our law immovable property.  A donation which 
deprives the heir of the donor of a slave (sic) is a disposition of 
immovable property.  The donation of freedom to a slave deprives the 
(master’s white) heirs (ownership) of the slave, and is therefore the 
donation of an immovable.236 (Emphasis added.)
Vail’s executor attempted to save the bequest to free Jane, arguing Jane 
could not have consented to be a concubine.  Arguably, the statute should not have 
applied to enslaved black women, because, being “enslaved,” legally meant one 
was without will and, therefore, could not have consented to be a concubine.237  On 
this, the Court recognized that an enslaved black woman was vulnerable to her 
235Id. at *2.
236Id.
237Abraham B. Vail et al. v. Abraham Bird, Executor, 6 La. Ann. 223, 1851 WL 3583 at 
*2 (La. 1851).
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white master’s power.238  But they stated that generally an enslaved mistress 
willingly participated in sexual relations with her master:
It is true, the female slave is particularly exposed ... to the seductions 
of an unprincipled master.  That is a misfortune; but it is so rare in the 
case of concubinage that the seduction and temptation are not mutual, 
that exceptions to the general rule cannot be founded upon it.239
In 1854, in Bird v. Vail et al.,240 Vail’s executor continued to sue for Jane’s 
and her child’s freedom, claiming that Vail’s heirs were not entitled to Louisiana’s 
forced heirship rights, as they were neither ascendants nor descendants.241  A 
newly-composed Court, Justice Campbell presiding, ignored the idea of an 
enslaved person as immovable issue, and acknowledged Jane’s right to freedom.242
But the Court again sided with Vail’s white heirs, by providing that Jane 
238Id.
239Id.
240A. Bird, Executor v. A. B. Vail, et al., 9 La. Ann. 176, 1854 WL 4038 (La. 1854).  See 
SCHAFER, SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 188. 
241A. Bird, Executor v. A. B. Vail, et al., 9 La. Ann. 176, 1854 WL 4038 (La. 1854).
242Id.
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must remain in their enslaved service until she reached thirty (then the statutory 
age of manumission of an enslaved black, she was then twenty-five).243  Judge 
Campbell reasoned:  That bequest to free enslaved black women did not free them 
at the time of probate, those enslaved black women are only “entitled to their 
freedom, upon compliance with the formalities prescribed by law for the 
emancipation of slaves; until [then]... the heirs had a right... [to] enjoy their 
services and labor.” 244   The Court also found that her daughter, Louisa, was 
permanently enslaved to the heirs, as Vail’s will was silent about her fate.245
d.  Adams v. Routh and Dorsey246
In 1853, in Adams v. Routh and Dorsey,247 the Court further assaulted 
243Id.
244Id., citing Nimmo et. al v. Bonney et al., Executors, 4 R. 179. 
245Id.
246William Adams v. Routh and Dorsey, 8 La. Ann. 121, 1853 WL 4080 (La. 1853).  See
SCHAFER, SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 189.
247William Adams v. Routh and Dorsey, 8 La. Ann. 121, 1853 WL 4080 (La. 1853).
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enslaved black women’s property rights.   The Court was asked to balance a white 
father’s forced heirship claim against his son Adams’s will, providing that his 
enslaved black woman, Nancy, be freed, and that their children receive $1,000 
each.248   The Court denied the miscegenational bequest, finding that it exceeded 
the statutory gift limitation.249  It decided that Adams’s father continued to own 
Nancy and her children with Adams, despite Adams’ specific bequest.250  And the 
Court authorized their new owner to partition or separate the interracial family to 
satisfy his property rights to one-fourth of the estate.251
In  Adams v. Routh and Dorsey,252 William Adams, Jr., a white master,  
lived in “open concubinage” with an enslaved black woman, Nancy.253  He died in 
1851 and, in his will, he ordered his executor to free Nancy, give her his watch, 
248Id.
249Id.
250Id. at *1-2.
251Id.
252William Adams v. Routh and Dorsey, 8 La. Ann. 121, 1853 WL 4080 (La. 1853).
253Id.
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furniture, and $1,000 for each of their children.254  Adams’s legitimate white father 
(who, under Louisiana law had “forced heirship” rights to one fourth of the estate, 
as the Court found that Adams had no legitimate children) sued to invalidate the 
will.255  Adams’s father claimed that as the entire estate was worth only $4,750, the 
donation to Nancy of her freedom could cost the estate her value, $1,000, and that 
amount exceeded the one-tenth concubinage statutory limitation.256  The Louisiana 
Supreme Court agreed with Adams’s father, ruling that Nancy could not be 
freed.257  It further held that Adams’s father was “entitled to receive one-fourth of 
the entire succession of the testator, and to enforce a partition of it in kind or
licitation (sic), as the case may be.”258  This likely meant that Adams’s interracial 
family would be divided by sale, to satisfy his father’s inheritance rights.  The 
Court also found in favor of Adams’s bequests of $1,000 to each of his colored 
254Id.
255Id.
256Id.
257Id.
258William Adams v. Routh and Dorsey, 8 La. Ann. 121, 1853 WL 4080 at *1-2 (La. 
1853). 
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children, as Adams’s father “had no interest or standing in Court to contest those 
legacies; and as the residuary legatees have not prosecuted their appeal from the 
judgment, it must remain undisturbed.”259
2.  “Adulterous and Incestuous Bastards:”  
Miscegenational Offspring of White Men and Enslaved Black 
Women?
a. Compton v. Prescott260–the Case of the Black Princess 
As seen in the following analysis, the Louisiana Supreme Court clearly 
disapproved of illegitimate children of white men and enslaved black women.261
259Id. at *2.
260John Compton et al, Heirs of Leonard B. Compton v. Aaron Prescott and Another, 
Executors of said Leonard B. Compton, et al., 12 Rob. (La.) 56, 1845 WL 1677 (La. 1845).
261See BILLINGS, supra note 140, at 197:
Although white New Orleans tacitly accepted interracial cohabitation, the Civil 
Code made it difficult for a concubine or natural children of mixed race to make 
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One reason was that they generally perceived white men-black women 
concubinage, as “immoral,” as many, if not most, of them were extramarital.  
Hence, the Court often felt morally obligated to punish the participants.  But, at the 
same time, the Courts seemed to ignore the morality of the outcome of their 
position, which was to victimize the innocent offspring of these extramarital, 
miscegenational relationships.   In the next case, the Court explained the various 
levels of illegitimacy in the enslavement society.  
In Compton v. Prescott,262 Leonard B. Compton, a white man, died without 
leaving any ascendants or legitimate descendants,263 but leaving an estate worth 
substantial claims on a white man’s estate.  The law allowed bastards of color to 
prove descent only from a father of color.  Unless a white father formally 
acknowledged his natural child of mixed race either at birth or at a later date, the 
child had no claim to inherit any portion from his natural father.  (Citing Civil 
Code, art. 221, 226; Jung et al., v. Doriocourt et al., 4 La. 175 (1832); Robinett et 
al. v. Verdun’s Vendees, 14 La. 592 (1840) (sic).
See supra, note 156. 
262John Compton et al, Heirs of Leonard B. Compton v. Aaron Prescott and Another, 
Executors of said Leonard B. Compton, et al., 12 Rob. (La.) 56, 1845 WL 1677 (La. 1845).
263Id. at *2.
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approximately $184,640.264  In this will, he made several bequests.  The most 
significant one at issue provided that his plantation (545 acres), enslaved blacks, 
and $10,000 each, go to his mulatto daughter, Loretta, and her mulatto brother, 
Scipio: “it being my intention to give them, and that they shall have one-fourth in 
value of my estate.”265  Compton had previously “acknowledged them, as his 
natural children, by regular notarial acts executed on the 14th of May, 1830, and 
27th of December, 1837.”266  In doing so, the Court found that Compton complied 
with the statutory requirements for acknowledgment of illegitimate “colored” 
children, under Article 221, and for bequeathing one-quarter of his estate to his 
“natural” children, pursuant to Article 1474 of the Louisiana Civil Code, then in 
effect.267
264Id. at *7.
265Id. at *3.
266John Compton et al, Heirs of Leonard B. Compton v. Aaron Prescott and Another, 
Executors of said Leonard B. Compton, et al., 12 Rob. (La.) 56, 1845 WL 1677, at *7 (La. 1845).
267Id. at *9, the Court stated, 
Now, art. 221, says, in positive terms, that ‘the acknowledgment of an illegitimate 
child, shall be made by a declaration before a notary public, in the presence of 
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In addition, Compton willed Fanchon, a “free woman of color” (and Loretta 
and Scipio’s mother), “all my household and kitchen furniture of all descriptions 
whatsoever; also one saddle horse, and my carriage, pair of horses, two patent gold 
watches, stock of cattle, &c. (sic)”268  The Court noted the special nature of the 
miscegenational relationship that Compton and Fanchon enjoyed:  
The testimony established that the deceased was living in open and 
notorious concubinage with a mulatress (sic) named Fanchon, who, 
being formerly a slave, was emancipated in April, 1825; since then, 
she was always considered a free woman of color.  Fanchon had 
several children, two of whom, Scipio and Loretta, are named in the 
will as being the testator’s children; he always treated them as such, 
and acknowledged them as his natural children, by regular notarial 
two witnesses,’ and provides that ‘No other proof of acknowledgment shall be 
admitted in favor of children of color.’”  See also, id. at *10, where the Court also 
stated, “It is perfectly clear that, under art. 1473, to wit: ‘when the natural father 
has not left legitimate children or descendants, the natural children, acknowledged 
by him, may receive by donation, inter vivos or mortis causa, to the amount of the 
following proportions, to wit: one-fourth of his property, if he leaves legitimate 
ascendants, or legitimate brothers and sisters; &c’. (sic)
268Id. at *3.
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acts executed on the 14th of May, 1830, and 27th of December, 1837.  
The deceased caused one of them to be educated in Ohio at his own 
expense, and always showed them the affection of a father.  It appears 
that Loretta is dead.269
In his will, Compton made two specific bequests and left the remainder of 
his estate to his four legitimate (white) nieces.270  During his lifetime, Compton 
had allegedly made, directly and indirectly, certain inter vivos gifts to his free 
black concubine and their children, Loretta and Scipio, including immovables.271
In the lawsuit, the legitimate, white nieces sought to have the entire estate divided 
amongst themselves, voiding the provisional bequests to Fanchon, Loretta, and 
Scipio, recapturing the inter vivos gifts to themselves, and questioning the specific 
269Id. at *7.  A close reading of the decision shows that Loretta and Scipio were likely 
born after their mother, Fanchon, was emancipated.  This would mean that they were free blacks 
and not enslaved (as there is no mention of the will’s providing that they be freed).
270John Compton et al, Heirs of Leonard B. Compton v. Aaron Prescott and Another, 
Executors of said Leonard B. Compton, et al., 12 Rob. (La.) 56, 1845 WL 1677, at *4 (La. 1845).
271Id. at *7-8.
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bequests to others.272
This case is as interesting for its dicta, as for its surprising disposition.  The 
disposition is easier to explain, so we will start there.  In the end, the Court 
honored Compton’s bequest that one-quarter of his estate go to his miscegenational 
children, Loretta and Scipio, “crediting” the alleged inter vivos gifts they had 
received previously.273  This was a major victory for miscegenational children.  As 
to the gifts to the free black woman and concubine, Fanchon, she received nothing, 
but not because of her status as a concubine  (although, but for the statutory 
prohibition of interracial marriage, she and Compton could have legally married, 
which would have resulted in the entire miscegenational family becoming 
legitimate, and likely entitled to most of Compton’s estate).274  The remaining 
three-fourths of the estate went to Compton’s four white legitimate nieces.275
272Id. at *1.
273Id. at *10-11.
274John Compton et al, Heirs of Leonard B. Compton v. Aaron Prescott and Another, 
Executors of said Leonard B. Compton, et al., 12 Rob. (La.) 56, 1845 WL 1677, at *11 (La. 
1845). 
275Id. 
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Now for the important dicta, the Court explained the nature of the Civil 
Code’s definition of “adulterous and incestuous bastards.”276  Overall, the 
Louisiana Code made it more difficult for a black child to inherit from a white 
father, mainly, because of its prohibition of interracial marriage.  First, under 
Article 200, it provided for two classes of “natural” or illegitimate children: “those 
born from two persons who, at the moment when such children were conceived, 
might have legally contracted marriage with each other (white couples); and those 
who are born from persons to whose marriage (sic) there existed, at the time, some 
legal impediment (a miscegenational couple).”277  (Of course, the most common, 
intended legal impediment was the legal prohibition of interracial marriage.)278
Second, it established more stringent rules for a white father to acknowledge a 
black or mulatto child, by providing that the sole means to acknowledge a 
“colored” child was for the acknowledging father to make a declaration before a 
276Id. at *9.
277Id.
278See supra note 140.
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notary public, in the presence of two witnesses.279   This more formal procedure 
differed from provisions for a white father acknowledging paternity of a white 
child or that of a black father acknowledging paternity of a child of either race.280
That brings us to the ultimate issue that the Court in Compton had to face:   
based upon the two classes of illegitimate children stated in Article 200, the Civil 
279John Compton et al, Heirs of Leonard B. Compton v. Aaron Prescott and Another, 
Executors of said Leonard B. Compton, et al., 12 Rob. (La.) 56, 1845 WL 1677, at *9, citing Art. 
221 (La. 1845). 
280Id.  See Succession of Melasie Hebert, 33 La. Ann. 1099, 1103-07, 1881 WL 8776 (La. 
1881), for a different twist, involving the “illegitimate” children of a free black man and a free 
white woman.  In this post-antebellum case, the plaintiff, Emelia Hebert, represented herself as 
the natural daughter and sole issue of the deceased and sought to be put in possession of the 
entire estate.  At the lower court, a judgment was rendered against her.  On appeal, the court held 
that at the time of Emelia’s birth, her mother (white) and father (black) were unable to marry.  
But the court further held that as there was no legal impediment to interracial marriage at the 
time of the succession, Emelia’s right to inherit must be enforced.  The court used as precedent 
Compton v. Prescott, holding that the legal prohibition against interracial marriage does not 
extend to the children of those relationships, such that they may prove maternal/paternal descent.  
The statutory requirement of written recognition of acknowledgment applied exclusive to 
children of color descending from a white father.  The statute did not address the issue of a white 
mother and a black father.  Hence, Emelia received her white mother’s estate through a loophole, 
not addressed by a legislature mainly concerned by protecting white men’s estates and not those 
of white women.  Succession of Melasie Hebert, 33 La. Ann. 1099, 1103-07, 1881 WL 8776 (La. 
1881).         
Blackness as Property
Page 153 of 302
Code in Articles 202 and 203, defines two classes of “adulterous and incestuous 
bastards.”281  Those of the latter class, whose marriage was subject to legal 
impediment, “can never be acknowledged.”282  But here is where the Court 
departed from its generally racist doctrine of blackness as white property:  
and although there is a legal impediment to the marriage of a white 
person, with a free person of color, (art 95,) (sic) the exception (that 
they as “adulterous and incestuous bastards,” can never be 
acknowledged) does not appear to extend to their illegitimate or 
natural children; for art. 222, says only: that ‘such acknowledgment, 
shall not be made in favor of the children produced by an incestuous 
or adulterous connection.’  Now, art. 221, says, in positive term, that 
‘the acknowledgment of an illegitimate child, shall be made by a 
declaration before a notary public, in the presence of two witnesses,’
and provides that ‘No other proof of acknowledgment shall be 
admitted in favor of children of color.’   (Court’s own emphasis.)  
281John Compton et al, Heirs of Leonard B. Compton v. Aaron Prescott and Another, 
Executors of said Leonard B. Compton, et al., 12 Rob. (La.) 56, 1845 WL 1677, at *9 (La. 1845).
282Id., citing Article 222.
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This last proviso, which contains a negative pregnant with an 
affirmative, undoubtedly means, that, as we said in the case of 
Robinett et al. v. Verdun’s Vendees, (14 La. 545,) any other proof of 
acknowledgment should be excluded, when offered by children of 
color.  It cannot mean any thing (sic) else; for art. 226, by which 
illegitimate children who have not been legally acknowledged, are 
allowed to prove their paternal descent, provided also, that free 
illegitimate children of color may also be allowed to prove their 
descent, from a father of color only, and it is obvious, that this last 
restriction, was inserted in the law, because, with regard to his white 
father, an illegitimate child of color, is not allowed to prove that he 
has been acknowledged, but in the manner pointed out in art. 221, to 
wit: by authentic evidence, and that, therefore, he cannot resort to any 
other kind of proof, but when his father is a man of color.  This 
interpretation... does not seem to us, to conflict in the least with art. 
259, relative to the alimony which natural children may claim from 
natural parents.  It is true, that article fixes the limit, to which such 
alimony should be extended, as to natural children of color; but it 
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clearly corroborates our opinion, that illegitimate colored children are 
not on the same footing with adulterous or incestuous bastards, since 
by art. 262, the latter are not entitled to any alimony from their father, 
but can only claim it from their mother or her ascendants.  We think 
therefore, that Scipio and Loretta could be acknowledged, and art. 
1473 makes no distinction, they should be entitled to the rights 
allowed by law as such.  (Emphasis added.)283
These dicta, although rather verbose, established that a white man could 
acknowledge, as his natural child (and thereby pass on limited inheritance rights in 
his will) a free colored child of a miscegenational relationship, between a white 
man and a free black woman (presuming that the child did not, in fact, result from 
an incestuous or adulterous relationship, such that the legal impediment was that 
the white man was already married).  It also indirectly meant that the white man 
who acknowledged as his natural child an enslaved colored child from a 
miscegenational relationship with a free or enslaved black woman, did not receive 
inheritance rights, because an enslaved black, albeit acknowledged, could not 
283Id. at *9-10.
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receive gifts and had no right to inherit.284  As we shall see in the next case, the 
miscegenational children were not as lucky. 
b.  Turner v. Smith285
In this next case, the miscegenational children were not so fortunate, as 
those in Compton.  As a result of their black mother being enslaved and a 
legislative change prohibiting emancipation, they were denied their freedom, their 
inheritance, and their family unity. As this case will show, by 1857, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court’s “blackness as permanent white property” doctrine seemed 
284See COBB, supra note 115.
285L.E. Turner, Curator v. C.D. Smith et al., 12 La. Ann. 417, 1857 WL 4878 (La. 1857).  
See SCHAFER, SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 189-90.  See also, MORRIS, supra note 51, at 379-80:
After a decade of bitter controversy among the members of the Georgia court, the 
state legislature, in 1859, adopted a law prohibiting all postmortem manumissions 
whether ‘within or without the State.’...  In some Southern states, in other words, 
public policy, especially after 1840, overroad (sic) the right of an owner of 
property to “discontinue” the claim to that property when the property was a 
slave.  Public policy had cut deeply into possessive individualism.  (Footnotes 
omitted.)
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complete.  It coincided with a southern legislative movement prohibiting 
emancipating enslaved blacks.286   One enslaved black woman and her children 
were caught in the sea-change, and denied the freedom provided in her white 
lover’s (or perhaps “rapist’s”?) miscegenational bequests.  As a result, the winning 
white heirs were allowed to divide the miscegenational family among them, 
286See STAMPP, supra note 125, at 232-54:
In the Deep South the trend was toward increasingly severe legislative 
restrictions.  In Louisiana (for many years the most liberal of these states) an act 
of 1807 limited the privilege of manumission to slaves who were at least thirty 
years old and who had not been guilty of bad conduct during the previous four 
years.  In 1830, Louisiana required emancipated slaves to leave the state within 
thirty days; after 1852, they had to leave the United States within twelve months.  
Five years later, Louisiana entirely prohibited private emancipations within the 
state.  The remaining states of the lower South had outlawed private 
emancipations early in the nineteenth century....  Several states in the Deep 
South... prohibited emancipation by last will and testament.  South Carolina acted 
as early as 1841, when it voided all deeds and wills designated to free slaves 
before or after removal from the state.  Mississippi, Georgia, Arkansas, and 
Alabama adopted similar laws during the next two decades....  [I]n 1859, only 
three thousand slaves were emancipated throughout the entire South.  At that time 
both Virginia and Kentucky permitted manumissions by deed or will.  Yet 
Virginia, with a slave population of a half million, freed only two hundred and 
seventy-seven; Kentucky, with a slave population of nearly a quarter million, 
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destroying the black family, for the sake of blackness as white property. 
In Turner v. Smith,287 the Court weighed white heirs’ property rights against 
a black family’s right to freedom.288  The facts of that case show that on December 
19, 1855, John Turnbull formally acknowledged, before a notary and two 
witnesses, his five mulatto children, born of his twenty-three-year-old enslaved 
woman, Rachel.289   On the same day, Turnbull made a will, instructing his 
executor to free his children and their mother upon his death; and, if that were not 
possible, then the executor was to take them to their chosen country or state, where 
enslavement was prohibited.290  His will further provided that one-third of his 
estate should be divided equally between Rachel and the children.291
freed only one hundred and seventy-six. 
287L.E. Turner, Curator v. C.D. Smith et al., 12 La. Ann. 417, 1857 WL 4878 (La. 1857).
288Id.
289Id.
290Id. at *1-2.  See also B. Price, Guardian v. John Ray, Executor, 14 La. Ann. 697, 1859 
WL 5929 (La. 1859); SCHAFER, SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 191-92 (similar facts and outcome).
291L.E. Turner, Curator, v. C.D. Smith et al., 12 La. Ann. 417, 1857 WL 4878, at *2 
(La.1857).
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In 1856, Turnbull died.292  The executor refused to free Rachel and the 
children; Turnbull’s white heirs joined in, claiming that Turnbull’s 
acknowledgment of the children, as his own, was “contrary to law and good 
morals.”293  The lower court found for Rachel and her children, making a rare 
statement that Rachel could not be blamed for “her yielding obedience to his 
wicked desires,” so as to “punish the weak and helpless for the sins of the strong 
and powerful.”294  (Clearly, the court “did the math,” recognizing that Turnbull 
sexually assaulted Rachel when she was still a minor.)  
Unfortunately for Rachel and her children, in 1857, the Louisiana 
Legislature passed an act expressly prohibiting all emancipation of enslaved 
blacks.295  Following the Legislature’s lead, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed 
292Id.
293Id.
294See SCHAFER, SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 190. 
295L.E. Turner, Curator v. C.D. Smith et al., 12 La. Ann. 417, 1857 WL 4878, at *2 (La. 
1857), quoting “the Act of the Legislature of the 6th March, 1857,” which entitled “an Act to 
prohibit the emancipation of slaves”: “Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives 
of the State of Louisiana in General Assembly convened.   That from and after the passage of 
this Act, no slave shall be emancipated in this State.”
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the lower court, and ruled against Rachel and her children, holding that they could 
not be freed, nor could they inherit or own property.296  Adding insult to injury, the 
Court authorized Turnbull’s white heirs to destroy the miscegenational family, by 
allowing them to divide Rachel and her children amongst themselves!297
Comparing Turner to Compton,298 notwithstanding the legislative 
prohibition, it appears that the Court in Turner considered as significant the fact 
that “Turnbull took no steps towards emancipating the children of Rachel during 
his lifetime, although he lived for six months after the so-called act of 
acknowledgment.  His declaration, in his will, of an intention to enfranchise them, 
was only intended to be operative after his death; and could not produce any effect 
until after his death, because it was always in his power, up to the moment of his 
death, to revoke his will.”299  This meant that Turnbull’s miscegenational children 
fit the Compton court’s definition of “adulterous bastards,” in that they were 
296Id. at *3.
297Id. at *3.
298See supra note 257.
299L.E. Turner, Curator v. C.D. Smith et al., 12 La. Ann. 417, 1857 WL 4878, at *2 (La. 
1857).
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offspring of a miscegenational relationship between a white man and an enslaved, 
versus a free, black woman.  (In both case reports, it appears that the white man, in 
the relationship, was unmarried, and died without white or legitimate children.)  
This point raises an issue of status, did “free” status produce a different result in 
miscegenational, postmortem bequest cases?  This is the subject of the next 
section.
C.  WHITE MEN AND THE “BLACK MISTRESS”– A DIFFERENT 
STORY?
Did the Louisiana Supreme Court serve up the same bittersweet cup of 
justice to enslaved black female concubines, denying their bequests, as it did when 
the white master’s bequest benefitted a free black woman,300 a “black mistress?”
300See BILLINGS, supra note 140, at 193-94, n.5:
Among the earliest infringements on that (free blacks’ legal) status was one 
designed to set free blacks apart from whites in all acts of legal record.  
Formalizing a custom practiced by the French and Spanish, a territorial statute of 
1808 required all officials to apply the designation ‘free man’ or ‘free woman of 
color’ in legal documents or public notices.  To segregate the vital records of 
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Free black women were, like their enslaved black sisters, handicapped by 
racially-based miscegenation laws.301  Louisiana law, similar to laws throughout 
the country, forbade marriage between whites and blacks, enslaved or free.302  But 
whites and free blacks, the Legislative Council of the Territory of Orleans also 
decreed that separate books be kept for the birth and deaths of free persons of 
color.  (Citing “An Act to Prescribe Certain Formalities Respecting Free Persons 
of Color,” Orleans Territorial Acts 92 (1808), “An Act to Provide for the 
Recording of Births and Deaths,” 1811 La Acts 74.)  (Emphasis added.)
See generally CHAINED TO THE ROCK OF ADVERSITY, TO BE FREE, BLACK & FEMALE IN THE OLD 
SOUTH 36 (Virginia Meacham Gould ed., 1998) (using personal letters of free women of color 
before, during, and after the Civil War, to provide valuable insight into their lives and 
experiences):
Mary E. Williams Bingaman was a free woman of color who had grown up 
outside of Natchez.  As an adult, she was involved in a liaison with the white 
colonial Adam Lewis Bingaman.... Before moving to New Orleans with Mary 
Williams, Adam Bingaman had been one of Natchez’s most distinguished 
citizens....  By 1819 Bingaman had become a planter, and between 1819 and 
1841, he inherited much of the property that had previously belonged to his 
family.  At one point he owned several plantations around Natchez and 235 
slaves....  By 1850, Adam Bingaman had moved to New Orleans with Mary and 
their children, Charlotte, Elenore.    
301See supra notes 36-40.
302See BILLINGS, supra note 140, at 208:
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free black women had at least one legal weapon that enslaved black women lacked: 
the right to contract.303   In order to “self-regulate” illicit miscegenational 
relationships and to protect their offspring, some enterprising free black women 
turned to contract and property law for answers to their miscegenational 
troubles.304 They were able to use contract law to negotiate a “marital-like” 
Free persons of color also maintained their right to own property.  In most states 
with large free black populations, landowning percentages were low, indicative of 
the blacks’ general economic standing.  In New Orleans, by comparison, property 
held by free persons of color in the late 1850s was estimated at around $2.5 
million.  The unrestricted ability to acquire land and slaves helped free blacks 
maintain the status and influence they needed to starve off wholesale diminution 
of their personal and civil liberties.  As long as they had economic standing, they 
had a voice.  (Footnotes omitted.) 
303See COBB, supra note 115, at 313-14  (“Free persons of color... may make contracts, 
and dispose of their estates by will.  In the absence of a will, administration will be granted on 
their estate, and unless otherwise directed by statute, they will be subject to the ordinary and 
general law of distribution.”)
304This case is a precursor to a contemporary property case–that of Marvin v. Marvin, 18 
Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 184 Cal. Rptr. 815 (Cal. Sup. Ct., 1976) (on the enforceability of a 
contractual arrangement for the disposition of property of unmarried cohabitation; although in  
Marvin, there were no legal implements to the couple marrying).  This leads to a discussion of 
the concept of “common law marriage,” wherein a state recognized as legally married (granting 
the same rights as if married with a ceremony and a license) cohabiting parties that manifest their 
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property arrangement, called the “placage.”305
1.  Thomas Durnford and Rosaline Mercier:   The Extra-Marital 
Contract or Placee or Placage
One very successful use of the placage, between a white man and a free 
black mistress, involved that of a wealthy white Englishman living in New 
Orleans, Thomas Durnford, and Rosaline Mercier, a “free woman of color.”306
intent to be husband and wife and hold themselves out to the public as husband and wife.  The 
arrangement was abolished in most states for several reasons including that “common law 
marriage dignified immorality among persons in the lower socio-economic class who were more 
likely than the well-off to enter into such an arrangement.”  DUKEMINIER, supra note 59, at 405, 
406.  See also, REPPY, supra note 48.  Compare similar issues involving same-sex cohabitation, 
see, e.g., Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public 
Policy Exception, 106 YALE L. J. 1965 (1997).   
305See STERKX, supra note 140, at 250 (“Besides the legal family, there existed a 
distinctive concubinage or placage–(fn. 24, Taken from the term une placee.  It was usually 
applied to those women who make arrangements for sexual connections with White men. See
Olmstead, A Journey in the Seaboard Slave States in the Years 1853-54, II, 245) a liaison 
between a White man and Mulatto or Quadroon women....  As a matter of fact placage (literally a 
situation) developed into an institution because of the legal restrictions against intermarriage.”)
306See DAVID O. WHITTEN, ANDREW DURNFORD: A BLACK PLANTER IN ANTEBELLUM 
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Thomas Durnford died on May 3, 1826, unmarried and without a will.307  The 
financial partnership between the white Thomas and the black Rosaline is 
evidenced in Durnford’s succession papers.308   John McDonogh,309 a very 
LOUISIANA 6-7, 9 n.25 (1982) [hereinafter WHITTEN] (Andrew Durnford was the offspring of a 
placee arrangement, wherein a representant or matchmaker would negotiate a contract 
“marriage” between the white male “husband” and a free black female “wife.”  Rosaline 
Mercier, his mother, was an affluent free mistress, who owned a small plantation in Orleans 
Parish.)  See also, ANNE RICE, THE FEAST OF ALL SAINTS (Simon and Schuster 1979) (presenting 
an historically accurate, fictionalized portrayal of the human working of a placage “marriage,” 
and its impact on the self image of young black women, as prostitutes). 
307See WHITTEN, supra note 306, at 7.
308Id. (“February 28, 1827–the estate paid Rosaline Mercier $1,095 for services rendered 
Thomas Durnford.  This was the first installment of $1,716 ordered by the probate court to be 
paid to her.  July 2, 1837–‘To expenses, paid Andrew Durnford, the son and heir of Rosaline 
Mercier, on the $1,716 ordered paid per by decree of the court of probate of the parish and city 
of New Orleans, on the 3rd day of January 1827 for services rendered by her to the deceased, 
during his last illness, as per receipt. $621.00.’” (Footnotes omitted.)) 
309Perhaps the richest Louisianian of his time, John McDonogh willed, inter alia, 
substantial wealth to the City of New Orleans and the City of Baltimore for public utility 
purposes and the establishment of free schools, “wherein the poor, and the poor only, of both 
sexes, of all classes and castes of color, shall be admittance, free of expense....”  Executors of 
John McDonogh v. Murdoch, 56 U.S. 367 (1853).  The United States Supreme Court upheld 
McDonogh’s will, which was the foundation for the establishment of the New Orleans public 
school system.   Id. at 415. 
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prominent white businessman in New Orleans, was the curator of the Durnford 
estate.310
The miscegenational couple produced one son, Andrew Durnford, 
who became a large and prosperous plantation owner.311  By 1850, the 
mixed-race Andrew Durnford owned 1,200 acres of improved and 
1,460 acres of unimproved land, farm machinery valued at $10,000, 
livestock valued at $2,800, and 70 enslaved blacks.  His total assets 
were valued at $80,000!312  This successful placage relationship was 
310See WHITTEN, supra note 306, at 9.
311See STERKX, supra note 140, at 202-03.
312Id. at 203.  See also, JOHNSON, supra note 140, at 128-9 (well documenting the story of 
another antebellum black man, William Ellison, from South Carolina who 
possessed princely wealth....  In the entire state, only 5 percent of the population 
owned as much real estate as Ellison....  However, Ellison was neither the richest 
free person of color in the South nor the largest slaveholder.  Louisiana contained 
six free Negro planters who were wealthier and owned more slaves.  The richest 
was Auguste Dubuclet, a sugar planter whose estate was valued at $264,000.  The 
largest slaveholders were the widow C. Richard (sic) and her son P.C. Richard 
(sic), also sugar planters, who together owned 152.  Outside Louisiana, only one 
free Negro in 1860 is known to have reported greater wealth than Ellison.  
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non litigated, but is very similar to the next, celebrated miscegenation 
case. 
2.  Eugene Macarty and Eulalie Mandeville: “Marital” 
Property of Unmarried Concubines313
The most notable antebellum miscegenation case involving a white man and 
a free black mistress, was that involving the interracial relationship between the 
white Eugene Macarty and the black Eulalie Mandeville, in 1848.   In that case, the 
Court went to great lengths to protect the property rights of a free black mistress.  
London Berry, a thirty-eight-year-old mulatto steward in St. Louis, owned real 
estate worth $67,000, a sum larger than the wealth Ellison reported in the census 
but not above the actual value of his property.  No free person of color outside 
Louisiana is known to have owned more slaves than Ellison in 1860.  Since the 
Louisiana planters tended to be second- and third-generation free people, it is 
likely that Ellison was the richest Afro-American in the South who began life as a 
slave.  (Emphasis added.)
See generally SCHWENINGER, supra note 29.
313Macarty et al. v. Mandeville, 3 La. Ann. 239, 1848 WL 3762 (La. 1848).
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The matter of Macarty v. Mandeville314 involved the scope of prohibitions 
on gifts (donations) of immovables and movables, whether inter vivos or causa 
mortis, between couples living in “open concubinage.”315   In this case, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court was faced with interpreting the scope and applicability 
of the state’s  statute on concubinage, that was clearly designed to prohibit or limit 
the amount of property a white male could transfer to his black female sexual 
partner.316
Macarty was a white man who, from 1796 until his death in 1845, “lived in 
314Id.
315The issue of what is “marital” property, even in “extra-marital” relationships, 
resembles one found in the contemporary property law case In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 
75 (Sup. Ct. of Colorado, 1978), determining whether a spouse is required to share, as marital 
property, a master’s degree in business administration with a divorcing spouse. 
316Macarty et al. v. Mandeville, 3 La. Ann. 239, 1848 WL 3762, at *1 (La. 1848).  (The 
Court noted, “This case arises under article 1468 of the Code (of 1808, book 3, title 2, art.10, p. 
210) which provides that those who live together in open concubinage are respectively incapable 
of making to each other, whether inter vivos or causa mortis (sic) any donations of immovables, 
and if they make a donation of movables it cannot exceed one-tenth part of the whole value of 
their estate.  Those who afterwards marry are excepted from this rule.”  (Emphasis added.))
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concubinage” with Mandeville, “who is a person of color.”317  Macarty’s white 
“collateral heirs” challenged Mandeville’s possession of $111,200, in the Bank of 
Louisiana; $11,000 that Macarty paid to a Lamothe; several other enslaved people; 
and lots and houses in the City of New Orleans, claiming that the property was a 
part of Macarty’s estate.318
What is surprising about this case is the unconventional, relative wealth 
relationship between the parties.  That is, the black woman, not the white man, was 
the wealthier of the two, and from her own business enterprises!  The Court noted, 
“She is in possession of a fortune which, taking the estimate of her counsel, 
exceeds the sum of $155,000....  She received, in 1799, a tract of land of three 
acres front and forty in depth on each side of the bayou of Terre aux Boeufs, and 
we think it is clear that her family gave her money....  There is no difficulty 
whatever in accounting for the capital requisite to commence her business of a 
retailer, which she afterwards followed....  She purchased from the importers, and 
retailed her goods by her slaves and persons who sold for her.  She was intelligent, 
industrious and skilfull. (sic)  Her business was extensive and lucrative, and her 
317Id.
318Id.
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trade extended as far as Donaldsville and even to Attakapas.”319
Apparently modifying its “blackness as white property” doctrine that the 
Court had previously used to dispose of postmortem bequests to enslaved black 
women, the Court took an “affirmative” approach to protect a free black woman’s 
property interests.320  The Court concluded, “At the same time that we are bound to 
give effect to our laws made in the interests of (white) families,321 it would be an 
abuse to bring them in conflict with the right of property, under which the 
defendant claims the subject of the present suit.  She bases her defence (sic) on that 
right, and we find no warrant in the law or in evidence for disturbing her in the 
enjoyment of the fruits of the (sic) labor and thrift of a long life.”322  (Emphasis 
added.)
319Id. at *1-2.
320Id. at *4.  The Court specifically noted their decision in Cole v. Lucas, 2 La. Ann. 946, 
supra note 213, in which “we have, on a recent occasion, reversed the verdict of the jury, 
vindicated the rights of heirs and restored to them a large estate, which a party had attempted to 
deprive them of by an indirect donation to a concubine.”  
321Macarty et al. v. Mandeville, 3 La. Ann. 239, 1848 WL 3762, at *1 (La. 1848).
322Id. at *4.
Blackness as Property
Page 171 of 302
Read literally, the statute323 the Court cited would have applied a ten percent 
limitation on the movable gifts, and would have totally prohibited Macarty’s gifts 
of immovables, to his concubine Mandeville.324  Instead, the Court narrowly read 
the “open and notorious” statute, and held that it provided for no other restrictions 
on the transfer of property, beyond the ten percent rule, stating, “The prohibition of 
donations of a particular character implies the right to make those not within the 
prohibition.”325
The Court also noted that whatever Macarty contributed to the relationship 
was not covered by the statute.326  “It is contended, on behalf of the defendant, and 
we think with justice, that there was nothing in the relation of those parties that 
prevented the deceased from giving the defendant the benefit of his aptitude and 
judgment in the loaning of money and the discounting of notes....  The mortgage 
323See supra note 147.
324Macarty et al. v. Mandeville, 3 La. Ann. 239, 1848 WL 3762, at *3 (La. 1848).
325Id.
326Id. at *3-4.
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transactions we think were of the same character.”327
This “pro-inheritance rights of a free black woman” case may have resulted 
from a number of factors.  First, there was the literal reading of the statute in 
question.  Second, there was the fact that the white man had been the primary 
beneficiary of the relationship.328  Third, the parties challenging the disposition of 
327Id.
328Id. at *1:
It appears that she had, in all respects, rendered her condition as reputable and as 
useful as it could be made.  Five children have been the fruits of her connexion 
(sic) with the deceased.  They were all well educated.  Two of her sons are in 
business in this city, and one is living on his income.  The daughters were married 
and established in Cuba; one of them is since deceased, leaving two children.
See also, SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 117-18:
[D]ry goods broker Drausin McCarty, the son of Eulalie Macarty, was listed in 
Dun’s credit ledgers in 1848 as being worth $30,000; twelve years later he had 
real estate valued at $25,000 and personal possessions at $10,000.  Between 1850 
and 1860, McCarty’s brother-in-law, merchant and exchange broker Bernard 
Soulie, doubled the estimated value of his real estate possessions, from $50,000 to 
$100,000.  Soulie’s brother, Albin Soulie, a partner in the business was very 
prosperous.  Together they were described in 1854 as ‘very wealthy, est. w[orth] 
from 250-300m.’  An R.G. Dun investigator exclaimed in 1857, they ‘are rich, w 
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Macarty’s estate were “collateral heirs,” not descendants.  Fourth, the relationship 
was in the eyes and words of Chief Justice Eustis, “the nearest approach to 
marriage which the law recognized, and in the days in which their union 
commenced the couple entered into serious moral obligations.  The union received 
the blessings of her family, which was one of the most distinguished in Louisiana, 
and nothing appears to have occurred to forfeit or diminish their approbation and 
good will.”329  And fifth, the black woman was a black mistress, a free, property-
owning woman, not enslaved: in other words, a black woman with status and her 
own wealth.
3. Sandoz v. Gary330
$500m.’   
329Macarty et al. v. Mandeville, 3 La. Ann. 239, 1848 WL 3762, at *1 (La. 1848).  See 
also, Olivier, f.w.c. v. Blancq. 2 La. Ann. 517 (La. 1848).  Cf. J. P. M. Dupre, Administrator v. F. 
Uzee, Widow, 6 La. Ann. 280, 1851 WL 3797 (1851) (wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court 
found that Joseph Uzee, a white man, had lived in “open concubinage” with an enslaved black 
woman, Anna Sinnet, and violated the statute on concubinage, when (even though he later freed 
Anna) gave her title to a lot, a house, and her freedom, during his lifetime.  The Court found that 
his estate belonged to his white widow and their white child).
330David Sandoz, Administrator of the Succession of Jean Pierre Decuir v. Louis Gary,
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The next two cases are earlier examples of those involving white men and 
free black mistresses.  The first is the case of Sandoz v. Gary, decided in 1845.331
In 1809, Jean Pierre Decuir emancipated “a mulatto girl named Josephine, who 
was his concubine, and who continued to live with him up to the time of his 
death.”332  In 1818, Josephine purchased an enslaved black woman, Betcy, for 
$1,100, and Decuir acted as her surety.333  In 1823, Decuir sold Betcy and her 
children for $1,500, but the buyer defaulted, and Decuir purchased Betcy and her 
children at a sheriff’s sale.
In 1825, Decuir and Josephine moved to France, leaving Betcy and her 
children on Decuir’s plantation.334  Decuir sold his plantation to another owner, it 
was sold once again, and then finally to the defendant in this case, Louis Gary.335 In 1826, Decuir died, and Sandoz, the Administrator of his estate, sued Louis Gary seeking title to Betcy and her children.
11 Rob. (La.) 529, 1845 WL 1662 (La. 1845).
331Id.
332Id.
333Id.
334Id. at *2.
335David Sandoz, Administrator of the Succession of Jean Pierre Decuir v. Louis Gary,
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Louis Gary.337  The Court stated that the issue was “whether she (Josephine) has 
lost it (title to Betcy and her children) by any of the kinds of prescription (statute of 
limitations) known to our law.”338
Sandoz argued, inter alia, that Josephine’s purchase of Betcy and, therefore, 
her title to Betcy and her children was Decuir’s “disguised” donation to his 
concubine, Josephine.  On that issue, the Court stated, “If it disguised a donation of 
this slave by Decuir to his concubine,... such donation was not prohibited by the 
law in force at the time it was made.”339  As to the effect that concubinage had on 
the issue, the Court stated:
The circumstances disclosed by the record, in relation to Josephine’s 
neglect of her rights, her silence when Decuir sold Betcy, the state of 
concubinage in which she lived with him, and her discontinuance of 
the suit brought in 1835, cannot, in our opinion, destroy or affect her 
11 Rob. (La.) 529, 1845 WL 1662, at *2 (La. 1845).
336Id. at *1.
337Id. at *2.
338Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
339Id. at *3, citing Civil Code of 1808, p. 210, art. 10.
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title in a contest with the heir of said Decuir.340
Hence, the Court upheld Josephine’s, and thereby Gary’s, title to Betcy and her 
children.341
4. Valsain v. Cloutier342
The second early free black mistress case was Valsain v. Cloutier.343  In that 
case, the right of a black concubine (and her children) to inherit from their white 
master went before the Louisiana Supreme Court.344
In July 1810, Joseph Dupe willed $6,400 to his half brother Jean B.S. 
Cloutier.  Dupre also willed “the remainder, consisting of lands, slaves, &c after 
paying for his debts... to some mulatto woman Adelaide, and his natural children 
340David Sandoz, Administrator of the Succession of Jean Pierre Decuir v. Louis Gary,
11 Rob. (La.) 529, 1845 WL 1662, at *3 (La. 1845).
341Id.
342Valsain et al. v. Cloutier, 3 La. 170, 1831 WL 717 (La. 1831).
343Id.
344Id.
Blackness as Property
Page 177 of 302
by her.”345  Dupre’s legal (white) heirs challenged the will.346  The Probate Court 
set aside the legacies to Adelaide and her children.347  On appeal, Dupre’s white 
heirs argued that Adelaide and her children should lose.  They reasoned that Dupre 
and Adelaide could not have been legally married, and as their children were not 
properly acknowledged, they were incapable of inheriting.  Further, Adelaide and 
her children were enslaved, which meant they were not lawfully able to inherit.348
Adelaide and her children countered that, inter alia, if they were, as enslaved 
people, incapable of inheriting, Dupre’s legacy to them belonged to their owner, 
Marie Louise.349  Marie Louise Mariotte was “the mother of Adelaide, and was a 
free woman of color before the death of Dupre the testator.350  Adelaide further 
argued that she and her children were legally free, because her mother, Marie 
345Id.
346Id.
347Id.
348Valsain et al. v. Cloutier, 3 La. 170, 1831 WL 717, at *1-2 (La. 1831).
349Id. at *2.
350Id.
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Louise, was free, and that her mother had provided that she would be free upon her 
mother’s death.351  Adelaide concluded “that as Marie Louise is dead, she be 
decreed to inherit her succession, and that the legacies and interest on them since 
1815, be included.”352
In addressing the issues of concubinage in this case, the Court decided the 
following: first, the Court found that Adelaide was a free woman.353  Her mother’s 
act, dated December 28, 1797, manumitted Adelaide upon her mother’s death in 
1815.354  Second, the Court found, “that a legacy given to a slave, shall belong to 
the master of that slave in the same manner as if the gift was directly made to 
him.”355  Third, the Court stated, “We think as the freedom of mother took place 
the instant the (children’s) grandmother died, there was capacity to inherit.”356
351Id.
352Id.
353Id. at *4.
354Valsain et al. v. Cloutier, 3 La. 170, 1831 WL 717, at *2-3 (La. 1831).
355Id. at *5.
356Id.
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In concluding, the Court found in favor of Adelaide, in her own capacity, 
rejecting any claims she made, on her children’s behalf.357  (The Court recognized 
that while Adelaide and Dupre lived in concubinage, it was not necessary to 
examine whether “natural” children (born out of wedlock) could be considered 
persons, interposed to convey a donation to their mother, a concubine, whom the 
law considered incapable of receiving.)358  Therefore, the Court allowed a free 
black mistress “to recover of the defendant the sum of six thousand, six hundred, 
and eighty-six dollars, with interest at the rate of five per cent. (sic) from the 28th 
April, 1830, until paid.”359  In this case, free status or white lineage played a part in 
the law’s allowing a free black mistress to inherit from her white male lover.  
It appears from the case law involving free black mistresses, a black 
woman’s status, enslaved or free, had some bearing on the Louisiana Supreme 
Court’s decisions concerning  the validity of white men’s postmortem bequests to 
black women.  If a white man chose a free black concubine, the Court was more 
likely to protect the property distributed to her, especially if, as in Macarty, the 
357Id.
358Id. at *4.  
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black mistress brought some wealth of her own to the table.  If, on the other hand, 
the white man chose an enslaved black concubine, as in Vail, the Court rejected the 
property transfer arrangement.  That is because the enslaved black woman’s 
sexuality already belonged to her white master.  Enslaved blacks were not merely 
their white master’s property; enslaved blacks were “white property,” indefeasible, 
and incapable of being released from white bondage, by will!360
Fortunately, antebellum legislatures and courts did not totally control black 
people’s destiny.  Otherwise, their real world would have perfectly reflected 
racially and sexually-oppressive laws, requiring that all blacks be enslaved and 
held incapable of owning or inheriting property.  As noted earlier, enslavement had 
many loopholes, and early on and throughout the antebellum period, many blacks 
were free or freed.  This next section discusses and analyzes the “black mistress,” 
the free black woman, who was not enslaved, and who managed to acquire 
property.  As we shall see, as evidenced by Eulalie Mandeville,361 some black 
mistresses came into their own, acquiring land, businesses, plantations, and, 
359Id. at *5.  
360See supra note 51.
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following the unfortunate example of their white counterparts, even owned 
enslaved blacks.   
V. THE BLACK MISTRESS:  A PARADOX CHALLENGING BELL’S 
“INTEREST-CONVERGENCE” PRINCIPLE362
‘A WEALTHY NEGRO FAMILY.– An immense estate 
in Louisiana, embracing over four hundred acres of land, 
with two hundred and fifty negroes belonging to the 
plantation was recently sold for a quarter of a million 
dollars.  The purchaser was a free negro, who is said to 
be one of the wealthiest men in the South.’
The above is from a New York paper, and refers to the Harrison 
property, which was purchased by Cypian (sic) Ricard, a free man of 
color of our parish....  It lies in the rear of Madame Ricaud’s (sic) 
plantation; and the two plantations, now owned by that family, 
361See supra note 313.
362See supra notes 27, 30, for the definition of “black mistress.”
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probably do comprise the number of acres of land and slaves as above 
stated, making them, doubtless, the richest black family in this or any 
other country.363
363As quoted in Calvin D. Wilson, Negroes Who Owned Slaves, POPULAR SCIENCE 
MONTHLY 488, at 492 (Nov. 1912) [hereinafter WILSON].  Pierre Cyprian Ricard was the son of 
Madame Cyprian Ricard, a black mistress.  They both lived in Iberville Parish, Louisiana. The 
1850 United States Population Census shows Madame Ricard and her son, owning 74 enslaved 
blacks and a 1,050 acre plantation.  The 1860 United States Population Census shows the 
Ricards, owning 168 enslaved blacks and two plantations, with 1,300 total acres.  Free black 
ownership of enslaved blacks was not limited to black women or to Louisiana, as free men and  
women owned enslaved blacks, and did so throughout the South.  See supra note 29.
There is a view that all free blacks were all light-complexioned and “looked white.”  See 
supra note 57.  Many free blacks were dark-complexioned and did not have “white” or European 
facial features.  See WILSON, infra, at 492, quoting the landscape architect Frederick Law 
Olmstead, who spent fourteen months roaming the South, preparing articles for The New York 
Times:
An intelligent man, whom I met in Washington, who had been travelling most of 
the time for two years, in the planting districts of Louisiana, having business with 
planters, told me of free negroes of the state in general, so far as had observed, 
were just equal in all respects to the white creoles.  There are many opulent, 
intelligent and educated.  The best houses and the most tasteful grounds that he 
had visited in the state belonged to a nearly full-blooded negro–a very dark man.  
He and his family are well educated, and though French is their habitual tongue 
they speak English with freedom, and one of them with more elegance than most 
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A.  SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BLACK MISTRESS
When it came to enslaved black women’s property rights in the antebellum 
South, Bell’s interest-convergence principle364 described how law was reflective of 
powerful white men’s interests:  that economic and sexual oppression required that 
enslaved black women have no property rights including rights to their labor, their 
sexuality, property, to receive gifts, or to inherit.365  The limited property rights that 
black women concubines enjoyed, enslaved or free, were also reflective of 
powerful white men’s interests: that concubines be encouraged to be loyal, faithful, 
liberally educated whites in the south.  They had a private tutor in their family.  
(Emphasis added.)
This account likely described the household of Joseph A. Metoyer, whose household listed Oscar
Dubreuil as a tutor (United States 1850 Population Census Manuscript), and whose portrait (a 
copy is in the author’s possession) shows a man with dark complexion, and “Negroid” features.
Compare KOLCHIN, supra note 11 (“Very large plantations were a rarity: a mere .01 
percent of slave owners held estates of 200 or more slaves, and such estates contained only 2.4 
percent of the slaves.”  This data makes Madame Ricard’s holdings ever more remarkable!)  See 
generally WOODSON, HEADS, supra note 112.
364See supra note 4.
365See Cole v. Lucas, 2 La. Ann. 946, 1847 WL 3490 (La. 1847), supra note 213.
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and true.366  What about the broad property rights that the law provided to the black 
mistress?  Were they consistent with Bell’s interest-convergence principle?  To 
answer that question, we turn to an analysis of the black mistress’s property rights.  
For white masters, the American “property-enslavement-sexual” Dream367 of cheap 
land and cheap labor worked to make many of them very wealthy.368  Along with 
wealth came power, and often a greater desire for control.369  When it came to a 
master’s control over his enslaved blacks, there was a nexus between the private 
property ownership paradigm and the enslavement paradigm.370  The control nexus 
was made stronger by the white master’s control over the sexuality of enslaved 
black women.371
But there was an inherent contradiction in the property-enslavement-sexual 
366See Macarty v. Mandeville, 3 La. Ann. 239, 1848 WL 3762 (La. 1848), supra note 
313.
367See supra note 110.
368See supra notes 12, 76.
369See supra note 109.
370See supra notes 99-105.
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nexus.  What if a master decided to exercise his property ownership rights, in a 
manner inconsistent with the enslavement paradigm?372  In other words, what 
should the law do when a white master wanted to free his enslaved black woman, 
in exchange for, or with gratitude for, love, loyalty, or sexual favors?373
The paradox of the property-enslavement-sexual nexus, then, resulted 
mainly from a white master’s desire to free or manumit his enslaved property.  
Overall, there were four sources that could have contributed to the existence of the 
free black population.  The first and greatest source was the manumission, inter 
371See supra note 109.
372See DAVIS, supra note 9.
373See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 151-52:
Limiting emancipation to a few favorites also shifted the balance of the 
manumitted population toward women.  Slave women not only made up a 
disproportionate number of the domestic workers, but they were more apt to win 
the sympathy and affection of their masters.  Black men, on the other hand, were 
more of a threat to white rule and also brought higher prices in the slave markets 
of the South.  If a master chose but one slave for emancipation, there were many 
more reasons to pick a woman than a man.    
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vivos or causa mortis, of enslaved blacks.374  The second source was through 
children of a legitimate marriage between a black slave and a white person; this 
source was not legally possible, due to prohibition of interracial marriage.375  The 
third source was children of an enslaved black man and a white free woman, which 
was extremely rare.376  And the fourth source was the relocation of free blacks into 
374White men most often freed enslaved black women, because they mothered their 
children and took care of their personal needs.  See supra note 203.  White men manumitted 
enslaved black men (who were not their children) for public service, successful military service, 
and heroics.  See PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 428. (“Pierre Chastang of Mobile who, in 
recognition of public service in the war of 1812 and the yellow fever epidemic of 1819 was 
bought and freed by popular subscription.”)  See generally ROLAND C. MCCONNELL, NEGRO 
TROOPS OF ANTEBELLUM LOUISIANA, A HISTORY OF FREE MEN OF COLOR (1968) [hereinafter 
MCCONNELL]; Donald E. Everett, Free Persons of Color in Colonial Louisiana, in 7 LA. HIST. 
21-50 (1966) (when Spain, then an ally with France, declared war against the British in the 
American Revolution, Governor Bernardo de Galvez had a force that included 169 free black 
men.)  See also, RODOLPHE LUCIEN DESDUNES, OUR PEOPLE AND OUR HISTORY 3-9 (Sister 
Dorothea Olga McCants ed., trans., 1973) [hereinafter DESDUNES].  (At the Battle of New 
Orleans in 1815, Commander (soon President) Andrew Jackson praised the black troops, who 
successfully fought at his side against the British.) 
375See supra note 140.
376See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 6:
In the colonial South... [m]ost mulattoes were children of white indentured 
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the South from a free country (such as Haiti, after the Revolution377) or a free state 
(not a common occurrence).  
From the primacy of the private property paradigm,378 a white master’s 
desire to free an enslaved black person was a logical derivation, for if private 
property comes under the owner’s sovereignty, then the owner is empowered to 
dispose of it as he or she pleases, including setting it free.  From the primacy of the 
enslavement paradigm,379 a master’s desire to free an enslaved black person was 
weighed against its impact on the entire enslavement system.  Hence, the legal 
status of the black mistress presented antebellum society with a peculiar challenge.  
That challenge became more acute with the rise in the number of free blacks.
Another question that a study of the black mistress will answer is, why did 
servant men and black women, and frequently, as William Gaston suggested, they 
were the offspring of black men and white servant women.  Indeed, despite the 
antipathy toward such unions, masters often connived to push black men and 
white women into bed together because the law gave them the services of the 
children born of such interracial matches for thirty-one years, and it locked the 
white mother into additional terms of servitude.  (Footnote omitted.)
377See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 114-18.
378See supra note 78. 
379See supra note 88.
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antebellum Southern law close the doors to emancipation prior to the Civil War, 
and seek to drive out of the South blacks who were already free?380  Were these 
pre-Civil War actions necessary to defend the very rationale of enslavement, that 
is, black inferiority?381 Arguendo, if blacks were really not inferior to whites, how 
could the enslavement political economy justify enslavement, other than for what it 
really was: social, economic, and sexual oppression, based on race.  As the black 
mistress became a more significant feature of antebellum society, and as Southern, 
white society increasingly questioned the status of free blacks in general, these 
questions took on greater meaning.  
Assuming that the white master’s private property ownership right to free his 
enslaved black woman won out over the enslavement right (and sometimes it did), 
what property rights did the enslavement social order want a black mistress to 
have?  Should they have the property rights of their enslaved black sisters?  In 
other words, should they have no rights?  Or should they have the rights of their 
380See L. E. Turner, Curator v. C. D. Smith et al, 12 La. Ann. 417, 1857 WL 4878 (La. 
1857), supra note 285.
381See generally HIGGINBOTHAM & JACOBS, supra note 43 (analyzing the nexus between 
white concepts of black inferiority as a precept function to enslavement, blacks as property, and 
black powerlessness).
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white masters, full civil rights?  Or should their property rights be somewhere 
between that of the enslaved and the fully free?
B. PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF THE BLACK MISTRESS 
As we have seen, in the antebellum South, black women were generally 
enslaved, and not legally allowed to acquire property, by purchase, not even by gift 
or inheritance.382  Some black women were legally free, often by manumission.383
What property rights should Southern society provide the black mistress?  Legally, 
should the black mistress be treated as a first class citizen as was her white 
counterpart?  Or should she be treated as a non-citizen as were her enslaved 
sisters?  Or should she be treated somewhere in between?  Were the property rights 
that Southern society gave the black mistress reflective of Bell’s interest-
convergence principle?  The answers to their questions will be discussed in the 
next section on the property rights of the black mistress.
The black mistress was the ultimate enigma to the American “property-
382See supra note 106.
383See, e.g., SCHAFER, FREE, supra note 45. 
Blackness as Property
Page 190 of 302
enslavement-sexual” Dream.384  As private property ownership was such an 
overarching paradigm in American law,385 what would prevent a black woman, 
once freed, from acquiring property?  If a black woman became a free person, 
shouldn’t she enjoy all legal private property rights of a citizen, including the right 
to purchase and sell property, to transfer title to property, to gift and receive gifts 
inter vivos and causa mortis, inheritance and rights of succession, and all other 
aspects of private property ownership?386
As previously discussed, the common law, along with a cluster of privileges 
384See supra note 111.
385See supra note 88.
386But see COBB, supra note 115, at 312-13: 
Manumission once effected, removes forever the dominion of the master....  To 
incorporate a new citizen into the body politic, is only within the power of the 
State.  The freed negro does not become a citizen by virtue of his manumission.  It 
requires another the act of another party, the State, to clothe him with civil and 
political rights.  Before such act he stands in the position of an alien friend, and in 
the absence of legislation he would be entitled to all such privileges as are 
allowed to such residents.  (Footnotes omitted.)) 
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and rights, revolved around private land ownership.387  There are many indices of 
private property ownership, from which one might evaluate the black mistress’s 
private property rights in the antebellum South.388  The following section focuses 
on eight indices of private property ownership rights by which to analyze the black 
mistress’s legal status, in the antebellum South.  These are 1) the right to earn 
wages; 2) the right to contract; 3) the right to acquire, by purchase; 4) the right to 
387See supra note 79.
388Id.  (“A.M. Honore likewise distinguished between the rights of exclusion and of use 
and enjoyment, listing the incidents of ownership as follows:
(1) the right to exclusive possession; (2) the right to personal use and 
enjoyment; (3) the right to manage use by others; (4) the right to the 
income from use by others; (5) the right to the capital value, including 
alienation, consumption, waste, or destruction; (6) the right to security 
(that is, immunity from expropriation); (7) the power of transmissibility by 
gift, devise, or descent; (8) the lack of any term on these gifts; (9) the duty 
to refrain from using the object in ways that harm others; and (10) the 
liability to execution for repayment of debts; and (11) residual rights on 
the reversion of lapsed ownership rights held by others.
Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in Transition from Marx to Markets (sic), 
111 Harv. L. R. (sic) 621, 663 n.187 (1998), citing Honore, A.M. Honore, Ownership, in Oxford 
Essays in Jurisprudence (sic) 107, 112-128 (A.G. Guest ed. 1961)  (emphasis added) (sic).” 
To that list, one might add (12) the right to encumber, by mortgage, liens, and covenants; 
(13) the right to use as collateral; (14) the right of an insurable interest; (15) the right to shared 
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acquire, by inter vivos gift; 5) the right to acquire, by will; 6) the right to acquire, 
by marriage; 7) the right of disposition, by sale, inter vivos gift, will, and 
inheritance (succession), and 8) the right to own enslaved blacks. 
In addition to those property rights that the black mistress exercised, there 
was another property right that caused the black mistress particular concern.  That 
was the black mistress’s ownership of enslaved blacks.  Because of the unique 
nature of and issues concerning the black mistress’s ownership of enslaved blacks, 
there will be a separate discussion of that topic.  But first, a caveat: the following 
discussion of the black woman’s property right should not be misunderstood.  
Their property rights are presented in the best light, during the best of times.389  In 
ownership; and (16) the right of bailment.  
389See FINKELMAN, CASEBOOK, supra note 136, at 142-69 (presenting an antebellum case, 
in which the court expressed its views about free blacks in general.  In Bryan v. Walton, 14 
Georgia 185 (1853), involved the right of a free black, James Nunez, to will property to his son, 
Joseph Nunez.  The case “underscores southern hostility to the existence of the free population.”  
Justice Lumpkin found that free blacks had no rights in the state of Georgia, except those that the 
state legislature expressly granted.  The Court concluded that “under the Act of 1818, James 
Nunez, the father of Joseph Nunez, should not be divested of the title to the slaves which he thus 
held: but that the property should remain with him, during his lifetime, and at his death, go to his 
descendants.  It is by virtue of this section of the Act... and not under the will of his ancestor, that 
Joseph Nunez held these slaves.” Id. at 146.)  See generally WOODSON, HEADS, supra note 112, 
at xxi-xlv, “III. The Free Negro Before the Law” and “IV. Economic Achievement.”
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reality, there was constant and increasing legal and societal hostility to the black 
mistress throughout the antebellum period.390  For many reasons, it can be said that 
the following property rights are ones that the black mistress exercised, as a result 
of consistent success over legal and economic adversities.
1.  The Right to Earn Wages.
Perhaps the greatest legal distinction between the black mistress and an 
enslaved black woman is that the black mistress had the right to the fruits of her 
390See JACKSON, supra note 29, at 3  (“This hostility toward the free Negro in Virginia 
was expressed in law, in politics, in literature, and in actions by organized groups.  The state 
legislature and the local units of government heaped up laws to restrain him, and candidates for 
office, governors, mayors, and other officials condemned him.  Similarly, the proslavery writers 
vilified free Negroes, and the American Colonization Society made every effort to get them out 
of Virginia into Africa.”)  Id. at 32 (“In this connection a sympathetic Northern writer of that day 
compared the hardships of the free Negroes of the country to those suffered by the Jews of 
medieval Europe.”  (Footnote omitted.))
See also, BERLIN, supra note 7, at 381 (“‘The ex-slave was not a free man; he was only a 
free Negro.’  George Washington Cable, The Negro Question (1888).”); WOODSON, HEADS, 
supra note 112, at xxi (“The status of the free Negro did not materially change for the worst until 
the ‘twenties and ‘thirties of the nineteenth century when practically all of the Southern and 
Middle States and a few communities of the North began to restrict and, in some cases, to debase 
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labor, unlike an enslaved woman, who was not allowed to benefit from her labor, 
as both she and her labor belonged to her master.391  By comparison, the free 
mistress was allowed to earn wages.392  Some chose to work independently of 
the free Negro to a status next to that of a slave.”)  
391See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 233 (“Ultimately, the right to collect wages, accumulate 
property, and control their own family life distinguished them from slaves.  Free Negroes, like 
whites, needed meaningful work not merely to support themselves and their families but to 
bolster their self-esteem.  Its absence often drained free blacks of self-respect and robbed them of 
a sense of purpose.”
Id. at 234-38:
The nature of the Southern work force and Southern attitudes towards blacks and 
work often allowed many free Negroes to turn their status and their color to their 
advantage in seeking employment....  In many places, free Negroes monopolized 
work as caterers, stable owners, bathhouse keepers, and tailors as well as lesser 
jobs as carters, butchers, coachmen, and delivery boys....  Many of the jobs 
deemed ‘nigger work’ were drudgery deserving that epithet, but others provided 
steady work and lucrative wages.  Some were skilled trades that demanded 
craftsmanship of the highest order....  Indeed, skill was an essential element in 
many of the jobs deemed ‘nigger work’....  Skilled free Negro artisans and 
tradesmen clustered in these stigmatized occupations... barbering, carpentering, 
plastering, blacksmithing, bricklaying, and shoe-making.
Compare SHAW, supra 58 (on the status of enslaved blacks).           
392See generally BERLIN, supra note 7.
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employers, owning their own businesses, and often employing others.393  Many 
393See PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 433 (Often the success of the black mistress was envied 
by whites, who thought wealth was too good for a black woman:  
The keeper of one good tavern in the Louisiana village of Bayou Sara in 1831 was 
a colored woman of whom Anne Royall wrote: ‘This nigger or mulatto was rich, 
owned the tavern and several slaves, to whom she was a great tyrant.  She owned 
other valuable property and a great deal of money, as report (sic) said; and 
doubtless it is true.  She was very insolent, and, I think, drank.  It seems one 
Tague [an Irishman], (sic) was smitten with her charms and her property, made 
love to her and it was returned, and they lived together as man and wife.  She was 
the ugliest wench I ever saw, and, if possible, he was uglier, so they were well 
matched.’ (Footnote omitted.)
See also BERLIN, supra note 7, at 241-42:
[T]he increasing number of free Negro and slave hirelings, especially in the cities, 
provided a small but growing market for black entrepreneurs.  In every Southern 
city, free Negroes ran boardinghouses for free Negroes and slaves whose owners 
allowed them to live on their own.  African churches and schools supported black 
ministers and teachers, and a few Negro merchants profited from trade with 
Liberia and Haiti.  But the most common black enterprise were small cookshops 
and groceries, which usually doubled as saloons and gambling houses where free 
Negroes, slaves, and occasionally whites gathered.
See also, SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 85-86:  
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free mistresses successfully did so,394 in spite of laws prohibiting free blacks from 
competing in certain professions.395  Others chose to commercialize their physical 
beauty and have control over their sexuality, with the hope of attracting a wealthy 
white suitor, to enter into a placage arrangement.396
In most large cities, and in some small towns, free women of color were able to 
establish themselves in service enterprises.  They managed eating houses, 
hairdressing shops, fruit and vegetable stands, confectioneries, bakeries, and 
grocery stores....  In Savannah, Susan Jackson ran a pastry shop in Reynolds 
Ward, the leading business section of the city, and eventually purchased her place 
of business, a brick building appraised at $10,000.  Her neighbor, free mulatto 
Ann Gibbons, the descendant of a West African Ibo chieftain, lived comfortably 
on the income from her various rental properties.  (Footnotes omitted.))    
394Such as Eulalie Mandeville, supra note 313, and Madame Ricard, supra note 363.
395See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 230 (“Proscriptive laws, pressure on white employers, and 
sporadic violence slowly drove free Negroes from many trades....  Free Negro mechanics had to 
pay high licensing fees to work in Charleston and Savannah, free Negro butchers were barred 
from the city market in Memphis, and free Negro masons in Georgia had to have their work 
approved by whites.”)  See also, WOODSON, HEADS, supra note 112, at xxiii (“Most of the States 
had restrictions having a direct bearing on earning a subsistence.”)
396See RACE CONSCIOUSNESS: AFRICAN-AMERICAN STUDIES FOR THE NEW CENTURY at 
67-92 (Judith Jackson Fossett and Jeffery A. Tucker eds., 1997), excerpt by Monique Guillory, 
entitled “Under One Roof: The Sins and Sanctity of the New Orleans Quadroon Balls,” 
(analyzing the commercialization and exploitation of creole women of color, in the New Orleans 
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2.  The Right to Contract.
The black mistress had the legal capacity to contract.397  This legal right 
facilitated a black mistress’s right to acquire property.398  One notable Southern 
judge recognized that the right to contract was essential for a black mistress to 
acquire property.399
quadroon balls).   
397See COBBS, supra note 115, at 313 (“They may make contracts.”) Compare, COBB, 
supra note 115, at 240 ([W]e may properly notice another disability of the slave, and that is, his 
inability to contract, or to be contracted with.”) 
398See BENJAMIN QUARLES, THE NEGRO IN THE MAKING OF AMERICA 88 (1969) 
(concluding that as free blacks throughout the antebellum South were allowed to make contracts 
and to own property, “some things operated in their favor.”).
399See, e.g., CATTERALL, supra note 96, at Vol. I, at 392-93 (citing in 1856, Judge 
Buchanan’s summary of free blacks’ legal rights: 
[I]n the eye of the Louisiana law, there is, (with the exception of 
political rights, of certain social privileges, and of the obligations 
of jury and militia service) all the difference between a free man of 
color and a slave, that there is between a white man and a slave.  
The free man of color is capable of contracting.  He can acquire by 
inheritance and transmit property by will.  He is a competent 
witness in all civil suits.  If he commits an offence against the 
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3.  The Right to Acquire, by Purchase.
The black mistress had the legal right to acquire property by purchase, the 
most significant of which was land.400 Most black mistresses who owned land 
laws, he is to be tried with the same formalities, and by the same 
tribunal, as the white man. (Emphasis added.)
See also, id., at vol. II, 334-35 and vol. III, 176, as cited in BERLIN, supra note 7, at 196 (A 
South Carolina judge saw nothing strange in the fact that many free blacks had “passed” for 
whites, and  “now enjoy all the rights of citizens; as well as lands, and even seats in the 
legislature.”)  
400See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 244:
Despite all whites could do, some free Negroes prospered.  Their success was 
reflected in the growth of free Negro property holding....  In Nansemond County 
in tidewater Virginia, the number of free Negro farmers increased steadily 
between 1830 and 1860, although the free Negro population remained relatively 
constant....  The growth of a black landowning class in Nansemond County 
mirrored that of the state generally....  The growth of free Negro property holding 
followed a similar pattern throughout the South.
See also, WOODSON, HEADS, supra note 112, at xxxi:
On the whole, however, there was a striking difference between the status of the 
free Negro and that of the slave.  The free Negro gradually lost ground during the 
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owned small farms.401  There were some, on the other hand, who owned large 
reactionary period, but he did not become as helpless as the slave.  The free 
Negroes still retained their right to acquire property and dispose of property and 
to do so could employ the general means effecting the transfer of property.  The 
courts early upheld the right of the Negro to devise property to another.  Laws to 
this effect were enacted as were also other measures to validate titles to real estate 
and other property with the exception of dogs and guns mentioned above.  Russell 
points out that the inviolability of the property rights of the free Negro was an 
effective argument against the frequent proposals to remove the entire free Negro 
population from Virginia.  It was considered a hardship to bring their property 
into market all at once to sacrifice by one precipitated sale.  (citing Russell, The 
Free Negro in Virginia, 90).
Along with property ownership, came the burden of property taxes:
In fact, instead of being exempt from taxation, the free Negro was sometimes 
required to pay higher poll taxes than the white man....  There were some 
exceptions in this case, as it happened in Virginia in 1769, with the exemption of 
free Negroes, mulatto and Indian women and all wives other than slaves of free 
Negroes, mulattos and Indians....  The Negroes in Baltimore paid $50 in school 
taxes in 1859, although their children could not attend the city schools.  
(Footnotes omitted.)
Id. at xxxii. 
401See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 244.  See also, JOHNSON, supra note 140, at 58 (“[O]ne 
free person of color in ten was a farmer who owned any real estate.”) 
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plantations and built large plantation homes.402   The incredible history of the black 
woman’s property transactions is told in the conveyance records throughout the 
South.403
4.  The Right to Acquire, by Inter Vivos Gift.
The black mistress had the legal right to acquire property by inter vivos gift, 
402See references to Madame Ricard contained in note 363, and see PHILLIPS, supra note 
14, at 434 (“In Louisiana colored planters on a considerable scale became fairly numerous. 
Among them... Marie Metoyer of Natchitoches Parish had fifty-eight slaves and more than two 
thousand acres of land when she died in 1840.”) See also, KOLCHIN, supra note 11, at 83 (“In 
Louisiana’s Natchitoches Parish a colony of free Creoles, descended from an eighteenth-century 
French settler and an African slave, grew and flourished until by 1860 it contained 411 persons 
who owned 276 slaves....”)  See also WOODSON, HEADS, supra note 112, at xxxiv-xxxv (“Using 
what limited opportunities they had, moreover, some of the free Negroes accomplished what 
might be considered exceptional.  Many of them owned slaves who cultivated their large 
estates....  Marie Metoyer, of Nachitoches Parish, possessed fifty slaves and an estate of more 
than 2,000 acres.”)    
403See, e.g., CARL A. BRASSEAUX ET AL., CREOLES OF COLOR IN THE BAYOU COUNTRY 
134-35 (1994) [hereinafter BRASSEAUX] (documenting the black mistresses’ property 
transactions, in the Conveyance Books, Clerk of Court’s Office, St. Laundry Parish Courthouse, 
such as “Auzenne, Carlostin, estate of, to Laurette Guidry, F.W.C. (free woman of color), wife of 
Theodore Chenier, F.M.C., Public Auction, Book U-1, p. 237.  On November 14, Laurette 
Guidry entered the high bid of $1,200 for half lot #55 in town of Washington, Louisiana.”)  
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although, as discussed, such gifts resulting from interracial concubinage 
relationships were problematic.404
5.  The Right to Acquire, by Will.
Gifts by will to the black mistress lacked many legal obstacles faced in gifts 
to enslaved black women.405  The black mistress had the legal right to inherit 
404See, e.g., Macarty et al. v. Mandeville, 3 La. Ann. 239, 1848 WL 3762 (La. 1848),  
supra note 313.
405See MORRIS, supra note 51, at 373-74:
In 1830, in Lenoir v. Sylvester, O’Neall wrote: ‘...a legacy cannot be given to a 
slave, for he can have no right, whatever, which does not, the instant it is 
transferred to him, pass to his master (sic).  In other words, he is in law himself 
chattels personal; and it would be absurd to say, that property can own 
property....’  In North Carolina, Ruffin, in White v. Green (1840), ruled that 
‘Slaves have not (sic) capacity to take by will, and a legacy to them is, like the 
direction for their emancipation, void.’  Judge Alexander M. Clayton of 
Mississippi, in Wade v. American Colonization Society (1846), adopted a different 
position.  The ‘right to freedom is inchoate, and becomes complete when the 
subjects of it are removed.  The bequest to the slaves is not void for want of 
capacity in the legatees to take.’ (Footnotes omitted.)
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property by will, but again, when her father was white, she faced some legal 
obstacles.406
6.  The Right to Acquire, by Marriage.
As we have discussed, marriage is a major source of wealth transference, 
that was unavailable to the black mistress in miscegenational relationships with 
white men.407  The black mistress was legally prohibited from marrying an 
enslaved black, as enslaved blacks were legally unable to marry even other 
enslaved blacks.408  That left the black mistress only one legitimate marital option: 
406See John Compton et al. Heirs of Leonard B. Compton v. Aaron Prescott and Another, 
Executors of Said Leonard B. Compton et al., 12 Rob (La.) 56, 1845 WL 1677 (La. 1845), supra
note 260.
407See supra note 140. 
408See MORRIS, supra note 51, at 29 (“...a North Carolina law of the 1830s.  Free blacks 
who married or lived as husband or wife with a slave would be punished. (fn. 64, Revised 
Statutes... North Carolina, 1:590.)  Insofar as the law included a marriage between a slave and a 
free black, it was an absurdity.  Slaves lacked the necessary ‘will’ to enter into a marriage 
contract, and slave jurisdictions universally refused to recognize any slave marriage.”) 
(Footnotes omitted.)  
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to marry a free black man, but many chose not to marry at all.409
See also, COBB, supra note 115, at 242-43 (“The inability of the slave to contract extends 
to the marriage contract, and hence there is no recognized marriage relation in law between 
slaves.” (Footnote omitted.))  Compare SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 84-85:
Some black women chose to live with a partner without formalizing marital vows.  
This could have the ironic effect of a woman losing all she had sought to preserve 
by not marrying.  In 1827, Nancy Munford, a Virginia slave, was purchased by 
her husband and emancipated, but the couple never legalized their union.  In 
subsequent years, they built up a substantial estate, but in 1845, Nancy’s husband, 
Thomas Walden, a carpenter, was murdered.  To her surprise, Nancy discovered 
that she was not entitled to any of their jointly acquired property–a house, three 
lots, and 150 acres of farmland–all listed in her husband’s name.  Although she 
eventually petitioned the state legislature and was awarded the property others 
were not so fortunate.” (Footnotes omitted.)) 
409See COBB, supra note 115, at 313 (“Free persons of color, unless restricted by statute, 
may contract with those of their own condition, or any free person capable of contracting.”) As 
nearly all antebellum Southern states prohibited interracial, black-white marriage, a black 
mistress could legally marry another free black, and perhaps other free persons of color, such as 
native Americans.  See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 140, at 209 (“About four out of ten free Negro 
women in Charleston in 1860 could not expect to find husbands among the city’s free Negro 
men.  A good many of them had to choose between remaining unmarried and accepting a slave 
husband.”)  Compare SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 128:
Among wealthy creoles of color in Louisiana, endogamous marriages were almost 
universal.  Antoine Decuir and Antoine Dubuclet, the richest blacks in Point 
Coupee Parish, signed formal contracts concerning their children.  In the case of 
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7.  The Right of Disposition, by Sale, Inter Vivos Gift, Will, or Inheritance.
The black mistress could transfer ownership of property by sale.410  She 
engaged in extensive property transactions, as evidenced in the parish courthouse 
records, throughout the South.411  In addition, the black mistress could apparently 
dispose of property by inter vivos gift, by will, and by inheritance, through the 
Decuir’s son, Antoine, Jr., and Dubuclet’s daughter, Josephine, they drew up a 
four-page document (in French) specifying the date of the wedding, the size of the 
dowry, and arrangements for the distribution of property.  Decuir contracted for 
his second son, Augustin, to marry the granddaughter of Iberville Parish planter 
Cyprien Ricard, at the time the wealthiest free person of color in Louisiana.
410See, e.g., Luther P. Jackson, The Virginia Free Negro Planter and Property Owner, 24 
J. NEGRO HIST. 390, 392 (1939) (“Having employment, many free Negroes turned their earnings 
to good account and bought property.  The right to own and transfer property was one right 
which an otherwise hostile society never took away from this minority group.”)  He supports this 
observation with the fact that in Virginia, there was a one hundred percent increase in free black 
land ownership between 1830 and 1860, even though the Virginia free black population only 
increased twenty percent in that time period.)  But see WOODSON, HEADS, supra 112, at xxxiv-
xxxv (“In 1805 Maryland prohibited Negroes from selling corn, wheat or tobacco....  North 
Carolina... [i]n 1826, there followed an act which restricted the right of free Negroes to trade in 
certain articles and to peddle beyond their county without a license.” (Footnotes omitted.)) 
411See, e.g., BRASSEAUX, supra 403.
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laws of succession.412  At least one Southern state expressly forbade the black 
mistress from the right to pass their wealth onto the next generation.413  Some were 
able to will sizable estates to their black heirs.414  The black mistress faced the 
same problem that white men faced when trying to will property to enslaved black 
loved ones, that is, the law often refused such efforts at wealth transference.415
412See COBB, supra note 115, at 313-14, n.1 (“They may... dispose of their estates by will.  
In the absence of a will, administration will be granted on their estates, unless otherwise directed 
by statute, they will be subject to the ordinary and general law of distribution.”  “In Georgia, 
their estates go to their ‘descendants,’ which has been held not to include collaterals.” (Cases 
omitted.)) Some wealthy black mistresses made substantial charitable donations to their 
community.  One such wealthy black mistress was a philanthropist who founded New Orleans’s 
Couvent School, in 1847.  SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 129.  See also DESDUNES, supra note 
374, especially the chapter on free women of color.
413Compare JULIA SMITH, SLAVERY AND PLANTATION GROWTH IN ANTEBELLUM FLORIDA
112-13 (1973) (noting that in Florida free blacks were not allowed to will their property to their 
heirs). 
414See supra note 403.
415See PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 435:
[S]uch petition was that presented in 1832 by Marie Louise Bitaud, free woman of 
color, which recited that in the preceding year she had bought her daughter and 
grandchild at a cost of $700; that a lawyer had now told her that in view of her 
Blackness as Property
Page 206 of 302
8.  The Right to Own Enslaved Blacks
Another issue the law faced was, if the black mistress could acquire 
property, should she have the right to acquire and own enslaved blacks?416  The 
lack of free relatives to inherit her property, in the case of death intestate her 
slaves would revert to the state; that she had become alarmed at this prospect; and 
she accordingly begged permission to manumit then without having to leave 
Louisiana.  The magistrates gave her their consent on the condition that the 
petitioner furnish a bond of $500 to insure support and education of the grandson 
until his coming of age.  This was duly done and the formalities completed. 
(Footnote omitted.)
See also BERLIN, supra note 7, at 156:
Many more blacks depended on their friends and relatives to extricate them from 
bondage.  Hundreds of free Negroes used their small savings to purchase and free 
loved ones, especially their immediate families.  In New Orleans, better than a 
third of the petitions for manumission between 1827 and 1851 came from Negro 
freemen.  Sometimes relatives in the free states helped to buy enslaved brethren 
out of bondage....  Wealthy free Negroes occasionally used their privileged 
position to aid bondsmen....  At times, the black community pitched in to help one 
of their number.  (Footnotes omitted.)
416
 See MORRIS, supra note 51, at 30 (“A touchier issue concerned the right of free blacks 
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answer, in most states, was yes, and some states expressly confirmed the black 
mistress’s right to own enslaved blacks.417  In some other states, the answer was 
no, a black mistress’s property rights were expressly limited to prohibit ownership
to own slaves.  In some jurisdictions the right was affirmed, and in others it was denied.”)
417Id. at 30 (“In cases in the Carolinas in 1833, for instance, the right of free blacks to 
own slaves was upheld.  In State v. Edmund, (a slave), Judge Thomas Ruffin observed that in 
North Carolina ‘a free man of colour may own... lands and personal property, including 
slaves.’...  In Cline v. Caldwell (1833), Judge O’Neall noted that as ‘free persons’ they could 
own slaves without restrictions.”  (Footnotes omitted.))  
See also, WOODSON, HEADS, supra note 112, at xxxii:
This right to own property extended even to that of owning white indentured 
servants and slaves.  Early in the history of the colonies, as in the case of Virginia, 
in 1670, Negroes and Indians were prohibited from owning white indentured 
servants, but were still permitted to acquire property in persons of their own 
color... free Negroes, for benevolent reasons, often purchased members of their 
family that they might thereafter be manumitted for a nominal sum.  An effort 
was made to prohibit this by restricting manumission, but free Negroes thereafter 
continued to purchase their wives, or husbands, or children and to hold them in 
slavery since they could not manumit them if they were to remain with them.  A 
man, therefore, often purchased his wife, or the wife her husband, or the parents 
their children.  This led to unusual complications upon the death of the free owner 
if he died intestate.  If there were no relatives legally qualified to receive the 
inheritance, such property escheated to the State, inasmuch as slaves were not 
considered as persons before the law.  (Footnotes omitted.)  
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of enslaved blacks.418  Allowing the black mistress to own enslaved blacks would 
418
 See TUSHNET, supra note 16, at 149-52:
The issue of a free black’s right to own slaves arose in a representative form in 
Georgia.  (Fn. 96, Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185 (1853))....  Then he addressed to 
‘main point,’ the ability of free blacks to own slaves.  Judge Lumpkin stated his 
‘strong inclination... to give [his] (sic) sentiments pretty fully upon this subject,’ 
and he did, in a virulently racist opinion.  First, he presented his conclusion, that 
free blacks were ‘in a state of perpetual pupilage or wardship’ and had only those 
rights expressly granted by the legislature....  To the extent that he supplied 
reasons for the result, they were found in the manumission, being the private act 
of the master, could convey no public rights on the free black.  Nor had the 
legislature acted to eliminate the ‘unconquerable prejudice, if it can be so called, 
of race’; rather the free black was ‘associated still with the slave in this State, in 
some of the most humiliating incidents of his degradation....’  ‘In no part of this 
country, whether North or South, East or West, does the free negro stand erect 
and on a platform of equality with the white man.  He does, and must necessarily 
feel this degradation....  Civil freedom among whites, he can never enjoy.... [T]he 
Courts of this country should never lean to that construction, which puts the 
thriftless African upon a footing or civil or political equality with a white 
population which are characterized by a degree of energy and skill, unknown to 
any other people or period.’ (Footnotes omitted).           
See also MORRIS, supra note 51, at 30 (“By a statute of 1818 Georgia prohibited such 
ownership....  How far this prohibition extended was debated in Bryan v. Walton (1856).  Judge 
Lumpkin... (clarifying that the restriction did not apply to all blacks), ‘that if a person has any 
negro blood, he is disabled from conveying slaves... we should say that to put him under such a 
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challenge the very basis of enslavement, black inferiority.419  Equally important, 
the black mistress, who owned land and enslaved blacks, challenged the white 
male-dominated hierarchy.420  Another court supported the black mistress’s right to 
disability, he must have one-eighth of African blood in his veins.’”  (Emphasis added; footnotes 
omitted.))  See FINKELMAN, CASEBOOK, supra note 136, at 389.
Compare WOODSON, HEADS, supra note 112, at xxviii (“Virginia... provided that no free 
Negro or mulatto should be capable of purchasing or otherwise acquiring permanent ownership, 
except by descent to any slaves, other than his or her husband or wife and their children.”)     
419See MORRIS, supra note 51, at 31:
One Arkansas judge in Ewell v. Tidwell (1859) provided the following logic for 
not allowing free blacks to own enslaved blacks: ‘The ownership of slaves by free 
negroes is opposed to the principles upon which slavery exists among us... its 
foundation is an inferiority of race....  The bondage of one negro to another has 
not this solid foundation to rest upon.  The free negro finds in the slave his brother 
in blood, in color, feelings, education and principle... civilly and morally 
disqualified to extend protection, and exercise dominion over the slave.’” 
(Footnotes omitted.))
420See TUSHNET, supra note 16, at 149:
Racism and its associated notions of hierarchy overcame the impulse to draw lines 
based solely on status when courts in Georgia, Mississippi, and Arkansas held, 
during the 1850s, that free blacks, although entitled to own certain forms of 
property, could not own slaves, even in the absence of a statutory bar such as 
existed in other states.  The opinions contain as feverish a rhetoric as can be found 
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own land,421 but drew the line there, holding that the free black mistress could not 
in any area of the law, which plainly resulted from the sensitivity of the issue at a 
time of heightened sectional conflict.  The Mississippi Supreme Court’s opinion, 
indeed, consisted in large measure of quotations from Chief Justice Taney’s 
opinion in the Dred Scott case, followed by a peculiarly inappropriate essay on 
the status of aliens in international law. (fn. 95, Heirn v. Bridault, 37 Miss. 209 
(1859). 
421Id. at 152-53:
A property dispute similar to that in Bryan v. Walton arose a few years later in 
Arkansas.  (fn. 97, Ewell v. Tidwell) The facts, drawn from a more complex 
situation, that are relevant to this discussion are that Jonathon Koen bequeathed 
land and a slave named Charles to a free black.  The Arkansas Supreme Court 
rejected the proposition, drawn from Bryan v. Walton, that manumission 
conferred no rights to contract or hold land.  
‘The negro, though morally and mentally inferior to the white man, 
is, nevertheless, an intellectual being, without feelings, necessities 
and habits common to humanity.  By the act of emancipation... no 
one is interested in the protection of the negro.  If, under such 
circumstances, he could not make and enforce contracts, it is 
difficult to understand how he could, with any certainty, supply his 
commonest necessities.  Such a condition would be inconsistent 
with civilization.  And, besides this, the negro, having no power to 
acquire property, or certain means of gathering the fruits of his 
labor, every incentive to industry would be at once destroyed; and, 
sinking into idleness and deprivation, he would become an 
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own enslaved blacks.422  Another court had the opportunity to discuss the subject 
intolerable nuisance.’
422Id. at 153-54:
But the situation was different when a free black sought to own, not land, but a 
slave.  
‘Without attempting to discuss slavery in the abstract, it may be 
said that it has its foundation in an inferiority of race. (sic) There is 
a striking difference between the black and white man, in intellect, 
feelings and principles.  In the order of providence, the former was 
made inferior to the latter; and hence the bondage of the one to the 
other.  For government and protection, the one race is dependent 
on the other.  It is upon this principle alone, that slavery can be 
maintained as an institution.  The bondage of one negro to another 
has not (sic) this solid foundation to rest upon.  The free negro 
finds in the slave his brother in blood, in color, feelings, education 
and principle.  He has but few civil rights, nor can have, consistent 
with the good order of society; and is almost dependent on the 
white race as the slave himself.  He is, therefore, civilly and 
morally disqualified to extend protection, and exercise dominion 
over the slave.’
In 1846, the same court had summarized the general view in upholding the 
state’s requirement that free blacks post a $500 bond against becoming a public 
charge or injuring any person.  (fn. 98, Pendleton v. State, 6 Ark. 509 (1846).)  
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of the black mistress owning enslaved blacks, in a case in which a black mistress 
owned her own child.423  Some whites recognized the importance of having free 
The statute did not violate the privileges and immunities of citizens, because free 
blacks could not be citizens: ‘The two races, differing as they do in complexion, 
habits, conformation and intellectual endowments, could not nor ever will live 
together upon terms of social or political equality.  A higher than human power so 
ordained it, and a greater than human agency must change the decree.’  
423Id. at 155-56:
This discussion can be summarized by examining a Delaware decision in which 
the impossibility of using race as the categorizing device is evident to the 
observer as it was concealed from the judges.  Tindal v. Hudson was a suit for 
freedom by Isaac Tindal. (fn. 99, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 441 (1838))  His father, a free 
black, had been ‘legally married’ to a slave.  When Isaac was born, his father held 
him as a slave and in his will bequeathed him to serve until he reached twenty-
five.  The suit for freedom from one who bought Isaac from the estate was said to 
pose two ‘novel and interesting’ questions: can a free black own slaves, and 
‘whether a father can hold his own children in slavery.’  The court’s opinion dealt 
with the questions separately.  On the first, it argued that slavery as it existed 
involved black slaves and white owners and that it would ‘not institute a new 
species of slavery.’  Further, free blacks were ‘almost as helpless and dependent’ 
on whites as slaves; their limited civil capacity made it impossible for them to 
provide the ‘support and protection’ that slaveowners had to give in a system of 
‘mutual and reciprocal obligations and duties.’  On the second question, the court 
said that ‘humanity revolts at the idea of a parent selling his own children into 
slavery’; ‘the natural rights and obligations of a father are paramount to the 
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blacks as allies in the enslavement enterprise.424  Despite white society’s and the 
law’s views on the subject, there is clear evidence that the black mistresses owned 
enslaved blacks.425
acquired rights of the master.’  But of course fathers owned their children 
throughout the South.  Although lawyers’s distinctions might be drawn between 
children born of legal marriages and ‘illegitimate’ children, the Delaware court 
could say what it did on the second question only by ignoring the reality of race 
on which its answer to the first question rested.  
See also, Valsain et al. v. Cloutier, 3 La. 170, 1831 WL 717 (La. 1831), supra note 342 (another 
case in which a black mistress owned her daughter as an enslaved black).          
424See JOHNSON, supra note 140, at 169 (“The free Negro’s ‘right to hold slaves gives 
him a stake in the institution of slavery, and makes it his interest as well as his duty to uphold it.  
It identifies his interests and his feelings, in this particular, with those of the white 
population...’”)  
425
 For empirical evidence that the southern black mistress did, in fact, own enslaved 
blacks, see SCHWENINGER, WOODSON, supra note 29. See also PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 433-
36 (“...a negro planter in St. Paul’s Parish, South Carolina, was reported before the close of the 
eighteenth century to have two hundred slaves as well as a white wife and son-in-law, and the 
returns of the first federal census appear to corroborate it....  In Louisiana colored planters on a 
considerable scale became fairly common....  In rural Virginia and Maryland also there were free 
colored slaveholders in considerable numbers.  Slaveholding by colored townsmen were likewise 
fairly frequent.  Among the 360 colored taxpayers in Charleston in 1860, for example, 130, 
including nine persons described as of Indian descent, were listed as possessing 390 slaves.”)
See also JACKSON, supra note 29, at 217 (“Frankey Miles was one of the largest 
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Some black mistresses owned no enslaved blacks, while some owned family 
members who were still enslaved.426  On the other hand, as this study will show, 
there were a few black mistresses, who like their white “aristocratic,” wealthy 
slaveholders among the free Negroes in Virginia during the entire period under review.  In 1860 
this woman, as previously noted, owned a plantation of 1,100 acres; and doubtless she had need 
for the nineteen slaves she owned.” (Footnote omitted.)); RUSSELL, supra note 14, at 77, 90-95 
n.34 (citing, inter alia, Lower Norfolk County Antiquary, vol. iv, pp. 174-82, “for negro slave-
owners enumerated in a list, prepared by the commissioners of the revenue,... of Princess Anne 
County in 1840.”); FRANKLIN, supra note 29 at 159 (“At no time during the ante-bellum period 
were Negroes in North Carolina without some slaves.”); JAMES M. WRIGHT, THE FREE NEGRO IN 
MARYLAND, 1634-1860 (1921) [hereinafter WRIGHT]; Horace E. Fitchett, The Origins and 
Growth of the Free Negro Population in Charleston, South Carolina, 25 J. NEGRO HIST. 430 
(1941); LARRY KOGER, BLACK SLAVEOWNERS: FREE BLACK SLAVE MASTERS IN SOUTH 
CAROLINA, 1790-1860 (1985); MARINA WIKRAMANAYAKE, A WORLD IN SHADOW: THE FREE 
BLACK IN ANTEBELLUM SOUTH CAROLINA (1973); and LITITIA WOODS BROWN, FREE NEGROES 
IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 1740-1846 (1972).  See generally BERLIN, supra note 7, at xvii-
xx (providing a list of published and unpublished doctoral theses on free blacks in virtually every 
enslavement state). 
426See FRANKLIN, supra note 29, at 160.  (Not all black mistresses, of course, owned 
slaves.  Most of them, like the majority of antebellum southern whites, were poor, and owned no 
property of any kind.  The majority of black mistresses, who did own enslaved blacks, owned 
only a few, leading to the observation “that by far the larger portion of free Negro owners of 
slaves were the possessors of this human chattel for benevolent reasons.  There are numerous 
examples of free Negroes having purchased relatives or friends to ease their lot.  Many of them 
manumitted such slaves, while others held title to slaves who were virtually free.”  (Footnote 
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counterparts, were in the “planter” class.427
C.   ORIGIN, EXISTENCE, AND GROWTH OF THE BLACK 
MISTRESS CLASS428
omitted.)) 
427
 For these black mistresses, there were the greatest status differences with the enslaved 
population.  Black mistresses were also the greatest challenge to enslavement’s white supremacy 
premise.  See supra note 30.
428See generally BERLIN, supra note 7 (presenting a definitive study of the origins, 
demographics, and development of the free black class in the antebellum South).  See also
WOODSON, HEADS, supra note 112, at vi.  (“The period in which it was possible for Negroes to 
come as servants and later acquire freedom terminated near the end of the seventeenth century.  
The free Negro population thereafter found recruits only from children born of free Negro 
parents, mulatto children born of free Negro mothers, mulatto children born of white servants or 
free white women, children of free Negro and Indian mixed parentage, and manumitted slaves.”)  
See also SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 100:
Whatever the specific circumstances, and despite the different traditions in 
various sections of the Lower South, prior to 1840, most free people of color who 
reached the upper economic levels were of mixed ancestry and had received 
assistance from whites.  Often they were children of white planters or merchants.  
In South Carolina, the father of a free mulatto owner Robert Collins was a white 
landowner in St. Thomas Parish; the father of farmer Henry Glencamp was a 
white planter in St. Stephens Parish; Charleston hotel owner Jehu Jones, described 
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Why did some white men in the antebellum South choose black women as 
sexual partners?  Perhaps it was merely rape and exploitation in an enslavement 
system that was sheerly barbaric.429  Perhaps it was exotic, some strange attraction 
as ‘almost white,’ tinner William Penceel, and barber Thomas Inglis claimed 
white ancestry; the father of Sumter County cotton gin maker William Ellison was 
probably Fairfield District planter and slave owner Robert Ellison.  Charleston 
slaveholder Margaret Noisette and other members of the Noisette family were 
children and grandchildren of French-born Philip Stanislas Noisette and his 
Haitian-born slave wife.  In Georgia, fisherman and farmer Anthony Odingsells, 
one of the largest Negro property holders, received his land and nine slaves from 
Charles Odingsells, an officer in the American Revolution, a state legislator, and 
the owner of three plantations.  The most prominent ‘colored creole family’ in 
Florida, the Ponis family, who engaged in various business activities, claimed 
descent from two Spanish officers.  In Alabama, the two largest Negro 
slaveholders, cattle ranchers Zeno and Basile Chastang, were the children of Dr. 
John Chastang, a prominent Mobile surgeon who had served as a medical 
consultant at the Spanish fort of San Esteban de Tombecbe.  In Mississippi, the 
plantation and slaveowning Baran brothers– Andrew, David, and John– and 
probably the Natchez barber William Johnson, the wealthiest Negroes in the state, 
were children of white slave owners and slave women.  (Footnotes omitted.) 
429See supra note 136.  See also WOODSON, HEADS, supra note 112, at xiv (“The masters 
of the female slaves, however, were not always the only persons of loose morals.  Many women 
of color were also prostituted to the purposes of young white men, and overseers.  Goodell 
reports a well-authenticated account of a respectable ‘Christian lady’ at the South, who kept a 
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to another race.   Perhaps it was sheer physical attraction.430  Perhaps it resulted 
from the seductive actions of black women.  Or perhaps, it was romantic, the result 
of true love.431  Whatever the reason, it appears that there was a lot of sexual 
activity between white men and black women, and that miscegenation between 
white men and black women was a reality.432
An analysis of key demographics explains why white men often chose black 
handsome mulatto female for the use of her genteel son, as a method of deterring him, as she 
said, ‘from indiscriminate and vulgar indulgences.’” (Footnotes omitted.))  
430For example, many white travelers in Louisiana remarked at the beauty of the black 
women they saw.  See THOMAS ASHE, TRAVELS IN AMERICA 315-16 (1809) (“... still there is an 
assembly held every Sunday evening at the Bayou, about two miles out of town, where the 
beauty of the country concentrates, without regard to birth, wealth, or colour.”); F. TROLLOPE, 
DOMESTIC MANNERS OF THE AMERICANS 33 (1832) (“... the gentle Quadroon has the sweet but 
dangerous vengeance of possessing that of attraction.  The union formed with this unfortunate 
race are said to be often lasting and happy, as far as any unions can be....”); and SAXE-WEIMER 
EISENACH, TRAVEL THROUGH NORTH AMERICA DURING THE YEARS 1825 AND 1826, vol.2, 62 
(1828) (“The quadroons both assume the names of their friends, and, as I was assured preserve 
this engagement with as much fidelity as ladies espoused at the altar.  Several of these girls have 
inherited property from their fathers or friends, and possess handsome features.”)
431See Macarty et al. v. Mandeville, 3 La. Ann. 239, 1848 WL 3762 (La. 1848), supra
note 113.
432See, e.g., BLASSINGAME, BLACK, supra note 27 (presenting, inter alia, a statistical 
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women as sexual partners in the antebellum South.433  First, white men 
outnumbered white women in the antebellum South, and most enslaved blacks 
lived on small farms, with resident white masters.434  Second, free black women 
outnumbered free black men, making for an imbalance in the free black 
community.435  Third, many free blacks were descendants of white men and black 
women, and therefore, were more closely connected to whites.436
analysis on interracial relationships in Reconstruction New Orleans).
433See generally BERLIN, supra note 7.
434See KOLCHIN, supra note 11, at 101 (“Regional variations qualify but do not negate the 
generalization that most Southern slaves lived on holdings of modest size... in the South as a 
whole, the medium figure was 23.  In rough terms, about one-quarter of Southern slaves lived on 
very small holdings of 1 to 9, one half lived on middle-range holdings of 10 to 49, and one-
quarter lived on large estates of 50 or more.” (Tables omitted.))   
435See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 177 (“In contrast to the white and slave populations, there 
were many more free Negro women than men in the South.”)   
436See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 178 (“In 1860 fully 40 percent of the Southern free Negro 
population were classified as mulattoes... throughout the South a light skin was the freeman’s 
distinguishing characteristic.”)  Berlin noted that the census takers were not given any criterion 
for distinguishing “black” from “mulatto,” so as noted we must view census figures on color 
with “usual skepticism.” Id. at 178-79 n.62.
See also SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 101:
Blackness as Property
Page 219 of 302
A federal census-driven study of the free mistress in rural Louisiana shows 
both the triumph of the unique group, their relationship to white masters, and their 
contribution to the antebellum Southern political economy.437   In 1850, in “rural” 
Even when there were no direct kinship ties prosperous free persons of color often 
received some assistance from whites.  Alabama bridge builder Horace King, 
emancipated in 1829 by Georgia slaveholder John Godwin, was assisted by his 
former master when he constructed a bridge across the Chattahoochee River, and 
later the two became partners in a construction company.  In New Orleans, Pierre 
A.D. Casenave, who worked for many years as a clerk in the office of 
philanthropist Judah P. Touro, was given a bequest of $10,000 by his employer to 
start a mercantile firm.  Later, Casenave established the first large-scale, black-
owned undertaking business in the South.  Between 1828 and 1832, Plaquemines 
Parish sugar planter Andrew Durnford purchased St. Rosalie plantation from New 
Orleans merchant-planter John McDonogh, a friend of Durnford’s white father, 
who allowed Durnford to pay the $72,000 purchase price over a period of more
than twenty years, at a 6 percent interest, when mortgage notes for such amounts 
usually called for lump sum payments over a period of three or four years at 8 or 
10 percent.  By 1840, with rare exceptions, affluent free persons of color in the 
Lower South were directly related either to whites or mulattoes who had been 
assisted by white benefactors.  (Footnotes omitted.)
437The author completed this analysis in fulfillment of his Scholar of the House thesis at 
Yale University in 1974-75, under the direction of Professor John W. Blassingame.  The full, 
unpublished thesis and statistical analysis is available.
See also SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 101:
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Louisiana, there were 169 households headed by free black women and men; a 
large majority of whom were the offspring of Spanish and French white masters 
Similarly, affluent free persons of color in Louisiana were often directly related to 
whites.  In New Orleans, among the approximately 535 succession (estates) 
probated for free blacks in the District Court between 1805 and 1846, nearly two-
thirds were for women.  Their names–Marie Allemand, Charlotte Burle, 
Marguerite Beaudouin, Charlotte Colbert, Catherine Lachiapella, Magdeleine 
Jourdain, Marie Pierre, Madeleine Rillieux–bore witness to their relationships 
with white Creoles.  At the same time, a majority of the city’s property-holding 
free men of color, including prosperous merchants Leon Sindoz and Erasme 
Legoaster and speculator Francois Edmund Dupuy, were of mixed African and 
Spanish or French heritage.  Similar interracial family backgrounds existed 
among affluent free persons of color in rural parishes, including those of 
Plaquemines Parish sugar planters Andrew Durnford, Louise Oliver, and Adolphe 
Reggio; St. John the Baptist Parish slave owners, George Deslonde, Cyprian 
Ricard, and Antoine Dubuclet; St. Landry Parish planters Adolophe Donatto and 
Jean Baptiste Meullion; and Natchitoches Parish slave masters Nicholas 
Augustine Metoyer, Marie Suzanne Metoyer, and Dominique Metoyer.  Meullion 
was the one of white planter Luis Augustin Meullion, and his slave Maria Juana, 
while the Metoyers were the children of French immigrant and planter Claude 
Thomas Pierre Metoyer, and his slave mistress Marie Thereze Coincoin.  
(Footnotes omitted.)
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and their African slaves.438  Three facts, abstracted from the 1850 manuscript 
census, indicate the origin of the black mistress in antebellum rural Louisiana:  
their average age, their place of nativity, and their skin color.  As to age, the 
average age of the black mistress in antebellum, rural Louisiana was 46 years old 
in 1850.  As to place of nativity, 96.6% of them had been born in Louisiana.  And 
as to skin color, 93.5% of them were described as “mulatto.”439   These three facts 
provide evidence that the black mistress had her origin in “Latin” Louisiana, in the 
late 18th and early 19th Centuries, from racially-mixed parentage.  This conclusion 
is further supported by the high incidence of black mistresses, who had French and 
Spanish surnames.440
438These facts were extracted from the 25 microfilmed reels of the free population, slave 
population, and agricultural schedules returned by those who took the census of Louisiana in 
1850. The term “rural” is used to define the State of Louisiana, except for Orleans Parish, which 
comprises the City of New Orleans.  As previously mentioned, see the English and colored 
creole ancestry of Andrew Durnford, supra note 306, not all free blacks in Louisiana derived 
from “Creoles” and Africans.  Some of these black mistress households were held by free black 
men.  As common when referring to men so as to include women by inference, the following 
discussion uses the term “black mistress” to include black masters, free black men who owned 
enslaved blacks.
439As compiled from the 1850 manuscript census, out of 169 households, the average age 
for the black mistress was 45.7 years; 6 were born outside of Louisiana; and 11 were listed of 
“black” skin color. 
440Although it is often difficult to say what nationality a name is, it is conservative to say 
that 90% of the names of free mistresses, listed in the 1850 manuscript census, are Spanish or 
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The number of mulattoes listed in the Census provides proof enough of the 
mixing of the races.441  In 1850, there were 17,462 free blacks in the entire state of 
Louisiana, of which 81% were listed as mulatto and 19% were listed as black 
(14,083 mulattoes; 3,379 blacks).442  And in Louisiana’s enslaved community in 
French. The majority of the white masters were also Catholic.  There has been some literature on 
the effect that religion played on enslavement.  Some have argued that the laws of the Catholic 
Church greatly affected enslavement.  See FRANK TANNENBAUM, SLAVE AND CITIZEN: THE 
NEGRO IN THE AMERICAS (1947), and STANLEY ELKINS, SLAVERY: A PROBLEM IN AMERICAN  
INSTITUTIONAL AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE (1976) (for a discussion of the humanizing effects of the 
Catholic Church on enslavement).  Others have argued that the behavior of the Church and its 
authority did not significantly affect the life of enslaved blacks.  Compare Carl N. Degler, 
Slavery in Brazil and the United States: An Essay in Comparative History, 75 AM. HIST. REV. 
1004-28 (1970).
See also KOLCHIN, supra note 11, at 82 (“The great majority of free blacks in the 
antebellum South were descendants of those who received their freedom between 1780 and 
1810.”) This is evidence that the Louisiana free mistress phenomenon was not unique to location, 
culture, or religious affiliation.  It appears that as the economics of enslavement changed, whites’ 
and the law’s attitudes towards manumission and to free blacks became more “conservative.”  
441As per instructions, the census takers classified the “free” population in 1850, 1860, 
and 1870 manuscript censuses, as “white,” “mulatto,” and “black,” in an effort to describe race 
based on skin color. See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 178 n.62 (“In 1850 and 1860, the census 
distinguished between ‘mulatto’ and ‘black’ members of the free Negro and slave populations.
However, census marshals were not given any criterion for distinguishing mulattoes from blacks 
or even whites.  Presumably, all those who were not full-blooded blacks yet were unable to pass 
for whites were listed as ‘mulattoes.’  Naturally, census figures on the color of both the free 
Negro and slave populations should be viewed with even more than usual skepticism.   Negro 
Population, 1790-1915 (Washington D.C., 1918), pp. 207, 220-1.”)
442Calculations are based on the statistics found in STATISTICAL VIEW OF THE UNITED 
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1850, there were 244,809 enslaved people, of which 8% were listed as mulatto and 
92% were listed as black (19,835 mulattoes; 224,974 blacks).443
One might assume that being “mulatto” meant special treatment by whites 
and automatic freedom, but this was not the case.444  The greater percentage of free 
blacks was mulatto:  400 mulattoes to every 100 blacks.445  This percentage was far 
greater than that for enslaved blacks:  the ratio of mulattoes to blacks in the slave 
community was about nine mulattoes for every 100 blacks.446  However, one 
cannot conclude that if a black person were mulatto, that meant that they were free: 
not all mulattoes were free and not all blacks were enslaved.  There were, in fact, 
more enslaved mulattoes than there were free mulattos, at least in antebellum, rural 
Louisiana: out of the total mulatto population, 4,083 were free, compared to 19,835 
STATES– COMPENDIUM OF THE SEVENTH CENSUS 83 (J.D.B. DeBow 1970) [hereinafter DEBOW, 
SEVENTH], at 83.
443Id.
444
“Mulatto” is defined as “[o]ne who is the offspring of a European and a Black; also 
used loosely for anyone of mixed race resembling a mulatto.”  OXFORD DICTIONARY, VOL. IX, 
supra note 5, at 68.
445See DEBOW, SEVENTH, supra note 442, at 83.
446Id.
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who were enslaved!447  These figures support two important conclusions:  first, that 
despite the laws, miscegenation was practiced in antebellum, rural Louisiana, and 
second, that white masters often abandoned their mulatto children to enslavement. 
Some white masters in Louisiana had relationships with black women that 
were “the nearest approach to marriage which the law recognized, and in the days 
in which their union commenced it imposed serious moral obligations,” defying 
the law and social disapproval.448  This was especially true of white masters of 
Iberville, West Baton Rouge, and Pointe Coupee Parishes.449  A large number of 
manumissions resulted from these miscegenational relationships.450  It has been 
estimated that, prior to the Civil War, three-fourths of the free black population in 
the Lower South had some white ancestry.451  In some Lower South port cities, like 
447Id.
448See Macarty, supra note 329, per Chief Justice Eustis. 
449In the emancipation document of 1829, five mulatto women who might have been 
sisters (all have the same maiden name of “Belly”) are listed as being married to wealthy 
(presumably) white planters.  See Emancipation document of “Henriette” by A. Dubuclet, et al., 
June 8, 1829, Iberville Parish Courthouse, Plaquemines, Louisiana, a copy of which is in the 
author’s possession. 
450See generally SCHAFER, FREE, supra note 45.
451See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 180.
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New Orleans, nearly 90 percent of free blacks had white ancestry.452  Many 
emancipation documents describe a young, enslaved black woman with mulatto 
children.453
One example of such a miscegenational relationship, in Latin Louisiana, 
occurred in 1764, between a white master, Luis Augustin Meullion, and his 
mulatto, enslaved woman, Maria Juana, which produced a son, Jean Baptiste 
Meullion.  In 1776, Jean Baptiste Meullion and his enslaved mother were 
emancipated, on the condition that they serve their former owner until his death.454
After his father’s death, Jean Baptiste Meullion moved to St. Landry Parish and, in 
1830, owned 52 enslaved blacks.455  The origins of many black mistresses can be 
traced back to miscegenational relationships, between white masters and their 
452Id.
453See generally SCHAFER, FREE, supra note 45.
454MS. Deed of Emancipation, February 21, 1776, microfilmed on Meullion Papers 
(Louisiana State University Archives).
455Compiled from over 20 reels of microfilmed manuscript schedules of population 
reported in Louisiana by the 1830 census takers. 
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enslaved black women.456
During the antebellum period, there were increased pressures throughout the 
South to send the black mistress out of the State, efforts to take away their 
property, and even efforts to re-enslave them.457  As a result of these pressures, 
including a decline in the number of newly-manumitted blacks, the free black 
population in Louisiana declined from 25,502 in 1840 to 17,462 in 1850.458  Many 
black mistresses migrated to the states in the North and the West, while others 
immigrated to Mexico, the Caribbean islands, and to France.459
The black mistress, especially in miscegenational relationships with white 
men, and those descendants of white masters and black mistresses, often relied on 
456See generally SCHWENINGER, supra note 29.  See generally BRASSEAUX, supra note 
403.
457See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 316-40, Chapter 10, entitled “The Mechanics of White 
Dominance.” (“‘Humanity, self-interest and consistency all require that we should enslave the 
free negro.’  George Fitzhugh, What Shall Be Done with the Free Negro (1851).”)  Id. at 343.
458See DEBOW, SEVENTH, supra note 442, at 63.
459See, e.g., Josephine Decuir who moved to France, in David Sandoz, Administrator of 
Pierre Decuir v. Louis Gary, 11 Rob. (La.) 529, 1845 WL 1662 (La. 1845), supra note 330.
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their “family ties” to support their legal rights.460  After all, the black mistress was 
at best a quasi-citizen, despite her wealth and status, for in the South, there was 
really no such thing as a half-black or a part white.461  The question that the 
enslavement law faced was, when a white master exercised his property rights and 
freed an enslaved black woman, or when he chose to have a sexual relationship 
with a free black mistress, should he be allowed to transfer his wealth to them?
                              * * *
In summary, the black mistress was an enigma to the American “property-
enslavement-sexual” Dream.  That is, she was allowed to exercise three prized 
possessions of American life: freedom, right to contract, and the right to privately 
own property, including enslaved blacks.
While the black mistress made significant progress in exercising her 
property rights in the antebellum South, her legal status was under constant 
460See CATTERALL, supra note 96, vol. 3 (1932) (citing examples of how white relatives 
of free blacks testified on their behalf in court).
461See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 182 (“‘You may manumit a slave but you cannot make 
him into a white man.’  Robert G. Harper, Letter to E.B. Caldwell (1818).”)
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scrutiny, and the subject of continuous debate.462   Other American civil rights of 
full citizenship, such as the right to vote, were hardly forthcoming.463  Prior to the 
462See BERLIN, supra note 7, 182-216, at Chapter 6, “A White Man’s Country: Racial 
Attitudes and Policies.”
463See KOLCHIN, supra note 11, at 17:
As the status of white migrants gradually improved, that of blacks in America 
became more clearly defined as well.  Whereas the legal status of the few blacks 
who resided in the colonies remained uncertain prior to the 1660s, a spate of 
legislation passed during the subsequent century regulated the condition of the 
growing population of black slaves and set them off from white settlers.  These 
acts established that slaves– and the children of slave women– would serve for 
life; limited the rights of slaves and even of free blacks (they could not vote, 
testify in court against whites, or marry whites)....
Limited civil rights, such as voting rights, that the black mistress exercised, must be 
viewed in the context of the limited rights, that women and free blacks exercised generally, even 
in the North.  
Northern blacks, although free, were objects of both legal discrimination and 
vicious hostility.  Excluded from most public schools, denied the right to vote 
(except Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and – if they could 
meet a property requirement– New York), forbidden by (sporadically enforced) 
law from entering many states, jeered at and at times physically attacked by 
whites who refused to work with them or live near them, blacks quickly came to 
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Civil War, even their property rights were eroding.464  Perhaps their eroded legal 
status reflected a decline in their percentage of the general population, due to an 
increase in the white population.465  Or perhaps it reflected the white population’s 
increased fear of the black mistress’s role in enslavement revolts.466
White fear and resentment of the black mistress often resulted in legal and 
extralegal restraints on their “freedom.”467  As clearly reflected in the post-
appreciate the difference between freedom and equality.
Id. at 82.  
464See BILLINGS, supra note 140, at 91.  (“While the state’s politicians undercut 
incrementally such freedoms as public assembly, education, and travel, they barely touched other 
rights.  Thus, free blacks managed to cling to a quasi-citizenship down to 1860.”)
465See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 46, 136, 398-99 (showing that in 1810, free blacks 
comprised of 18 percent (or 7,585 people) of the Louisiana population, but by 1860, they 
comprised of only 5.3 percent (or 18,647) of the State’s population; while the white population 
grew in Louisiana from 34,311 in 1810 to 357,456 in 1860).
466Id. at 345-49.  (This would help explain the focus on free assembly, education, and 
travel of anti-free black legislation.  And with some justification, there was sufficient evidence 
that many free blacks were anti-slavery and promoted black liberation.)    
467See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Greer C. Bosworth, Rather Than Free: Free 
Blacks in Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 26 HARV. C. R.-C. L. L. REV. 17 (1991).  See 
generally WOODWARD, STRANGE, supra note 64.  
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enslavement, “Jim Crow” era, many white Southerners “could not conceive of a 
society in which whites and blacks were equal.”468
Overall, for whatever the reasons, Southern white society allowed the black 
mistress to exercise many private property rights.   This represents a triumph of the 
468See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 182:
The desire to get rid of free Negroes, perhaps all Negroes, stood at the heart of 
racial policies of the Upper South.  Believing that blacks were a people yearning 
for liberty but forever barred from enjoying it in America, Upper South whites 
saw only three alternatives:  amalgamation, race war, or physical separation....  ‘... 
the only rational and Christian alternative is colonization.’ 
Id. at 200.  Greed was a major factor in laws against free blacks, and led whites to propose a 
fourth alternative for free blacks’ fate, that of re-enslavement: 
It took but scant provocation for whites to chip off another piece of the freemen’s 
ever-shrinking liberty.  In 1822, for instance, when a Virginia legislator found the 
state penitentiary crowded and the treasury low, they ordered free Negro felons to 
be whipped and sold into slavery.  Enthusiasm for the new penal system quickly 
spread to nearby Maryland and Delaware, both of which barred free Negro 
convicts from the state penitentiary and local jails and subjected them to the lash 
or to sale for a term of years out of the state....  A minor fiscal crisis was enough 
to encourage some whites to drive free Negroes into permanent bondage.
Id. at 182-83. 
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private property ownership paradigm over the enslavement paradigm.  As we shall 
see, the black mistress class, and the free black population, grew in number and 
prominence in the antebellum South, making them less marginal.469  The question 
that Professor Bell’s “interest-convergence” principle implores is, why did white 
masters empower the black mistress with private property rights?   And, in 
particular, was it in the best interest of the white power structure to do so?
VI.    “JIM CROW” SEGREGATION AND THE BLACK WOMAN’S 
STRUGGLE FOR SEXUAL AND RACIAL EQUALITY
This next section discusses the black mistress’s fate in the years just prior to 
the Civil War, her reaction and that of her racially-mixed offsprings, to the Civil 
War, and their experiences during Reconstruction.  It also examines the effect the 
Reconstruction rules allowing interracial marriage had on pre-War legacies that 
469Id. at 46-47, 396-403.  (In 1810, there were 108,265 free blacks in the South, out of a 
southern white population of 2,208,785, and an enslaved black population of 1,163,854.  By 
1860, there were 261,918 free blacks in the South, compared to a southern white population of 
8,097,463, and an enslaved black population of 3,953,696.  More important than their numbers, 
they provided a  “legacy of freedom,” as important as the legacy of enslavement.)  Id. at 395.
Blackness as Property
Page 232 of 302
white men provided their black concubines.  And lastly it glimpses at the 
challenges that “Jim Crow” segregation posed for the black mistress in her 
struggles for sexual and racial equality. 
A.  A “DYING GENERATION”
The black mistress was born near the end of the eighteenth century and, as a 
result, most died or were old by 1860, the end of the antebellum period.470
Looking over its life span the black mistress class reached its height in the 1830s, 
and their children benefitted from economic expansion over a thirty-year period.471
These black mistresses laid the foundation for the financial success of their mixed-
race children, for example, Nicholas Metoyer of Natchitoches, the son of a 
prominent black mistress, died in 1856, after he had been a wealthy planter for 
most of his eighty-eight years of life.472  His two younger brothers died in 1864, at 
470See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 176-77.
471See WOODSON, HEADS, supra note 112, at v. 
472See generally SISTER FRANCES JEROME WOODS, MARGINALITY AND IDENTITY (1972) 
[hereinafter WOODS], and MILLS, supra note 117.
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the ages of sixty-seven and sixty-nine.473  Many of the black mistress class and 
their children died by 1860, through natural causes as a result of the Civil War or 
war-related causes.474
This generational phenomenon can be seen in the life of Rosaline Mercier, a 
black mistress who, with her white paramour Thomas Durnford, produced Andrew 
Durnford, a wealthy and influential black master.475  Andrew Durnford was 
reaching thirty years old on June 27, 1829, when he was listed as the purchaser of a 
large tract of land in Plaquemines Parish.476  In that land sale, he was listed as a 
“f.m.c. [free man of color] residing in this City [New Orleans].”477  On July 22, 
1829, Andrew Durnford purchased another tract of land in Plaquemines Parish, 
and, by 1830, Andrew Durnford, with his black mother’s assistance, became 
473See MILLS note 117.
474See supra note 428. 
475See supra note 306.
476Land sale of John McDonogh to Andrew Durnford, New Orleans, June 27, 1829, 
Orleans Parish Courthouse Archives. 
477Id.
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Andrew Durnford, the black sugar plantation owner.478
By 1840, Andrew Durnford had begun to make his mark in the planter class.  
According to the 1840 Census (he was then about forty years old), Durnford 
owned sixty enslaved blacks, and was listed as the head of a household of four 
members.479  By 1850, he was listed in the manuscript census as being fifty years 
of age, a sugar planter, heading a household of seven members, owning seventy 
enslaved blacks, and having a sugar plantation valued at $80,000, showing the 
growth of this estate.480  Just prior to the 1860 Census-taking, and prior to the Civil 
War, Andrew Durnford died, as recorded in the July 13, 1859 obituary column of 
the New Orleans Bee:  “on his plantation in the Parish of Plaquemines 12th instant 
at 4½ (sic)  o’clock, a.m., Dr. (sic) A. Durnford, aged sixty years.”481  Andrew 
Durnford’s death marked the end of the black mistress and their interracial 
478Land sale of John McDonogh to Andrew Durnford, New Orleans, July 22, 1829, 
Orleans Parish Courthouse Archives.
479See the 1840 manuscript census for rural Louisiana.
480See the 1850 manuscript census for rural Louisiana. 
481See David O. Whitten, Slave Buying in 1935 Virginia as Revealed by Letters of a 
Louisiana Negro Sugar Planter, 11 L A. HIST. 231-32 (1970) [hereinafter WHITTEN, BUYING]. 
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offspring.
Parenthetically, one wonders about the attitude black mistresses and their 
racially-mixed children held toward ownership of enslaved blacks.  Some of them 
owned enslaved blacks in small numbers and probably for benevolent purposes.482
Some mistresses and their offspring, who owned large numbers of enslaved blacks, 
did so for economic exploitation and profit.483  Such was the case of  Andrew 
Durnford, as evidenced through his extensive correspondences with a prominent 
white businessman and personal friend, John McDonogh, on many issues of the 
day.484
Andrew Durnford, a black man who enslaved black people, can be classified 
482See WOODSON, HEADS, supra note 112, at xxxv:
In some of these cases, as in that of Marie Louise Bitaud, a free woman of color 
in New Orleans, in 1832, these slaves were purchased for personal or benevolent 
purposes, often to make their lots much easier....  Samuel Martin, a benevolent 
slaveholder of color residing at Port Gibson, Mississippi, purchased two mulatto 
women with their four children, brought them to Cincinnati in 1844, and 
emancipated them.
483See generally WHITTEN, supra note 306.
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as a “progressive” enslaver (if such a classification makes any sense).  He, along 
with McDonogh, favored the re-colonization of blacks to Africa, particularly 
Liberia.485  While traveling to Philadelphia in 1835, Durnford met with the 
outspoken abolitionist of American enslavement, Elliott Cresson.486  From his St. 
Rosalie Plantation on March 23, 1844, Andrew Durnford wrote to John 
McDonogh, praising him for establishing a voyage to Africa for New Orleans 
people: 
I see by your letter of the 4 that a vessel is to leave here for Africa:  I 
have heard since with pleasure, from different sources, that you have 
been engaging some of our New Orleans people to go to Africa; act.  
This is the right way to do things my friend.487
484Id. at 57-67.
485Id. at 58.
486See WHITTEN, BUYING, supra note 481, at 233-35. 
487Andrew Durnford to John McDonogh, St. Rosalie, March 23, 1844, McDonogh MSS,
Tulane University Library.  See also, supra note 66: “Contrary to the norm, some enslaved 
blacks were able to obtain money, often with the permission of their master, and allowed or 
encouraged to ‘purchase’ their freedom.”  
See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 427-28:
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Durnford himself had a burning interest in the American Colonization Program: 
the article of the colonization Herald of March 20th, from the Biblical 
repository and Princeton review for January 1844; is a clear 
topographical and commercial  &c. (sic) of the colonies of Africa.  It 
is worth reading.  I have sent for it, if it can be had in New Orleans.488
Andrew Durnford apparently wished to send his enslaved blacks to Africa, 
and obviously influenced his friend John McDonogh, who willed that eighty-five 
of his enslaved blacks be liberated and sent to Liberia with transportation expenses, 
tools, provisions, and money to get settled.489  Durnford wrote on January 6, 1844: 
“ . . . (it will interfere with my future projects, if I am spared long enough, to send 
John McDonogh... of New Orleans... made a unique bargain with his whole force 
of slaves...by which they were collectively to earn their freedom and their passage 
to Liberia by the overtime work of Saturday afternoons....  The plan was carried to 
completion on schedule...they left America in 1842, some eighty in number....  
McDonogh wrote: ‘... I can say with truth and heartfelt satisfaction that a more 
virtuous people does not exist in any country.’ (Footnotes omitted.)
488Id., June 13, 1844. 
489See WHITTEN, BUYING, supra note 481, at 234.
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my mite to the African shore) . . .”490  The Plaquemines Parish conveyance index 
lists Durnford’s emancipation of enslaved blacks, indicating he did free some of 
his people.491  Yet, the 1860 manuscript census lists the estate of Andrew Durnford 
as owning seventy-five enslaved blacks and showing that Durnford freed few, if 
any, of them.492  Unlike McDonogh, Durnford was greatly in debt (to McDonogh’s 
estate) when he died; this might have affected his decision or bettered Durnford 
ability to liberate his enslaved blacks.   Durnford did not live to see the Civil War, 
but some of his fellow black masters did, as discussed next.493
490Andrew Durnford to John McDonogh, St. Rosalie, January 6, 1844, McDonogh MSS,
Tulane University Library.
491Index to the Plaquemines Parish Civil Records, New Orleans Public Library Archives. 
492See the 1860 manuscript census for rural Louisiana. 
493See SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 192:
Following the death of their mother in 1866, Andrew Durnford, Jr., and his sister 
Rosema Durnford struggled desperately to regain the antebellum production of 
sugar that made their father one of the richest free Negroes in the United States, 
but in 1874, besieged by creditors, they were forced to sell St. Rosalie plantation 
for a few thousand dollars.
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B. FIGHTING FOR HER PROPERTY 
The ten years between 1860 and 1870 brought the Civil War and the 
Reconstruction to the South, along with social confusion and economic ruin to the 
black mistress.494   In the late 1850s, the black mistress faced a change in white 
attitudes toward her.  New laws made it impossible to emancipate an enslaved 
black in Louisiana and throughout the South, limited her free movement, and even 
494Id. at 190:
Despite such professions of ‘common sympathy,’ the war and its aftermath 
spelled disaster for the great majority of affluent free persons of color in the 
Lower South.  This was especially true in rural areas that had experienced the 
brunt of Union attacks, but even in towns and cities, despite the ability of some 
wealthy families to maintain their real estate holdings, there was a marked decline 
in the wealth holdings of the majority.  Following three successive postwar crop 
failures, South Carolina rice planter Robert Collins, who had once owned a 3,100-
acre plantation and seventeen bondsmen and women, was forced to borrow 
money from the Freedmen’s Bureau to purchase supplies for his former slaves.  
Collins’s sister, Margaret Mitchell Harris (both children of Elias Collins), owner 
of 44 slaves and a 981-acre rice plantation in Georgetown District, had a 
premonition of the coming disaster.  In 1860, she sold her slaves, disposed of her 
plantation, and invested $35,000 in stocks and bonds, only to lose everything as 
the stock certificate became worthless during the war.
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encouraged her to select a white master and voluntarily become enslaved.495  One 
politically astute free black taught his children to do menial tasks normally done 
for them by their enslaved blacks:  “And he made his children, mind you, every 
week one of those daughters had to cook and another would take the house.  
Learning housekeeping.  Because he saw that things were going to change.  He 
told them its going to be different.  You are going to have to do (sic)–to work.”496
Not all black mistresses and their privileged children resolved the possible 
future changes in such an easy and committed manner.  As reported in September 
1861, two free blacks argued over their positions concerning the Civil War, and 
one man was killed in the ensuing duel.497  While many opposed the Civil War, 
others took up arms to defend their homeland, volunteering to fight for their 
property rights, as expressed in a 1864 communication to the New Orleans Daily 
Delta stating: 
The free colored population (native) of Louisiana . . . own slaves, and 
495See TAYLOR, supra note 137, at 157. 
496See WOODS, supra note 472, at 36-37. 
497See BLASSINGAME, BLACK, supra note 27, at 33. 
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they are dearly attached to their native land, . . . and they are ready to 
shed their blood for their defense.  They have no sympathy for 
abolitionism; no love for the North, but they have plenty for 
Louisiana. . . .  They will fight for her in 1861 as they fought in 1814-
’15. . . .  If they have made no demonstration it is because they have 
no right to meddle with politics, but not because they are not disposed.  
All they ask is to have a chance, and they will be worthy sons of 
Louisiana.498
Free blacks who proposed to defend their homeland followed a well-
established tradition of fighting foreign invaders.499  They had participated in the 
Battle of New Orleans with success, as noted in President Andrew Jackson’s 
recognition, that General Sir Edward Pakenham, the British commander, had been 
shot by “a free man of color, who was a famous shot and came from the Attakapas 
region of Louisiana,” perhaps a certain “Captain” Savary.500  It was not surprising 
498See PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 435-36. 
499See generally MCCONNELL, supra note 374.
500See EDWIN ADAMS DAVIS, LOUISIANA, A NARRATIVE HISTORY 85 (1971) [hereinafter 
E. A. DAVIS]. 
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that as the Civil War approached, a free black, Jordan Noble, who was the 
drummer boy at the Battle of New Orleans in 1815, advertised and held meetings 
in New Orleans, for those free blacks, who wanted to defend their homes.501
Accordingly, on April 23, 1861, the New Orleans Delta reported, “these men who 
distinguished themselves at the Battle of New Orleans are determined to give new 
evidence of their bravery.”502
Free blacks in Louisiana’s Pointe Coupee and Natchitoches Parishes formed 
companies of Home Guards, soon after the Civil War began, and were reportedly 
used to prevent uprisings of enslaved blacks.503  An affluent free black, Metoyer of 
Natchitoches, was reported a Confederate captain in the cavalry, and another free 
black from that area was a colonel.504  Free blacks in Plaquemines Parish organized 
a militia company.505
501See Mary F. Berry, Negro Troops in Blue and Gray: The Louisiana Native Guards, 
1861-1863, 8 LA. HIST. 165, 167 (1967) [hereinafter BERRY]. 
502See BLASSINGAME, BLACK, supra note 27, at 33. 
503See generally MCCONNELL, supra note 374.
504See WOODS, supra note 472, at 38-39. 
505See generally MCCONNELL, supra note 374.
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One should not assume that the free blacks’ call to arms meant that they 
agreed with the Confederate cause, as clearly evidenced in the Confederate leaders’ 
decision not to employ the free black “Home Guard” regiment, formed in New 
Orleans.506  One noted scholar concluded that this disinclination of the state militia 
to use the colored regiment evidenced their distrust of the free black soldier, 
evidenced a Confederate policy not to use black troops, or evidenced some free 
black soldiers were forced to join the Confederacy.507  One free black, Charles 
Gibson, testified he was taken from his home, and forced to join the Confederacy.  
Another colored officer reportedly said, “We were ordered out and dared not 
refuse, for those who did so were killed and their property confiscated.”508   These 
examples show the complexity of the motives that free blacks had for joining the 
Confederate Army.  
While the Confederacy apparently chose not to employ free black soldiers, 
the Union leaders used them; they were outstanding soldiers in the Battle of Port 
506Id.
507See BERRY, supra note 477, at 169. 
508Id. at 172. 
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Hudson.509  Andrew Cailloux, a free black from New Orleans, was reportedly one 
hero of the Battle.510  While the black mistress and her children were engaged in 
some aspect of the Civil War, many of them who had thrived against legal 
obstacles during the antebellum period did not live to see the ravages of the Civil 
War.
C.  THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF THE CIVIL WAR
As for most southerners of every background, the Civil War had devastating 
effects on the black mistress’s property ownership.511  For those black mistresses 
509Id. at 179-89.
510Id.
511See SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 190:
Despite such professions of ‘common sympathy,’ the war and its aftermath 
spelled disaster for the great majority of affluent free persons of color in the 
Lower South.  This is especially true in rural areas that had experienced the brunt 
of Union attacks, but even in towns and cities, despite the ability of some wealthy 
families to maintain their real estate holdings, there was a marked decline in the 
wealth holdings of the majority.
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and their offspring, who owned enslaved blacks, the Civil War’s most significant 
effect economically was the loss of their investment in enslaved blacks, resulting 
from the Emancipation Proclamation.512  Enslaved blacks were the most significant 
capital investment and a great source of virtually free labor; hence, with the 
emancipation, work greatly slackened and a large decrease in profits resulted.513
512Id. at 191:
When war commence (sic) it purty (sic) hard on folks,’ a free Negro in St. Mary 
Parish, Louisiana, recalled.  First came the Confederates who swept up the slaves, 
including those owned by blacks, and took them away to build fortifications.  
‘Dey (sic) line my daddy up with de others, but a white man from town say, ‘Dat 
(sic) a good, old man.  He (sic) part Indian and he (sic) free’....  So dey (sic) let 
him go.’  Then Yankee raiding parties rode through, burning, pillaging, and 
looting.  ‘Dey (sic) tak (sic) a whole year crop of sugar and corn and horses.’  
Everywhere the Union army advanced free blacks told of death and destruction.  
‘The road all the way to Natchitoches,’ one observer said, describing the region 
where some of the wealthiest free persons of color in America owned their 
plantations, ‘was a solid flame.’  His heart was ‘filled with sadness’ at the sight of 
those lovely plantations being burned to the ground.  (Footnotes omitted.) 
513See Joe Gray Taylor, Slavery in Louisiana During the Civil War, 8 LA. HIST. 27, 33 
(1967).  See also, SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 193-94:
In addition, free persons of color in the city (of Charleston) lost an estimated 
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The black mistress class, especially those with significant wealth, lost substantial 
fortunes as a result of the economic effects of the Civil War.514  Still, some free 
$216,000 in slave property when they were forced to free their bondsmen.  In 
New Orleans, a close study of creoles of color in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
wards, the heart of the free mulatto community, reveals a similar decline.  Among 
the 98 free persons of color listed in the 1860 and 1870 census returns, nearly half 
experienced losses, only one of four kept their holdings intact, and 23 expanded 
their wealth... carpenter Casimir Labat... was joined by 31 other propertied 
antebellum men and women in the three wards who had lost everything.  
(Footnotes omitted.)
514See SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 191-93:
While some of the Metoyer family escaped destruction, in St. Landry Parish, 
despite declarations of loyalty to the United States, Antoine Meullion lost 30 head 
of cattle, 150 sheep, 26 hogs, 5,000 fence rails to a band of Union soldiers under 
the command of Nathaniel Banks.  Pierre and Cyprian Ricard, descendants of the 
wealthiest free person of color in the State, lost virtually everything during the 
war.   In 1868, a final 161 acres was seized by the Iberville Parish sheriff for 
nonpayment of debts and sold at public auction.  Similarly, the Ponis family in St. 
John the Baptist Parish, the Verdun family in St. Mary Parish, the Deslonde in 
Iberville Parish, and the Porche family in Pointe Coupee Parish witnessed the 
disintegration of their antebellum fortunes during the war....  As with their white 
neighbors, the problems in securing farmhands, the flooding and crop failures in 
1866 and 1867, and the difficulties in obtaining credit forced many landholders 
off the land, while pushing others to the brink of disaster.  Within a few years 
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mistresses and their offspring thrived financially, as a result of the War.515
after the war the vast majority of the wealthiest rural Negroes in antebellum 
America–Louisiana’s creoles of color–had lost not only their slaves, farm 
machinery, livestock, buildings, and personal possessions, but their land was 
well....  In 1860, 121 Negro real-estate owners in Charleston (including a few near 
the city but in the county) boasted holdings of more than $2,000; they owned a 
total of $618,900, or $5,115 per property owner.  A decade later, only 81 realty 
owners were listed in the same category; they held $423,000, still $5,222 per 
owner, but a large majority of the 1870 group–two out of three–had acquired their 
holdings during the postwar period.  (Footnotes omitted.)   
515Id. at 193-94:
Only a few affluent free persons of color escaped the war years unscathed.  Those 
who did had usually invested heavily in urban real estate (rather than slaves) or 
maintained profitable businesses.  In Charleston and New Orleans, despite 
occupational declines and wartime destruction, a few prosperous free blacks 
actually improved their economic standing following the Civil War.  Charleston 
engineer Anthony Weston, wood dealers Richard Dereef and Robert Howard, 
butcher George Shrewsberry, and realtor William McKinlay, among the richest 
antebellum mulattoes, either maintained their estates or improved their economic 
position.... A similar situation existed in the Crescent City.  Land speculator 
Thomy Lafon, who became a large contributor to various black charities, 
increased his wealth from $10,000 to $55,000 by speculating in swampland 
during the Union occupation... another broker, Drauzin Barthelemy McCarty, 
increased his fortune from $45,000 to $77,300 during the same period... landlord 
Edmond Dupuy, whose $200,000 worth of real estate made him the second 
wealthiest Negro in the South.  (Footnotes omitted.)
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An analysis of the 1870 federal manuscript census shows the devastating 
effect the Civil War and post-War economy had on the black mistress’s property 
ownership.  But first, a caveat: despite the War and post-War economic disasters, it 
has been suggested that, in analyzing the plantation system in Louisiana, it not only 
survived the Civil War, but also grew.516  This observation may be true of the 
plantation system, but it hides the devastating effect the War had on individual 
owners.  Therefore, in analyzing the effects of the Civil War on the economic 
situation of the black mistress, it is important to follow the names of the black 
plantation owners and their families.  
The following conclusions about the social and economic effects that the 
Civil War had on the black mistress class are based on the author’s analysis of the 
1870 manuscript census for rural Louisiana.  We begin with an analysis of black 
mistress’s property ownership in rural Louisiana, as, prior to the Civil War, some 
of the wealthiest black masters in the South resided in Louisiana.517
The black mistress class in Iberville Parish, for example, experienced a great 
516Roger Wallace Shugg, Survival of the Plantation System in Louisiana, 3 J. OF SO. 
HIST. 311 (1937). 
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decline in their property ownership.518  In 1860, there were six blacks in the black 
mistress class, one of whom, Durand, was in partnership with Dubuclet, owning 
plantations of over 3,299 acres (of which 1,595 were improved), valued at a total 
517See SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 191-92. 
518Id. at 121:
In Iberville Parish, by 1860, nine (black) plantation owners were listed as having 
$646,000 in real estate, or $71,778 per family.  Census takers probably included 
some personal property in these valuations, but even so Zacharie Honore 
increased his land holdings from $20,000 to $60,000; Antoine Dubuclet, from 
$87,500 to $200,000; George Deslonde (and his wife), from $65,000 to $115,000; 
and Madam and Pierre Ricard, from $80,000 to $200,000.  In 1859, one observer 
described the Ricard family as ‘doubtless the richest black family in this or any 
other country. (Emphasis added, footnotes omitted.)
Id. at 191-92:
Pierre and Cyprien Ricard, descendants of the wealthiest free person of color in 
the state, lost virtually everything during the war.  In 1868, a final 161 acres was 
seized by the Iberville Parish sheriff for nonpayment of debts and sold at public 
auction....  During the war, Antoine and Josephine Decuir, once among the richest 
free mulattoes in America, were forced to mortgage their house, the adjoining 
land, and even their crops.
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of $125,730.519  By 1870, only two of them–Augustin Dubuclet and Madame F. Z. 
(sic) Honore –were still listed as “planters,” owning a total of 488 acres worth 
$1,650 (in 1860, they owned a total of 348 acres, worth $42,006).520  (The reason 
for the increase in the total acreage owned by the two was due to Madame C. 
Ricard, who is not listed in the agricultural census, but as living on the Honore 
household.  It is likely that some of her property was credited to Honore.)
An example of the economic ruin suffered by the black mistress class 
following the Civil War was that of the Ricard family.  Before the Civil War, 
Madame C. Ricard and her sons had purchased their second plantation; the two 
plantations had been valued at a quarter of a million dollars.521  In the 1870 
manuscript census, Widow P.C. Ricard, aged eighty years old, is listed as living in 
the house of Madame F.Z. Honore, and is listed as not owning any real or personal 
property.522  Her son, Pierre, is not listed and is presumably dead.  And although 
three of her other sons are listed Emile T. Ricard–music teacher; Joseph Ricard–
519See the 1860 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana. 
520See the 1870 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana. 
521See supra note 363.
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carpenter; and Lucien Ricard–carpenter, none of them is listed as owning any real 
or personal property.523  The Ricard family, one of the wealthiest black families in 
the country, had become impoverished.  
A review of the changed fortunes of Claire Poland and Antoine Dubuclet 
shows how some black mistresses faced economic ruin following the War.  In 
1852, the succession papers of Dubuclet’s wife, Claire Polard Dubuclet, show that 
she left $82,076.25 of real property and enslaved blacks to her family.524
According to the 1860 manuscript census, Antoine Dubuclet owned real property 
worth $200,000.525  But, by 1870, the value of his real property was $40,000.526
And, in 1888, in Antoine Dubuclet’s succession papers, he left his family 
522See the 1870 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana. 
523See the 1870 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana. 
524Succession papers of Claire Polard Dubuclet, November 18, 1852, Iberville Parish 
Courthouse. 
525See the 1860 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana.
526See the 1870 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana. 
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$1,130.76 of real estate, rights, and credits.527
The free black mistress class went from landed gentry to other occupations, 
including Antoine Dubuclet, who became Louisiana’s State Treasurer; Alcide 
Durand (probably Pierre Durand’s son) who became a carpenter (along with Pierre 
Cyprien Ricard, who was not listed and was perhaps dead; and his mother Widow 
P.C. Ricard, listed as “at home,” probably retired).528  The most accomplished of 
all the Iberville Parish black mistress class was Antoine Dubuclet.  He became 
State Treasurer during Reconstruction, using the accounting skills that he learned 
as a planter to help the freedmen and the State of Louisiana to “keep the books.”  
White critics sought to hold him responsible for the heavy spending on social 
programs (like the first public school system) and accused him of corrupt dealings 
during his service from 1868 to 1879.  One free black writer, Rodolphe Lucien 
Desdunes, defended Dubuclet’s integrity and his accounting abilities: 
Some of the most eminent politicians of Louisiana came–determined 
to find irregularities in Dubuclet’s records, but to no avail.  The 
Aldiger Committee was at this time actually created for the one 
527Succession papers of Antoine Dubuclet, April 2, 1888, Iberville Parish Courthouse. 
528Id.
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purpose of examining Dubuclet’s accounts.
The men of the committee, in order to achieve this end, secured the
services of three of the most reliable experts in the field of accounting.  
For six months the investigation continued.  The group made every 
effort to prove Dubuclet guilty but his integrity prevailed.  In any 
other case, a person who had proved himself so clean would have 
been given high commendation but not Dubuclet, for he was a Creole 
of color.529
Another effect that economic ruin had on the black mistress class was a 
social one: the loss of status that the white enslavement social-economy provided, 
and the fear of being classified commonly with the newly freed, formerly enslaved 
blacks.530  As in the case of Antoine Dubuclet and others, the response was one of 
529See DESDUNES, supra note 374, at 74-75. 
530See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 390-92:
Black life from Reconstruction to present cannot be fully understood without 
taking into account the long-standing differences between these free Negroes and 
the masses of the former slaves.  Well into the twentieth century, the descendants 
of the free Negro elite maintained their lofty status within black society....  The 
legacy of the free Negro caste was not confined to these lingering enmities.  Most 
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leadership, about 30% of the black leadership in New Orleans during 
Reconstruction had owned enslaved blacks before the War.531  Some of the black 
mistress class “passed over” into the white race if they could.  Two such cases of 
“passing over” that appear in the 1870 manuscript census, were those of Augustin 
Dubuclet and Emile T. Ricard.532  Both had been listed in previous censuses as 
being “mulattoes.”533  But, in the 1870 census, they were listed by the census-taker, 
who happened to be P.G. Deslondes, a free mulatto and a family friend, as being 
free Negroes did not belong to the elite and felt little sympathy for its pretensions.  
Tied closely to the former slaves by blood, marriage, religious affiliation, and 
work habits and alienated from whites, the vast majority of free blacks greeted 
Emancipation with the same wild enthusiasm as did the mass of enthralled blacks.  
If freedom within the slave society had made free Negroes leaders without a 
following, Emancipation restored their constituency....  Economic changes 
unleashed by Emancipation also pushed freemen and freedmen together.  
Emancipation eroded the paternalism which had encouraged whites to patronize 
free Negro tradesmen by depriving these whites of the gratification they received 
from being served by those of lower status than themselves.
531See David C. Rankin, The Origins of Black Leadership in New Orleans During 
Reconstruction, 40 J. SO. HIST. 417 (1974) [hereinafter RANKIN]. 
532See the 1870 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana. 
533See the 1850 and 1860 manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana.
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“white.”534  (Pierre G. Deslonde was Louisiana’s Secretary of State during 
Reconstruction, 1872-1876.)
Some black mistresses were less affected by the Civil War.  One group in 
Louisiana that prospered, for example, despite the War, was the sugar and rice 
planters in Plaquemines Parish.535  In Plaquemines Parish in 1850, there were three 
in the black mistress class who were sugar planters–Andrew Durnford, Charles 
Reggio, and Adolphe Reggio–who produced a total of 730 hogsheads of cane sugar 
and 36,000 gallons of molasses (the Reggio brothers had produced 530 hogsheads 
of cane sugar and 2,000 gallons of molasses of those total figures).536  Andrew 
Durnford died shortly before the Civil War and the 1870 manuscript census does 
not list any Durnfords in Plaquemines Parish.537  And Charles and Adolphe Reggio 
were not listed in the 1870 agricultural census.538
534See the 1870 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana. 
535Id.
536Id.
537Id.
538Id.
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However, there is a strong indication that the Reggio brothers did continue 
sugar production after the Civil War.  In the 1850 manuscript census, Charles 
Reggio is listed as a “sugar planter,” who owned $18,000 of real property,539 and 
Adolphe Reggio is listed as a “sugar planter,” who owned $70,000 of real 
property.540  In the 1870 manuscript census, they are both still listed as “sugar 
planters,” with Charles owning $35,000 of real property, and Adolphe owning 
$25,000 of real property.541  It seems obvious that the Reggio brothers of 
Plaquemines continued their economic holdings and production after the Civil 
War.  
Black mistresses who were rice planters in Plaquemines Parish did even
better.   The 1850 manuscript census listed the names of six black masters families 
who grew rice:  Duplessis, Lafrance, Larche, Barthelemy, Paul, and Baptiste, 
producing 178,000 pounds of rice in 1850.542  According to the 1870 manuscript 
census, they continued rice production, after the War: Duplessis, Lafrance, 
539See the 1850 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana. 
540See the 1850 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana. 
541See the 1870 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana. 
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Barthelemy, and Baptiste, with their relatives Ancar, St. Anne, Sylve, File, 
Lightell, Dinet, Encalador, Moliere, and possibly others, producing 131,220 
pounds of rice, or 1.5% of the 8,639,026 total pounds of rice produced in 
Plaquemines Parish according to the 1870 agricultural census.543
After the Civil War, the black mistress class spread its landholdings to 
family members.  With the loss of their enslaved labor, the black mistresses faced 
the problem of holding on to the land and farming it.  For example, in 1860, Jesse 
Ashworth of Calcasieu Parish owned $31,500 of real property and personal 
property;544 in 1870, he is listed as owning $1,500 of real and personal property.545
Yet in 1870, there are four other Ashworth households, listed in 1870, with a total 
of $1400 of real property and personal property.546
Another example of the black mistress distributing land to her family was 
542See the 1850 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana. 
543See the 1870 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana. 
544See the 1860 manuscript census for rural Louisiana. 
545See the 1870 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana. 
546See the 1870 manuscript census for rural Louisiana. 
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that of the Boutte family of St. Mary Parish (Iberia in 1870).  The 1860 census 
listed four families named Boutte in St. Mary Parish, owning a total of $8,800 of 
real property, two of which owned a total of 22 enslaved blacks.547  With the 
emancipation of their 22 enslaved blacks, the Bouttes apparently divided their 
farms between their children and relatives to continue production.  In the 1870 
census, there are fifteen families named Boutte listed as owners of a total of 
$15,200 of real property.548  So that the Bouttes, in distributing their land to 
relatives, increased (nearly doubled) the value of their land.  
Was it possible that the same Bouttes named in the 1870 census were the 
former enslaved blacks that the Bouttes owned?  This seems unlikely, because all 
of the Bouttes’ enslaved blacks, according to the 1860 “slave” schedule, were 
listed as “black,” while all of the Bouttes listed in 1860, were listed “mulatto.”549
In 1870, all the Bouttes who owned property were listed as “mulatto,” and 
probably were not former enslaved blacks (this assumes that having real property
did not automatically “change” one’s skin color in the census-takers’ eyes).  
547See the 1860 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana. 
548See the 1870 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana. 
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In some cases after the Civil War, some blacks, other than of the black 
mistress class, obtained large tracts of land, including some former enslaved blacks 
and some Northern blacks who fought for the Union in the Civil War.  An example 
of the former was Arthur Sheff, a black born in Louisiana, and listed in the 1870 
manuscript census as being 27 years old and owning an estate in Iberville Parish 
worth $20,000.550  An example of a Northern black owning property in Louisiana 
was Edward Butler of Plaquemines Parish, who was 27 years old, born in 
Massachusetts, was the parish recorder of Plaquemines, and owned $1,900 in real 
and personal property.551
The black mistress class that survived the Civil War faced economic  
depression and increased taxes in the 1870s.   There was a decrease in the value of 
the property in Natchitoches Parish, for example, from $8 million in 1861, to about 
$1.25 million by 1873.  The result was an increase in the parish tax from 1.6 mills 
in Natchitoches Parish in 1861, to 64.5 mills in 1873.  The result of this economic 
depression and increased taxes was the forced tax sales of land.  The Natchitoches 
549See the 1860 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana. 
550See the 1870 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana. 
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People’s Vindicator  reported 30,000 acres of land “offered at sale for taxes.”  The 
Shreveport Times a few weeks sooner had protested:  “Under the present 
government [William Pitt Kellogg, who led white rule against black political 
leadership during the Reconstruction] of thieves, in God’s name, what hope have 
the people of Louisiana before them?”552
Hence, the black mistress class was impacted by the Civil War and 
Reconstruction.  The social response varied–some became leaders for the newly 
freed, formerly enslaved blacks, while some “passed over” to the white race.  
Some continued their land ownership, by distributing it to their relatives, but few 
continued their production after the War.  While different black mistresses 
experienced the War in different ways, one fact is clear:  the group was generally 
economically ruined by the Civil War, and by the depression and rise in taxes, 
during the following Reconstruction.  Few were to enjoy the property and social 
status they had once enjoyed during the enslavement period. 
D. RECONSTRUCTION:  U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL EFFORTS AT 
551Id.
552See E. A. DAVIS, supra note 500, at 274. 
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BLACK CITIZENSHIP AND MISCEGENATION553
As a result of the Civil War and its aftermath, the legal status of enslaved 
blacks changed radically.554  The Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
553See generally Charles Vincent, Black Constitution Makers: the Constitution of 1868, in 
IN SEARCH OF FUNDAMENTAL LAW: LOUISIANA’S CONSTITUTIONS 1812-1974 (Warren M. 
Billings & Edward F. Haas, eds., 1993); ROGER A. FISCHER, THE SEGREGATION STRUGGLE IN 
LOUISIANA 1862-1877 (1974); Germaine A. Reed, Race Legislation in Louisiana, 1864-1920, 6 
LA. HIST. 379 (1965); HOWARD N. RABINOWITZ, RACE RELATIONS IN THE URBAN SOUTH Ch. 8
(1978); BLASSINGAME, BLACK, supra note 27, HOWARD ASHLEY WHITE, THE FREEDMEN’S 
BUREAU IN LOUISIANA (1970).
554See BELL, RACE, supra note 36, at 55-63:
Historians have cited humanitarian concerns, political realities, and a desire to 
punish the South as factors explaining the enactment of the civil rights 
amendments.  But Dr. Mary Frances Berry suggests that the necessity and self-
interest in utilizing large numbers of black troops during the conflict largely 
determined the measures aimed at securing emancipation and granting citizenship 
and suffrage during the postwar years....  Even without Dr. Berry’s theory, it is 
beyond dispute that the Republicans recognized that unless some action was taken 
to legitimate the freedmen’s status, Southerners would utilize violence to force 
blacks into slavery, thereby renewing the economic dispute that had led to the 
Civil War.  To avoid this result, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and 
Civil Rights Acts of 1870-1875 were enacted.  They were the work of the Radical 
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legally abolished enslavement.555  Unfortunately, it did not abolish or eradicate 
Reconstructionists, some of whom were deeply committed to securing the rights 
of citizenship for the freedmen.  For most Republicans, however, a more general 
motivation was the desire to maintain Republican party control in the Southern 
states and in Congress.
See also, RECONSTRUCTION, AN ANTHOLOGY OF REVISIONIST WRITINGS (Kenneth M. Stampp & 
Leon Litwack eds., 1969) [hereinafter STAMPP, RECONSTRUCTION], especially Chapter 9, Joel 
Williamson’s “The Meaning of Freedom,” at 193-219:
Thus, even in the early days of freedom, former slaves with amazing unanimity 
revealed– by mass desertion, migration, idleness, by the breaching of the infinite 
minor regulations of slavery, by a new candor in relationships with whites, and by 
their ambition to acquire land–a determination to put an end to their slavery....  In 
a sense, far from being the disaster so often described, Reconstruction was for the 
Negroes of South Carolina a period of unequal progress.
555The Thirteenth Amendment provides:
Section 1.  Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall 
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2.  Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation. 
as cited in BELL, RACE, supra note 36, at 56 n.6. 
But see BELL, RACE, supra note 36, at 56 (“Enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment 
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economic enslavement.556  In order to ensure their citizenship, Congress passed the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, expressly recognizing that former enslaved blacks, now 
called “freedmen,”557 required the right to property and the right to contract.558
ended the Constitution’s protection of slavery, but did not resolve the issue of the newly freed 
slaves’ political status.”)  Nor did it resolve the issue of the newly free blacks’ economic status!
556See generally BLASSINGAME, BLACK, supra note 27.
557The term “freedmen” is the term that the federal government used to describe the 
newly freed, formerly enslaved black following the Civil War.  From a critical perspective, it 
hints of white property rights in the newly freed blacks.  An alternative, liberating term, such as 
“free people,” would have been better descriptive of blacks’ self-determination, and of their new 
and inherent status as full citizens.  On the contrary, the term “freed”-men has as an underlying 
connotation, that someone (Northern whites) had freed enslaved black “men,” and, as a result, 
the “freedmen” should be politically grateful, and, therefore, had a debt or obligation to pay 
(northern white Republicans) for their “emancipation” or freedom.   
558The rights of the formerly enslaved blacks, to contract for property, and to enjoy other 
property rights, were expressly provided for in Section One of the Civil Right Act of 1866:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding 
Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such 
citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or 
involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United 
States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property, and to full 
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That effort at guaranteeing freedmen full rights of citizenship resulted in the 
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.559  The Fifteenth Amendment provided the 
freedmen the right to vote, but only freed black men.560  On the other hand, the 
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and 
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains 
and penalties and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to the 
contrary notwithstanding.  (Emphasis added in bold-faced.)
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866).
559Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any 
persons of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
as cited in BELL, RACE, supra note 36, at 56, n.7.
560See BELL, RACE, supra note 36, at 55, n.10:
Adopted in 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment prohibited the denial of the right to 
vote to United States citizens because of ‘race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.’  Congress was empowered to enforce the provision ‘by appropriate 
legislation.’  The fate of post-Civil War laws is reviewed in name Gressman, The 
Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH L. REV. 1323 (1952) (sic).
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black woman’s struggle for full economic and legal equality in America was not 
won, either by constitutional amendments or by federal legislation; it had merely 
entered into another phase.  
After Reconstruction, a new era of white oppression of blacks would 
begin.561  In the meanwhile, during Reconstruction, many blacks especially those 
Of course, the Fifteenth Amendment did not provide protection for the right to vote, on the basis 
of gender!
561See generally VAN WOODWARD, STRANGE, supra note 64.  See also supra note 129: 
See KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 76, 77: ‘Reconstruction’s egalitarian spirit had 
posed challenges to antimiscegenation laws, but these challenges were typically 
short-lived.  South Carolina’s history is instructive in this regard.  Prior to the 
Civil War, the state had declined to prohibit interracial marriage, but immediately 
following the abolition of slavery, white authorities enacted an antimiscegenation 
statute.  Reformers removed the barrier in 1868, only to see it be reenacted in 
1879.  In 1895 white supremacists embedded the prohibition in the state 
constitution, where it remained for 103 years.’
Professor Kennedy also points out:
The same dynamic led to revisions of existing antimiscegenation laws in Alabama 
and Mississippi.  Alabama changed its laws to render all interracial marriages null 
and void, while Mississippi increased the punishment for the violation of its 
prohibition on interracial marriage: persons engaged in such unions, the state 
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who were formerly enslaved enjoyed the many benefits of American citizenship 
for the first time.562  That included the right to contract to marry with a person of 
the opposition race; the interracial sexual order was changed briefly during 
Reconstruction, allowing for many, for the first time, the right of interracial 
couples to legally marry.563   This change provided some Reconstruction state 
declared, could be confined to the penitentiary for life.  See Alabama Constitution 
of 1865, art. 4, sec. 31; Miss. Session Laws ch. 4, sec. 3 (1865).  See also Peter 
W. Bardaglio, Reconstructing the Household: Families, Sex, and the Law in the 
Nineteenth-Century South (1995), 179.
Id. at 77, n.*. 
562See generally STAMPP, RECONSTRUCTION, supra 554.
563See supra note 126:
See KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 254: ‘During Reconstruction, the color bar at the 
altar was breached in several places.  For a brief period, Alabama’s supreme court 
invalidated that state’s antimiscegenation law, and when reformers friendly to 
Reconstruction overhauled the laws of Arkansas, Mississippi, and South Carolina, 
they dropped existing antimiscegenation provisions from the statute books.  
Reconstructionists likewise repealed Louisiana’s bar on mixed marriages.  
(Footnotes omitted.)’
See, e.g., infra note 577, Cornelia Hart, Tutrix v. Hoss & Elder, Administrators, 1874 WL 3865 
(La. 1874), wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court validated a “marriage” between E.C. Hart, a 
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Supreme Courts the opportunity to remedy some of the wrongs committed during 
enslavement.  In Louisiana, this changed how antebellum laws on concubinage 
operated, by focusing in on the “afterwards married” exception in the statute.564
white man, and Cornelia Hart, a colored woman.
But see, supra note 127: 
See MORAN, supra note 112, at 5-6: ‘During Reconstruction, the state high court 
in Alabama declared a ban of interracial marriage unconstitutional but reversed 
itself shortly thereafter.  The U.S. Supreme Court upheld an antimiscegenation 
statute in Pace v. Alabama (106 U.S. 583 (1883)) in 1883, thereby cementing the 
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ marriages and families.  Only one state court 
declared antimiscegenation laws unconstitutional after the Pace decision.  In 
1948, the California Supreme Court in Perez v. Sharp (32 Cal. 2d 711, 948 P.2d 
17 (1948)) concluded that prohibition of interracial marriage violated the principle 
of racial equality and interfered with liberty to choose a spouse.  (Footnotes 
omitted, case citations added.)
See also KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 22:
During the reaction against Reconstruction, white supremacists exploited fears of 
interracial intimacy as perhaps the major justification for subverting the civil and 
political rights that had been granted to blacks, and the major reason for confining 
blacks to their degraded ‘place’ at the bottom of the social hierarchy.
564See LA. CIV. CODE, art. 1481 (1870), repealed by 1987 La. Acts No. 468, § 1:
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Louisiana Reconstruction courts were, for a short time, presented a rare 
opportunity to provide long-overdue property inheritance rights to black women.  
These cases, as were those during the antebellum period, involved “concubine” 
relationships, between white men and their now formerly, enslaved black women, 
and her miscegenational children.565  The following cases show how the political-
economic order changed in the South during Reconstruction.566
In 1873, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided the case of Fowler, Morgan 
and als. (sic) v. Ellen Morgan Individually and as Tutrix.567  In Morgan, the 
deceased James S. Morgan was a white man whose legitimate white children from 
a prior marriage (“forced heirs” under Louisiana law) sued to void an inter vivos 
Those who have lived together in open concubinage are respectively 
incapable of making to each other, whether inter vivos or mortis causa, 
any donation of immovables, ; and if they make a donation of movables,
it can not exceed one-tenth part of the whole value of their estate.  Those 
who afterwards marry are excepted from this rule. (Emphasis added.)
565See supra, Section IV, for a discussion and analysis of Louisiana’s antebellum statute 
and cases on concubinage.
566See supra note 126, on the changes concerning miscegenation law in the South, during 
Reconstruction.
567Fowler, Morgan and als. (sic) v. Ellen Morgan Individually and as Tutrix, 25 La. Ann. 
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gift Morgan made to his then enslaved mixed-race daughters.  Morgan had also 
granted them along with their then enslaved black mother, Ellen Morgan, their 
freedom at a future time.568  Morgan’s inter vivos to his mixed-race children was 
given before the parish recorder, where he also legally acknowledged them,569 and 
was accepted by a third party to hold until the children were freed.570  (Today we 
would analyze such a transaction as a semi-secret trust.571) 
206, 1873 WL 6956 (La. 1873).
568Id.
569Id.
570Id. at *2.
571Id., although Louisiana did not, at the time, embrace trust law.  Morgan is a precursor 
of the “semisecret” trust.  See, e.g., Pfahl v. Pfahl, 10 Ohio Misc. 234, 225 N.E.2d 305 (1967). 
The semisecret trust came into vogue in the 1920s, when wealthy white, married “gentlemen” 
established financial security for their “flapper” mistresses.  See also JESSE DUKEMINIER & 
STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUST, AND ESTATES 616-17 (2000) (citing Restatement 
(Second) of Trust § 55, Comment h (1959), as expressing the viewpoint that a constructive trust 
should be imposed in favor of the intended beneficiary in the semisecret, as well as secret, trust 
situation.  But see Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 18, Comment c (T.D. No. 1, 1996), agrees, but 
admits that enforcing a semisecret trust by imposing a constructive trust “probably does not 
reflect the current weight of authority.”) 
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The Court noted that under Article 193 of the Louisiana Civil Code572
Morgan’s miscegenational children whom he had legally acknowledged could 
receive gifts when they became free and, thereby, could inherit.573  The Court held 
that, as these events had occurred, it “could see no circumstances in this case 
which would have defeated the rights of the (miscegenational) children of the 
defendant, whatever may be the moral view of the question. (Emphasis added.)”574
In 1864, Louisiana as well as all Southern states amended its State 
Constitution to comply with the federal constitutional changes which represented a 
572Fowler, Morgan and als. (sic) v. Ellen Morgan Individually and as Tutrix, 25 La. Ann. 
206, 1873 WL 6956, at *2 (La. 1873), quoting La. Civ. Code, art. 193 (1825) stated:
The slave who has acquired the right of being free at a future time, is from that 
time capable of receiving testament or donations.  Property given or devised to 
him must be preserved for him, in order to be delivered to him in kind, when his 
emancipation shall take place.  In the meantime it must be administered by a 
curator.
In this author’s mind, this arrangement is very similar if not identical to a semisecret trust.
573Morgan, 1873 WL 6956 (La. 1873) at *2.
574Id.
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sea change from the “Black Code” of antebellum enslavement days.575   The effects 
of this change are seen in the case of Cornelia Hart, Tutrix  v. Hoss and Elder, 
Administrators.576   In that case, there was a battle over a large estate in Caddo 
Parish, Louisiana, for which succession was opened in 1869.577  Cornelia Hart, a 
former enslaved black woman, sued on behalf of her children with E. C. Hart, who 
was a white man.578  The black Cornelia Hart and white E. C. Hart had lived in 
open concubinage for several years and produced several children.  They were 
married in November, 1867.579
E. C. Hart’s white collateral heirs also sued claiming that Cornelia Hart was 
575See generally QUIGLEY, supra note 51.
576Cornelia Hart, Tutrix  v. Hoss and Elder, Administrators, 26 La. Ann 90, 1874 WL 
3865 (La. 1874).
577Id. at *1.
578Id. 
579Id. at *1-2.  According to the Court, a Roman Catholic priest performed the marriage, 
and the verbal process was written out and signed by the couple, three witnesses, and the 
officiating priest.  “No marriage license was issued, and no return was made of the act of 
celebration for record.  Subsequently the children were baptized by the same priest, of which he 
furnished a certificate.”  Id. at *2.
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a woman of color and was legally prohibited from marrying E. C. Hart and their 
miscegenational children “could not be legitimated by a marriage subsequent to 
their conception and birth.”580   They also claimed that even if the marriage 
occurred, it was a “private marriage,” and that “proof of that class of marriages can 
only be made by notarial act executed by the parties in conformity with the 
provisions of that act.”581  They further claimed that illegitimate children could not 
inherit until they were legitimated.582
The black Mrs. Hart’s counsel argued that “at the date of the marriage of E. 
C. Hart to Cornelia there was no law prohibiting the marriage; that the children of 
that marriage may and have availed themselves of the existing laws of the State to 
establish their legitimacy and their right to inherit their father’s estate.  Civil Code, 
580Cornelia Hart, Tutrix  v. Hoss and Elder, Administrators, 26 La. Ann 90, 1874 WL 
3865, at *2 (La. 1874).
581Id., citing Louisiana Statute “of 1868, No. 210, pages 278 and 279.”  
582Id. at *2, citing Louisiana Civil Code, articles 180, 198, and 200. . . 204 (sic), stating 
that acknowledgment of an illegitimate child should not be made in favor of children whose 
parents were incapable of contracting marriage at the time of conception, and that legitimization, 
as prescribed in articles 180, 198, and 200 of the Louisiana Civil Code, could only occur by the 
formal acknowledgment of a white father, before a notary and two witnesses.
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articles 208 and 209.”583  As such, the moment the law was changed permitting 
interracial marriage, it was arguably lawful to legitimate the black children of 
white men in the same way that their white children were legitimated. 
In disposing of the case, the Court first reviewed the language of the Civil 
Rights Act.584  The Court next noted that, under Louisiana’s State Constitution of 
583Cornelia Hart, Tutrix  v. Hoss and Elder, Administrators, 26 La. Ann 90, 1874 WL 
3865, at *2 (La. 1874).
584The first section of the Civil Rights Act declares ‘that all 
persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign 
power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be 
citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and 
color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or 
involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime, whereof the 
party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in 
every State and Territory in the United States to make and enforce 
contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, 
lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property, and to full 
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 
persons and property as enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be 
subject to like punishment, pains and penalties and to none other, 
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to the contrary 
notwithstanding.’
Id. at *3, Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866).
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1864, title 1, article 1, “Slavery and involuntary servitude, except a punishment for 
crime, whereof the party shall have been convicted, are hereby forever abolished 
and prohibited throughout the State.”585  The Court found that Louisiana law 
considered marriage as a civil contract (C.C. art. 86),586 “Cornelia Hart, therefore, 
in November 1867, was vested with the right to enter into a contract of 
marriage.”587  The Court concluded that the religious ceremony that the Harts used 
to marry fulfilled the requirements for a valid marriage,588 and, as the Louisiana 
Constitution (Article 149), retroactively recognized prior “marriages made in good 
faith,”589 their marriage was valid.590
585Cornelia Hart, Tutrix  v. Hoss and Elder, Administrators, 26 La. Ann 90, 1874 WL 
3865, at *3 (La. 1874). 
586Id., citing Article 90 of the Code:  “As the law considers marriage in no other view 
than that of a civil contract, it sanctions all those marriages where the parties at the time of 
making them were, first willing to contract; second, able to contract; and third, did contract 
pursuant to the forms and solemnities presented by law.” Id. at *3. 
587Id.
588Id.
589Id. at *4, citing Code, Art. 149, in pertinent part: “All... marriages and executed 
contracts, made in good faith and in accordance with existing laws in this State, rendered, made 
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The Court next discussed the issue of the legitimacy of the Harts’ mixed-
race children.591   The issue was whether E. C. Hart could legally recognize the 
children in that “acknowledgment,” under Louisiana law, must be proven by “a 
transcript from the birth or baptism kept agreeably to law or the usages of the 
county,”592 and other means of proving legitimacy.593  The Court decided that Mrs. 
Hart, on behalf of her children, had met those tests.594   Hence, the Court awarded 
the E. C. Hart’s estate to his black wife and mixed-race children.595
or entered into between the twenty-sixth day of January 1861, and the date when this constitution 
shall be adopted, are hereby declared to be valid....”  Id. at *4.
590Cornelia Hart, Tutrix  v. Hoss and Elder, Administrators, 26 La. Ann 90, 1874 WL 
3865, at *4 (La. 1874). 
591Id.
592Id.
593Id. at *4-5, wherein the Court found that according to La. Rev. Civ. Code, article 198, 
acknowledgment may be made by the contract of marriage; or under article 208, there were other 
ways that legitimacy could be proven, such as private writings, public acknowledgments, 
education, and open concubinage.
594Id. at *5.
595Id.
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In summary, for a brief time during Reconstruction, Southern state 
legislatures recognized the importance of transferring wealth from white men to 
their black wives and mixed race children.  In Louisiana, the Reconstruction 
Legislature did so, by permitting interracial marriage contracts, and by making it 
easier than it had been for antebellum miscegenational children to prove paternity.  
This allowed miscegenational families born out of “concubinage” to receive the 
state’s blessings of marriage and legitimacy, and allowed them to prove paternity 
in the same way as for white children.596
E. THE BLACK WOMAN’S STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL AND 
SEXUAL EQUALITY
During the post-Reconstruction period, the black woman entered into
another phase in her continuing legal battle for economic and civil equality, if not 
596See La. Rev. Civ. Code, art. 208.  See also Blasini v. Succession of Silvestre Blasini, 30 
La. Ann. 1388, 1878 WL 8609 (La. 1878), wherein “colored” children of a white man and a 
Mexican women established their parents lived in “open concubinage” and thereby were 
awarded to share in their father’s estate along with their white half-brothers and half-sisters. 
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civility.597  In 1896, the U.S. Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson598 set the legal 
standard for three decades of legal racial discrimination.599
Less known is the case of Mrs. Josephine Decuir, a black women of the 
black mistress class, who, like Plessy, fought for racial equality, in addition, to 
sexual equality.600  In 1873, “Madame” Decuir filed suit against a steamboat 
597See generally KEITH WELDON MEDLEY, WE AS FREEMAN: PLESSY V. FERGUSON
(2003).  In 1890, as Reconstruction was failing, the New Orleans Comite des Citoyens was 
founded to fight “Jim Crow” racial segregation legislation.   It targeted an 1890 local statute 
requiring passenger railroads in Louisiana to provide “equal but separate accommodations for the 
white, and the colored races.”    In Louisiana ex rel. Abbott v. Hicks, 44 La. Ann. 770, 11 So. 74 
(La. 1892) the Louisiana Supreme Court held the segregation statute unconstitutional, as applied 
to interstate commerce.  As a result, the Comite encouraged Homere Plessy to challenge the 
applicability of the statute vis-a-vis interstate transportation.   Plessy established the 
constitutionality of racial segregation under the banner of  “separate but equal,” which meant 
social and economic inequality became the law of the land until Brown v. Board of Education, 
387 U.S. 483 (1954).
598163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
599See generally ROBERT J. COTTROL ET AL., BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: CASTE, 
CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003).
600Mrs. Josephine Decuir v. John G. Benson, Docket #7800, Supreme Court of Louisiana 
Collection, Department of Special Collections, University of New Orleans; Frederick Way, Jr., 
comp., Way’s Packet Directory, 1848-1943 (Athens, Ohio, 1983), as cited in Kathryn Page, 
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owner, citing Article 13 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1868, and a state statute, 
both of which forbade racial discrimination in certain public places.601  Decuir, like 
many black mistress, faced the loss of favored status, that white society had 
“Defiant Women and the Supreme Court of Louisiana,” in BILLINGS, supra note 140:
On 20 July 1872, the widow boarded the steamboat Governor Allen at New 
Orleans. Because she was of mixed white and black racial background, a femme 
de couleur, Decuir was denied a stateroom in the so-called ladies cabin, an area 
reserved for the exclusive use of white women.  Instead, the cabin steward 
directed her to a stateroom set aside for freedwomen and freedmen located in an 
area called the ‘colored bureau.’  Decuir declined to accept such accommodations 
and spent the night sitting in a chair at the rear of a public area reserved for white 
women.  She was not permitted to eat in the dining area with other cabin 
passengers; instead, her meals were brought to her, and a second chair served as 
her table.  (Footnote omitted.)
Id. at 184-85.  
It is noteworthy that although there was a designated white women’s cabin separate from the 
white men’s cabin, there was no distinction made between the sexes in the area reserved for 
African Americans.   Female and male black passengers were assigned rooms in the same area. 
(Footnote omitted.)
Id. at 186.  See also FOX-GENOVESE, supra note 30.
601See BILLINGS, supra note 140, at 185.
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provided her prior to the Civil War.602  Madame Decuir won the case at the trial 
level, and was awarded a thousand dollars in actual damages.603
Benson, the ship’s owner, appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, and 
602Id., at 186-87.
Madame Decuir’s presence before the bar posed a dilemma.  Here was an 
educated woman, described by the white trial judge... as a genteel ‘lady of color’ 
who was modest, neat, and ‘quite fair for one of mixed blood’ and whose facial 
features were ‘rather delicate.’  Decuir was never a slave, but the color of her skin 
defined her not as a ‘lady’ but as a black woman.  Were she white, there would be 
no question that Josephine Decuir fit the southern definition of an ideal ‘lady’; a 
woman of purity, modesty, and refinement, fully deserving of male protection–be
they black or white. (Footnote omitted.)
Id. at 187.  
One of her attorneys attempted to establish her claim for equal treatment, arguing 
that a lady such as Decuir plainly could not undress for bed on deck ‘on account 
of delicacy.’  Furthermore, he averred, she was shocked, shamed, and mortified 
when subjected to the vulgar conversation of the crew and everyone else on the 
boat who passed by her.
Id.
603Id.
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lost.604  He then took the case to the United States Supreme Court, who, in 1877,  
found that the Louisiana State Constitutional provision prohibiting racial 
desegregation was unconstitutional, as it involved interstate commerce which was 
under federal jurisdiction.605  The Court then concluded that the steamboat owner 
had the right to adopt such “reasonable regulations,” as appropriate to conduct his 
business, including racially discriminating against black women.606  Hence, the 
Court held that a state could not prohibit segregation on a common carrier.607
604Id.
605Id. at 188.
606Id.
607See VAN WOODWARD, STRANGE, supra note 64, at 70-71:
The cumulative weakening of resistance to racism was expressed also in a 
succession of decisions by the United States Supreme Court between 1873 and 
1898 that require no (sic) review here.  In the Slaughter House Cases of 1873 and 
in the United States v. Reese and United States v. Cruikshank in 1876, the court 
drastically curtailed the privileges and immunities recognized as being under 
federal protection.  It continued the trend in its decision on the Civil Rights Cases 
of 1883 by virtually nullifying the restrictive part of the Civil Rights Act.  By a 
species of what Justice Harlan in his dissent described as ‘subtle and ingenious 
verbal criticism,’ the court held that the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress 
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Hence, Mrs. Josephine Decuir, a black mistress’s offspring, joined the ranks 
of other African-American women, including the modern day Rosa Parks,608 in 
the power to restrain states but not individuals from acts of racial discrimination 
and segregation.  The court, like the liberals, was engaged in a bit of 
reconciliation- reconciliation between federal and state jurisdictions, as well as 
between North and South.  Having ruled in a previous case (Hall v. de Cuir, (sic) 
1877) that a state could not prohibit  segregation on a common carrier, the Court 
in 1890 (Louisville, New Orleans, and Texas Railroad v. Mississippi) ruled that a 
state could constitutionally require segregation on carriers.  In Plessy v. Ferguson,
decided in 1896, the Court subscribed to the doctrine that ‘legislation is powerless 
to eradicate racial instincts’ and laid down the ‘separate but equal’ rule for the 
justification of segregation.  Two years later, in 1898, in Williams v. Mississippi, 
the Court completed the opening of the legal road to proscription, segregation, 
and disenfranchisement by approving the Mississippi plan for depriving Negroes 
of the franchise.     
608See generally JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE, AMERICA’S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 
1954-1965, 66-67 (1987):
In 1955, Rosa Parks was a quiet but strong-willed woman of forty-three.... On 
Thursday, December 1,... Parks boarded a bus at Court Square.  She sat down in 
the first row of the middle section of seats, an area open to blacks as long as no 
whites were left standing.  At the next stop–the Empire Theatre–some whites got 
on, filing all the white-only seats.  One white man was left standing.  The bus 
driver... told Parks and the other three blacks in the fifth row to get up so that the 
white man could sit down.  Nobody moved....  Parks was taken in a police car to 
the city jail, where she was booked for violating the law banning integration.  She 
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fighting for both racial and sexual equality.  Their legacy and perseverance have 
served all Americans.
*                        *                           *
Black women who were enslaved enjoyed no property rights, were legally 
deemed property, and did not control their own sexuality.  Black women who were 
free enjoyed limited property rights, but as friendly aliens, not as full citizens.  For 
a time during the Civil War, free and enslaved blacks fought, voluntarily and 
involuntarily, for the Confederacy.  During Reconstruction, many of the 
restrictions on black property rights, including prohibitions against interracial 
marriage, were lifted, allowing some miscegenational relationships to receive the 
property benefits of marriage.  But this was short lived, and post-Reconstruction, 
“Jim Crow” laws were harsher than the antebellum, anti-miscegenation laws.  
While black enslavement was formally abolished with the Thirteenth Amendment, 
black women were just beginning to face new and long-lasting struggles for racial 
and sexual equality.        
longed for a drink of water to soothe her dry throat.  ‘But they wouldn’t permit 
me to drink out of the water fountain,’ she recalls.  ‘It was for whites only.’
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VII.    BLACKNESS AS PROPERTY AND CURRENT REFLECTIONS ON 
BLACK PROPERTY OWNERSHIP
A. MISCEGENATION, BLACK WOMEN’S PROPERTY RIGHTS 
AND BELL’S “INTEREST-CONVERGENCE” PRINCIPLE
 Antebellum, Southern legal principles, regulating sexual relationships 
between white men and black women, and black women’s property rights, test 
Professor Bell’s “interest-convergence” principle.  Bell’s “interest-convergence” 
principle, relative to Critical Race Theory, states:  “Translated from judicial 
activity in racial cases both before and after Brown, this principle of ‘interest 
convergence’ provides: The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be 
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.”609
This article described and analyzed the nature of sex, race, status, and 
wealth, through the law of miscegenation and black women’s property rights, in 
the antebellum South.  It found that black people in the antebellum South were 
generally enslaved and legally treated as property.  Black women’s sexuality was 
609BELL, supra note 4.
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merely another aspect of property ownership that white men controlled.  In rare 
instances, in which white men chose to reward their black sexual partners with the 
gift of freedom, the law often denied white men the power to do so.  Even granted 
a legacy of freedom, white society often deemed black people as incapable of 
being freed and made them indefeasible property of white families, passed on from 
one generation to the next.  It is clear that when it came to enslaved black people, 
their property rights reflected Bell’s interest-convergence principle, in that they 
had no property rights, and were legally deemed property, because it was in white 
society’s best interests to keep blacks powerless and dependent on white support.
This article also evaluated private property principles through their 
application to the antebellum South’s ultimate anomaly: nineteenth-century, 
southern black women who owned property; the black mistress.  The relationship 
between wealthy white men and black women, and how the law regulated white 
men’s attempts at property transference to black women, is particularly challenging 
to Bell’s interest-convergence principle.   
The existence of the black mistress in the antebellum South is a peculiar 
legal anomaly or perhaps “a mystery wrapped in an enigma.”610  The black 
610BLASSINGAME, supra note 3, at viii, used this phase to describe George Bentley’s 
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mistress existed within the context of the property-enslavement-sexual paradigm 
nexus, which held that enslaved black women were white men’s private economic 
and sexual property.  Their existence and success challenged that doctrine.  
This article served to answer three probing questions about the relationship 
between sex, race, status, and wealth: first, why did the law allow some blacks to 
be freed and to remain free, despite the general legal proposition of enslavement 
law that all blacks be enslaved?  The answer to that question is that the laws of 
manumission and the legal status of free blacks reflect Bell’s “interest-
convergence” principle, in that those laws allowed wealthy white males to 
manipulate enslaved blacks to do their masters’ bidding.  White men’s bidding 
included sexual favors from enslaved black women, family loyalty from the white 
master’s mulatto children, and extraordinary military accomplishments and heroic 
ministry: 
One Lynn Creek, Giles country, Tennessee, there is a Hardshell Baptist Church, 
supported by a number of wealthy communicants of that “persuasion,” who for 
several years past have had for their regular pastor a negro man, black as the ace 
of spades, named George.... George is the “preacher in charge” of a large 
congregation, nearly all of whom are slaveholders, and who pay him a salary of 
$600 to $700 for his personal services. 
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achievements from enslaved black men.  
Second, why did the law allow free blacks to own private property, despite 
the general legal proposition that all blacks be property-less?  The right to private 
property was the greatest operative paradigm of nineteenth century America.611  It 
is what drove the American economy, the opportunity to achieve wealth, power, 
and status, through the acquisition of and development of property, particularly 
land and enslaved blacks in the antebellum South.  Even for non-property-holding 
whites in the Promised Land of America, the promise of land and enslaved blacks 
(at least in enslavement states and territories) was a driving force.  To deny free 
blacks the opportunity to own property would be to negate the single driving 
element of frontier expansion, indeed the core value of American society.    
And third, why have African-American women been stereotyped as un-
industrious, helpless victims of white domination, despite a history of self-
determination and achievement?  This study showed that black women, even in the 
most difficult of enslavement times, were able to acquire property, develop it, and 
accumulate wealth.  It serves to explode the “helpless, defenseless” black woman 
(citing the African Repository 1859 reprint from a Tennessee newspaper, at vii).
611See supra note 78.
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myth that plagues the contemporary mind.  
Why is our contemporary view of African Americans so far removed from 
our history?  It is because negative African-American stereotypes are a part of 
white America’s historical attempt to maintain America as “white man’s 
country.”612  Such that, as Reconstruction ended in the South, and Union troops 
were removed, there grew a white “democratic” movement,  promoting white 
domination over the black population, requiring that the status of the lowest white 
612See JORDAN, supra note 49, at 73-74:
The history of the proposition that America was and is meant to be “a white 
man’s country” is found in words of a “liberal” patriarch: “Benjamin Franklin, 
who was as attuned to American destiny as anyone, nervously expressed the idea 
that the continent belong to ‘White People.’  ‘I could wish their Numbers were 
increased.  Why increase the Sons of Africa, by Planting them in America, where 
we have so fair an Opportunity, by excluding all Blacks and Tawneys, of 
increasing the lovely White and Red?  But perhaps I am partial to the Complexion 
of my Country,’ he concluded with his usual self-conscious good sense, ‘for such 
Kind of Partiality is natural to Mankind.’  Franklin was expressing an important 
feeling, one which a famous Virginian, William Byrd, expressed more directly: 
‘They import so many Negros (sic) hither, that I fear this Colony will some time 
or other be confirmed by the Name of New Guinea.’
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be the ceiling for the highest black.613  For the formerly prosperous black mistress,  
reflecting their failed ties to the wealthy white men, this new political order 
required a great reduction in their status.  This also coincided with a renewed status 
of white women, as “pure, lily white,” “innocent,” and “frail,” there to serve the 
sexual needs of white men.614
Ultimately, antebellum society even controlled white men’s property rights.  
Despite their success in transferring freedom and wealth to some fortunate blacks, 
white men were eventually prohibited by white legislatures and courts from 
613See generally WOODWARD, STRANGE, supra note 64, at 31:
The Redeemers who overthrew Reconstruction and established ‘Home Rule’ in 
the Southern states conducted their campaign in the name of white supremacy....  
Separation of the races continued to be the rule in churches and schools, in 
military life and public institutions as it had been before (during Reconstruction).  
(Emphasis added.)
See also C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION, THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE 
END OF RECONSTRUCTION (1966).  Compare WILLIAM IVY HAIR, BOURBONISM AND AGRARIAN 
PROTEST, LOUISIANA POLITICS 1877-1900, 107 (1969) (for a state-focused study of the change in 
post-Reconstruction politics and racially-based brutality, and of a “regime remarkably powerful, 
backward, and corrupt”). 
614See generally FOX-GENOVESE, supra note 30.   
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effectively transferring wealth to black families.  This is one of the roots of today’s 
wealth gap between whites and African Americans, and of American society’s 
failure to assimilate African Americans.   As seen in antebellum cases involving 
white heirs who challenged property transfers to black women and miscegenational 
children, the law failed to provide white men the right to will wealth, and blacks 
the right to inherit or obtain wealth, consistent with Bell’s interest-convergence 
principle. 
A. “BLACKNESS AS PROPERTY” DOCTRINE 
This legal history study of antebellum Southern anti-miscegenation laws and 
of black women’s private property ownership rights evidences the existence and 
features of  the “blackness as property” legal doctrine.  In addition, it provides 
insights into the development of American private property (wealth) law.  
America’s private property ownership paradigms promoted the development of 
property, particularly land, through principles of free alienation, inter vivos by gift 
or sale, and causa mortis, by will.  It sacrificed the traditional property principle of 
primogeniture and reduced family inheritance obligations and expectations.  That 
paradigm represents the victory of development, living for today, property as a 
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commodity, and the struggle for wealth and greed.
Consistent with the private property ownership paradigm, America’s 
enslavement paradigm promoted many of the same aspects of the private property 
paradigm.  As enslaved blacks were legally deemed to be “property,” they were, in 
the antebellum South, a major (if not the major) investment in property.  But the 
enslavement system was more than a business; it was a political-racial-sexual 
economy.615  And enslaved blacks were more than mere property.  They were 
people with feelings, aspirations, and needs. 
America’s sexual paradigm stripped enslaved and free black women of their 
sexual freedom.  It allowed white men the right to rape black women without 
criminal or civil sanctions.  It took from black women the personal and economic 
value of their person, thus de-valuing their position as stakeholders.    
Paradoxically, even in light of these legal, economic, and personal barriers, 
in many instances, the black mistress enjoyed great property rights and privileges 
in the antebellum South.  Many were virtually on par with their white male 
counterparts, as related to private property acquisition.  A few, such as Madame 
615See PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 401 (“Plantation slavery had in strictly business aspects 
at least as many drawbacks as it had attractions.  But in the large it was less a business than a 
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Ricard, held exceptionally large tracts of land and impressive plantation homes, 
exceeding the success of their white counterparts in wealth creation and personal 
gain.     
Black mistresses’ property ownership, like their freedom, did not come 
easily or go unchallenged.  They faced many legal obstacles specifically designed 
to prevent obtaining property, hindering their ownership, and defeating their 
success.  It was the strength of the private property paradigm, along with their 
personal perseverance and determination, and concurrent interests and support of 
their white benefactors that created their success as property owners.  
In the post-Reconstruction days of “Jim Crow,” the political economy 
changed from wealthy-white master-driven to powerful-white male politician-
driven.  The privileged position of the black mistress was greatly marginalized, 
reduced to that of the newly freed enslaved black.  As a result, many former black 
mistresses led the legal battle for equality and civil rights for all Americans, 
seeking to regain the great property and civil rights privileges they enjoyed during 
the antebellum period.  Many of them were truly sympathetic with the plight of the 
freedmen.  Others merely sought to protect their own interests, seeking to escape 
life; it made fewer fortunes than it made men.”)
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the political and social forces “lowering” them in society.  A few left the South, 
and along with some who stayed, “passed for white” (if they were light enough), 
abandoning their enslaved, African heritage.
The existence of the black mistress, then, represents the triumph of the 
private property paradigm over the enslavement paradigm.  It clearly challenged 
the enslavement paradigm that all blacks should be enslaved property and never 
free.  It also challenged the enslavement paradigm that no black should own 
property.  On the other hand, the black mistress’s existence and her ownership of 
property resulted directly from the legal operation of the private property paradigm 
that promoted the interests of wealthy white men.  Hence, the political economy, 
the sexual economy, and the enslavement economy had one main defining feature: 
the domination, supremacy, and privilege of the wealthy white men.  
As reflective of Professor Bell’s “interest-convergence” principle, black 
women’s exercise of property rights needed to coincide with the interests of the 
wealthy.616  Educated, physically attractive and available, socially-sophisticated, 
and even wealthy free black women served all the sexual, political, economic, and 
616See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 182 (noting “The desire to keep the South a (wealthy) 
white man’s country governed white racial thoughts and policies throughout the antebellum 
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social needs of the wealthy white men.   In the end, they are, at best, reminders of 
the struggles that black women endured and overcame against all odds.  At worst, 
they are examples of the universality of greed and abuse in a political economy.  
And lastly, their success, as competent business leaders, debunks the anti-
empowerment myth, which is an underpinning of contemporary sexism and 
racism.
Hence, the antebellum South developed legal principles that exhibited the 
“blackness as property” doctrine.   Its elements included the supposition that black 
people were an inferior race, and legal principles that enslaved blacks were legally 
white property; enslaved black women’s sexuality belonged to their white masters;  
white men could legally rape black women; concubinage or consensual sex 
between white men and black women was legally regulated; free blacks were 
legally friendly aliens, not citizens; and all blacks, no matter their status, remained 
subject to the political whims of white society.  Unfortunately, the blackness as 
property doctrine did not die with the legal end of black enslavement, but 
continues as a part of today’s constitutional framework. 
years.” (Emphasis added.))  
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B. THE CONTEMPORARY BLACK WOMAN’S ECONOMIC 
PLIGHT
This article analyzes how the antebellum South developed legal principles, 
regulating miscegenation and black women’s property rights.  Miscegenation and 
enslavement laws have contemporary effects on African-American wealth and 
wealth creation.617  This article casts new light on an old myth, relative to sex, race, 
status, and private property, that of the “helpless, defenseless black woman.”  
According to the myth, it is believed that black women are helpless, incapable of 
controlling their destiny.  This is a disturbing image, for it seems to reflect the 
apparent plight of many African-American women (and families) enslaved in 
today’s capitalist political-sexual-racial economy.618
617See generally SHAPIRO, supra note 42.
618Contrary to Professor Davis’s findings (see DAVIS, supra note 9, at 282-84), this author 
believes that today there is a unitary racial-sexual political economy.  At the core of that 
economy are the impoverished, inner city poor blacks, for whom limited educational 
opportunities, limited access to capital, and high unemployment are continuously taking its toll 
on African-American women, men, and, most importantly, their families.  Evidence of the 
unitary nature of that economy is its duplication throughout each and every region of the country, 
in black ghettos, in Atlanta, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, New York, 
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In today’s political-sexual-racial economy, the welfare mother parallels the 
nineteenth century enslaved black woman.  Not only is she practically devoid of 
property in the world’s richest economy, she is downtrodden and generally denied 
opportunities for property advancement.619  She is enslaved (along with her family) 
in a world of crime, drug-abuse, public housing, HIV and other STDs, mental 
illness, and sometimes spiritual hopelessness.620  She is often legally denied even 
the minimum of property interest:  that of her welfare benefits.621
The low-to-non-existent legal status of the welfare mother vis-a-vis property 
rights reflects Professor Bell’s “interest-convergence” principle,622 in that her 
interests have little-to-no convergence with the interests of the white, male power 
structure.  No value to rich white America equals no private property rights.  These 
African-American women are often propertyless, not due to their inability to 
and Washington D.C., and in every major and minor city and town, where African Americans 
reside in great number.     
619See FISS, supra note 61 .
620Id.
621See generally BROWN, supra note 61.
622See BELL, supra note 4.
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achieve or lack of talent, but due to society’s failure to value their worth.  (This 
case study demonstrates how, despite the nineteenth century enslavement sexual 
economy, black women were often masters of their destiny and were capable 
business leaders.)  They are, unfortunately, like the enslaved black women of the 
nineteenth century, who served white men’s sexual and labor needs:  the victims of 
an often brutally unfair society. 
Then there is the African-American middle class woman.  She parallels the 
free black women of the antebellum South.  Consistent with Bell’s “interest-
convergence” principle, she is given greater property rights, such as limited 
educational opportunities, when and as those rights converge with the interests of 
the white, male power structure.  It is the African-American middle class woman, 
who is perhaps most affected by the Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter.623
Grutter has the effect of increasing the number of college -bound African-
American women, attending elite, predominantly white (male) campuses.624  As 
623Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003), supra note 18.
624See JOURNAL, supra note 25.  It does so without regard to the effects on the African-
American, such as adding to wealth-gender imbalance:  the preponderance of educated African-
American women over the dearth of educated black men.  (The author suggests that there should 
be a conscious effort to add more African-American men to elite, predominantly white, 
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such, she is allowed to  participate in, and exercise the benefits of, a “white” 
university education, but solely to add “diversity” or enrichment to the white 
(male) majority.625  An abundant number of educated, sophisticated black and 
brown women, provides white men a trophy of political-racial-sexual conquest.626
And last, but not least, there is the wealthy and powerful African-American 
woman.  She parallels the antebellum black mistress, who was at the height of 
society’s power and wealth.  She assuages the guilt of white society.  These rich 
and successful African-American superstars, such as Oprah Winfrey and 
Condoleezza Rice, exemplify today’s American Dream, achieving economic or 
political success against all odds, through their own extraordinary talent, hard 
work, and good fortune.  Their property rights support Bell’s “interest-
educational institutions (and not just as athletes).  The author does not suggest reducing the 
numbers of African-American women on those campuses.)  Due to the fact that there are more 
African-American men in America’s prisons than on its college campuses, we have inherited a 
social order founded upon our racist, enslavement past.  That is, except as laborers, soldiers in 
time of war, and the hero (today, the gifted athlete), the dominate white male culture has little 
use for African-American men (similar to society’s attitude towards poor, uneducated African-
American women).
625See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct 2325, 2733 (2003), supra, note 19.
626See generally ELRIDGE CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE (1969).
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convergence” principle, in that, for white America, these African-American 
superstars serve as symbols of racial progress, and the triumph of America 
democratic-capitalism, over all other forms of political economy.  They also allow 
the white, male power structure to ignore the need to develop meaningful solutions 
to persistent problems of gender and racial wealth disparity in this country.  (One 
needs only to visit local and state prisons or inner city schools throughout this 
country to appreciate the failing of our present political-sexual-racial economy.)  
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
In analyzing contemporary constitutional issues, Critical Race Theory and 
legal history are valuable tools.  This article utilizes such tools to seek the roots of 
the Supreme Court’s rationale in the Grutter case.  The result of that inquiry is that 
Grutter is rooted in the antebellum Sout h’s “blackness as property” legal doctrine.
The blackness as property doctrine embodied the political-economic-sexual 
tenets of antebellum Southern society.  It was based upon the then politically-
correct assumption that black people were an inferior race and, therefore, required 
white control.   It justified society’s treatment of enslaved black people as legally 
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classified white people’s property.  It devalued black women’s sexuality, treated it 
as a commodity or a mere dividend of a white’s purchase of a black woman.  It 
dictated the legal status of free blacks, who were legally permitted to exercise 
some property rights, not as citizens, but as friendly aliens.  It even prevented 
wealthy white men from controlling their own property when they attempted to 
bequest freedom to their enslaved black sexual partners and their children.  The 
blackness as property doctrine derived from antebellum Southern legal principles, 
regulating miscegenation and black women’s property ownership rights.   
The blackness as property doctrine also reflects and supports  Professor 
Derrick Bell’s “interest-convergence” principle.  As such, enslaved black women 
were given no property rights, as it was in white society’s interest to keep them 
powerless and dependent on white support.  They were also denied the right to 
their own sexuality.  When it came to concubinal sexuality, between white men 
and black women, at least one state’s law provided black women some limited 
property interest, as it was in white society’s interest to give white men an 
incentive to encourage black women to participate as concubines.  And when it 
came to the black mistress, white society allowed them to exercise many property 
rights, as friendly aliens as it was in white society’s interest to create black allies, 
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supportive of a corrupt enslavement social order.   Hence, the law regulating and 
negotiating the sexual-racial economies of property acquisition and transfers, 
including testamentary transfers and intestate succession, served to reinforce a 
greater social and economic order in the antebellum South:  the domination, 
supremacy, and privilege of wealthy white men.
As it relates to Grutter and contemporary constitutional matters, Justice 
O’Connor’s rationale in Grutter has its roots in the antebellum South’s blackness 
as property doctrine.  First, it reiterates the racist foundation of that doctrine, by 
finding that African Americans who apply to elite, predominantly white, public 
universities and professional schools are intellectually inferior to their white 
counterparts.  Second, it ignores a critical legal history analysis of black property 
disenfranchisement and white immorality, by finding that African Americans are 
undeserving of any consideration for wealth reparations, as victims of centuries of 
white wealth oppression.  And third, it treats African Americans as white property, 
by expressly stating that those few chosen African Americans that whites pick to 
integrate these elite educational institutions, are merely “diversity commodity” (the 
author’s term, not the Court’s), expressly there to enhance the white majority’s 
educational experience.  Overall, Grutter adopts the blackness as property doctrine, 
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reducing African Americans to white property, by assuming the power to control 
their destiny, and by permitting a selected number of them, for some uncertain (but 
limited) time, to integrate elite, predominantly white, educational institutions.  
Grutter’s “anti-affirmative action” rationale also reflects Professor Bell’s 
“interest-convergence” principle, in that it provides some chosen African 
Americans a chance at wealth transference, while providing whites with many 
benefits.  These white benefits, supporting the contemporary constitutional 
blackness as property doctrine, include the appearance of an open and free society 
(particularly to world opinion during the “war on terror”), a source of sexual 
exploitation (particularly of black women), athletic exploitation (usually of black 
men), military leadership (especially important to the Iraqi invasion), and an 
expected cadre of African Americans, loyal to the American Dream (a source of 
Republican converts, such as Justice Clarence Thomas).  The blackness as property 
doctrinal analysis may also prove valuable in analyzing other contemporary 
constitutional disenfranchisement questions, relative to the right to control one’s 
sexuality.627
627The blackness as property doctrine and the regulation of miscegenation and of black 
women’s property rights parallels the contemporary, constitutional debate on same-sex marriage.
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See generally EVAN GERSTMANN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2004) 
(wherein the author analyzes the legal debate relating to same-sex marriage, and whether the 
courts or the electorate should settle the question: “Does the Constitution protect the right to 
same-sex marriage?”) 
As this article shows, many times antebellum Southern Supreme Courts denied a white 
“husband” and father the right to free his enslaved black mistress and their children, through an 
act of inheritance.  The single reason that state justices provided in these cases was “defense of 
the family.”  By “family,” these justices did not mean the miscegenational family, but the “white 
family.”   The result was to ignore the miscegenational family, and to abandon its black 
members, so that they remained the property of the white family.  One is compelled to compare 
the contemporary debate concerning the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), and ask, what 
effect does a narrow legal definition of heterosexual “marriage,” have on the homosexual 
family?  See in DOMA, Pub. L. No. 104-99, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 
(2000) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738c (2000)), Congress bars federal recognition for as-of-then, 
nonexistent same-sex marriages.  See also, Rebra Carrasquillo Hedges, The Forgotten Children: 
Same-Sex Partners, Their Children’s Unequal Treatment, 410 B.C. L. REV. 883 (2002).
